4th and 1 at the 2, up by 10......

[Philly McButterpants]

I can't believe what I'm seeing here....are you guys just trying to make up garbage to complain about Jauron???

 

Kicking the FG was the right call. It's a chip shot. If Lindell makes it, the Bills are up by two TOUCHDOWNS, not just two scores. TB would need to get into the end zone twice, instead of once. Yes, it's 13 points and two TDs with extra points would beat you, but if your defense can't prevent them from getting into the end zone twice with that amount of time left, you don't deserve to win.

 

No mathematician is needed - only someone with first grade math level. The Bills win and we still find a way to bash the coach.

 

Thank you for the voice of reason. I'm reading these responses thinking WTF? It's simple. If you don't make it, Tampa can score a TD and a FG to tie. The 3 points taken forces them to score 2 TD's.

 

If DJ had gone for it and come up short, y'all would be calling for his head cuz he didn't put us up by 2 scores . . .

[FightClub]

Field goal was the correct call.

 

Yeah, I agree. I'm amazed so many people have a problem with this. If you are only up by 10 points, then all the other team needs to do to force overtime is have a short drive that stalls and results in a field goal, then get the ball back somehow and hit a hail mary.

 

Why would you expose yourself to that possibility? Why not make them need 2 TDs so that in that first drive, they have to push all of the way to the end zone, which is infinitely more difficult than just making it to the 35 and going for the FG and then taking your chances on the onside kick working.

 

It seems pretty obvious - I am as much a critic of DJ as anyone, but this made total sense.

[FightClub]

FWIW, how about Zorn's decision yesterday ... late in the game, in a similar field position but with only a 2 point lead, he went for the 4th down even though by doing so and failing, St. Louis had a chance to WIN the game with just a FG. The alternative was to attempt a FG, go up by 5 if it was good, and kick off.

 

Similar, but not identical, analysis applies. (The full analysis is here: http://www.advancednflstats.com/2009/09/ji...4th-down.html.) It's worth a read if trying to break down and analyze these decisions is interesting to you.

 

I didn't watch this (Rams-Redskins) game, but I think probably a key difference here is that the Rams were not moving the ball at all - 7 points total - so pinning them down in their own end was probably just as desirable as making it and the game being over.

 

In the Bills' case, the Bucs were moving the ball a bit, and the idea of them using the rest of the time to get into field goal range was entirely plausible. Remember, if you're just up by 10, this is their goal on the next drive - a quick FG - then they go onsides and try to use the rest of the time, whatever's left, to get the TD, even if there's only time for a hail mary.

 

If you go up 13, you take this strategy away from them, because a FG that late in the game does nothing for them.

[tennesseeboy]

I say go for it. Tampa doesn't have the kind of offense to go 90 yards quickly, our defense is good, a 13 point lead doesn't exactly put the game much more out of reach than a 10 point lead. I can't get awfully excited a bout the decision to go for the field goal, but I think going for it makes more sense.

[Beerball]

I say go for it. Tampa doesn't have the kind of offense to go 90 yards quickly, our defense is good, a 13 point lead doesn't exactly put the game much more out of reach than a 10 point lead. I can't get awfully excited a bout the decision to go for the field goal, but I think going for it makes more sense.

Yeah, we've never seen that happen.

[MRM33064]

I think the basic disagreement is that - except in the most obvious examples - many folks just don't want to buy into the idea that there are objective methods to help analyze trade offs in football decisions. Trade offs between points needed, field position, and time ... trade offs between punting, kicking FGs and going for it, and so forth. Each has a proper weight in the equation, but I respectfully think there is a tendency for folks to overvalue the TD in that equation.

 

For instance, if we offered an extreme choice: 1st down at the opponent's 2, with 10mins left in the game, down by 7; or 1st down at your own 2, with 30 seconds to go, down by only 3 - most will agree to be down by 7 rather than 3. In other words, they'd value the field position and time over the extra point differential. One isn't always worse off being down by 5 than down by 2 (the Rams), or being down by 13 than down by 10 (the Bucs). It all depends on the other factors ... and there are literally thousands of real-life examples of those "other factors" to examine which can help to make informed decisions on the closer cases.

 

Running the actual data for the Zorn decision, I believe the decision to go for it was correct (using historical data) if Zorn had assumed that the Rams would've reached about the 25 yard line (or further) on an ensuing post-FG kickoff. In other words, the data shows that the historical chance of winning is generally about the same for the Rams if they have the ball: (a) at the 2 yard line, down by 2; or (b) at the 25 yard line, down by 5. In the Bills situation - similar but not exact - TB would've had a better chance of winning the game, generally, being down 13 points rather than 10 if they had returned the subsequent kickoff to roughly the 25 yard line or further.

 

Obviously, situational factors are certainly relevant. If half the team is injured, it isn't fair to assume the team will perform at least to an average level, and that is implied by looking at data from several thousand games. However, I do think it's very relevant to understand that there is meaningful data to use to guide these decisions objectively - better than relying solely on "football sense" or "feel" or whatnot.

 

When Jauron made the absolute right call (according to the data) on the 4-and-1 at the 36 earlier in the game, he could be lauded as "confident" or "aggressive" or whatever, but the simple truth - regardless of the actual outcome - was that was the right call on the numbers. Marv used to say something like "if you didn't make it, you shouldn't have gone for it", which was obviously his way of criticizing the way folks play on results as opposed to the decision. Similarly, Belichick gets credit for his "guts" or his "desire to win" and such nonsense, but in the majority of cases he is just making the right call based on the probabilities, which I suspect he knows well.

[Dan]

I think the basic disagreement is that - except in the most obvious examples - many folks just don't want to buy into the idea that there are objective methods to help analyze trade offs in football decisions. Trade offs between points needed, field position, and time ... trade offs between punting, kicking FGs and going for it, and so forth. Each has a proper weight in the equation, but I respectfully think there is a tendency for folks to overvalue the TD in that equation.

 

...

While I completely agree with you and I think it's important for any good coach to be aware of these statistics/trade offs (or at least have someone in the box that is, ala the Pats*). However, you're forgetting or ignoring the fact that football (and much of life) is more than a collection of statistics and probabilities.

 

By the numbers, Jeff George should have been a Super Bowl winning QB. He wasn't. What's the numbers on a team scoring 3 times in 77 seconds? What does math say about Elway taking the Broncos 98 yards in a playoff game on the road. The Pats* went for it twice on 4th and short 2 weeks ago - failed on both attempts.

 

There are plenty of circumstances where the reality defies the math. So what's a good coach to do... go with his gut, feel the flow of the game and react to the reality in front of him, IMO.

 

Just for fun, there's also another line of reasoning to considering - Type 1 versus Type 2 errors. Both have negative outcomes; however, the Type 2 has a more detrimental negative outcome. Going for the FG in this situation minimizes the Type 2, which could be argued is what you want.

[bluenews]

I can't believe what I'm seeing here....are you guys just trying to make up garbage to complain about Jauron???

 

Kicking the FG was the right call. It's a chip shot. If Lindell makes it, the Bills are up by two TOUCHDOWNS, not just two scores. TB would need to get into the end zone twice, instead of once. Yes, it's 13 points and two TDs with extra points would beat you, but if your defense can't prevent them from getting into the end zone twice with that amount of time left, you don't deserve to win.

 

No mathematician is needed - only someone with first grade math level. The Bills win and we still find a way to bash the coach.

 

 

 

yes!

[MRM33064]

While I completely agree with you and I think it's important for any good coach to be aware of these statistics/trade offs (or at least have someone in the box that is, ala the Pats*). However, you're forgetting or ignoring the fact that football (and much of life) is more than a collection of statistics and probabilities .... Just for fun, there's also another line of reasoning to considering - Type 1 versus Type 2 errors. Both have negative outcomes; however, the Type 2 has a more detrimental negative outcome. Going for the FG in this situation minimizes the Type 2, which could be argued is what you want.

 

We have different ideas on the error evaulation, but this is the best objection yet, and certainly reasonable. Decisions can't be made in a vacuum, absolutely correct, and the ideal gameday staff would include someone who had a solid grasp of the probabilities AND the desirable intangible qualities. Someone in the box to radio-down the hard data, the numbers, and someone on the field to use that information to make the call. I'm just not certain that we see a lot of evidence that the data is being used in a lot of gameday decisions.

 

It's the posts like ... "it puts us up by 2 TDS! not just a TD and a FG" that, respectfully, just miss the point. I really hope that wasn't the depth of the sideline analysis, or that Dick really said "3 points is 3 points" or whatnot. I can just imagine Belichick & Co. watching that, giggling.

[eball]

We have different ideas on the error evaulation, but this is the best objection yet, and certainly reasonable. Decisions can't be made in a vacuum, absolutely correct, and the ideal gameday staff would include someone who had a solid grasp of the probabilities AND the desirable intangible qualities. Someone in the box to radio-down the hard data, the numbers, and someone on the field to use that information to make the call. I'm just not certain that we see a lot of evidence that the data is being used in a lot of gameday decisions.

 

It's the posts like ... "it puts us up by 2 TDS! not just a TD and a FG" that, respectfully, just miss the point. I really hope that wasn't the depth of the sideline analysis, or that Dick really said "3 points is 3 points" or whatnot. I can just imagine Belichick & Co. watching that, giggling.

MRM33064 -- some good and welcome analysis on this issue. I started a thread last week referencing the HS coach who always goes for it on 4th down (and backs it up with statistics).

 

I agree that the "right" call in the 4th quarter Sunday was to go for it, much as it was in the 2nd quarter. From Tampa's perspective, down 10 with the ball at the 2 is not a whole lot different than down 13 with the ball at the 30 (following the KO). But that's not the complete analysis. There is likely a greater probability that Buffalo makes the 1st down than they don't, so the odds of Tampa being down 17 are more favorable than either of the other two scenarios. Kicking the FG was a traditional, conservative call that gave the illusion of strengthening Buffalo's hold on the game -- and ignoring the fact that statistically speaking, they were more likely to go up 17 and end all doubt.

[Special K]

MRM33064 -- some good and welcome analysis on this issue. I started a thread last week referencing the HS coach who always goes for it on 4th down (and backs it up with statistics).

 

I agree that the "right" call in the 4th quarter Sunday was to go for it, much as it was in the 2nd quarter. From Tampa's perspective, down 10 with the ball at the 2 is not a whole lot different than down 13 with the ball at the 30 (following the KO). But that's not the complete analysis. There is likely a greater probability that Buffalo makes the 1st down than they don't, so the odds of Tampa being down 17 are more favorable than either of the other two scenarios. Kicking the FG was a traditional, conservative call that gave the illusion of strengthening Buffalo's hold on the game -- and ignoring the fact that statistically speaking, they were more likely to go up 17 and end all doubt.

 

Exactly...In simpler terms, there were two outcomes that would lead to the game being over at that point(TD or first down)......kicking the field goal or not making the first down would lead to the same outcome(the game not being over--less than 2 scores). The extra-added benefit of going for it and not making it would be leaving the Bucs on the 2 yard line with no timeouts left.

[Special K]

Thank you for the voice of reason. I'm reading these responses thinking WTF? It's simple. If you don't make it, Tampa can score a TD and a FG to tie. The 3 points taken forces them to score 2 TD's.

 

If DJ had gone for it and come up short, y'all would be calling for his head cuz he didn't put us up by 2 scores . . .

 

On the same note, if Tampa returned that ensuing kickoff for a TD, I'd bet all of you field goal people would be calling for his head because he didn't go for it to ice the game.

 

You are only OK with the FG because it worked out, whereas statistics bear out that going for it would have been the right move.

 

Personally, I think both descisions can be viewed as right or wrong...it just depends upon the personality of the coach as to which route is going to be taken...we know which route DJ is always going to take.

[stuckincincy]

everyone seems to forget the fact that you run the possibility of a fumble or an INT if you go for it, and if it ends up being taken back to the house, then you have another situation on your hands... I was and am in favor of the FG. No point in playing it too risky and having a horrible turnover that could change the outcome of the game.

 

Yes. Take the points and don't waste a drive on a chance 4th down conversion... A turnover is unlikely, but you leave earned money on the table if you fail. Yes, you may leave them deep in their own territory. 90 yard drives happen.

 

Put the points up on the scoreboard, tuck them in the pocket, and let the opposition try to change the score. Turning your back on an easy 3 when you already up is goofy.

[reddogblitz]

Kick the FG. Nothing fires a team up more than a goal line stand. Up by 13, TB now needs two TDs, not a TD and FG. Big difference in the 4th Quarter.

 

Hat's off to Dick for making a good game time decision. Hopefully it becomes a trend!

[Brandon]

I'm not a fan of Dick Jauron, in fact, I think his firing is well overdue, but I can't criticize him for that decision. In fact, its the same decision I would have made in his shoes. As others have said, the difference between being ahead 10 and being ahead 13 is that the latter forces a weak Tampa Bay offense to score two TDs. It seems like an easy decision to me. Maybe it was a safe, dull choice, but it was the correct one. I can't blame him for taking the points under the circumstances at all.

[prissythecat]

We have different ideas on the error evaulation, but this is the best objection yet, and certainly reasonable. Decisions can't be made in a vacuum, absolutely correct, and the ideal gameday staff would include someone who had a solid grasp of the probabilities AND the desirable intangible qualities. Someone in the box to radio-down the hard data, the numbers, and someone on the field to use that information to make the call. I'm just not certain that we see a lot of evidence that the data is being used in a lot of gameday decisions.

 

It's the posts like ... "it puts us up by 2 TDS! not just a TD and a FG" that, respectfully, just miss the point. I really hope that wasn't the depth of the sideline analysis, or that Dick really said "3 points is 3 points" or whatnot. I can just imagine Belichick & Co. watching that, giggling.

 

 

The statistical comparisons of outcomes is interesting to an academic or someone who has taken enough statistics/probability to understand the analysis. But are there actually NFL teams out there that employ PhDs on their staff to run through the numbers to help coaches come up with game decisions? Moreover, stats tell us what can be expected to happen on average. It becomes very difficult to generalize at the extremes. For instance, a 4th and 1 on the 50 yard line during the 2nd Qtr with half the field left is not at all comparable to a 4th and 1 near the goal line with 2 minutes left in the game.

[slyng1]

I think the basic disagreement is that - except in the most obvious examples - many folks just don't want to buy into the idea that there are objective methods to help analyze trade offs in football decisions. Trade offs between points needed, field position, and time ... trade offs between punting, kicking FGs and going for it, and so forth. Each has a proper weight in the equation, but I respectfully think there is a tendency for folks to overvalue the TD in that equation.

 

I applaud you for trying to fight the good fight and presenting the analytical framework for why you should go for it there (given the circumstances) but I'm guessing that it'll fall on deaf ears. It's long been ingrained that you always "take the points" no matter what - regardless of the circumstances. And it's a lot easier to call you a nerd/smarty-pants than address the logic of your arguments.

 

I'm with you though, I say go for it. There is an expected probability of making the 1st down (>50%, maybe as high as 75%). You can then adjust that up or down based on your own team's experience: Buffalo was 2 for 2 on 4th down conversions in their first 2 games (adjust up), but had just lost a starting lineman(adjust down). Weigh that versus the likely outcome if you don't make it. In this case, since we were on the 2yrd line, there is a chance they get sacked in the endzone (given leftwich's lack of mobility & throwing motion this isn't that far fetched of an outcome), there's a chance they throw an interception, there's a chance you make them go 4-and-out, and there's a chance they drive it 98yards for a touchdown.

 

Another common mistake is assuming that by doing the above analysis the Analytical/Go-For-It crowd are trying to criticize Jauron's decision. I don't think that's necessarily the case. Perhaps Jauron thinks that the odds of us making the 1st are only 30%, the odds of us getting a safety are 5% and the chances of them driving the field are 64%, then his expected value of going for it is 0.3(7)+.05(2)+.01(7).64(-7) = 2.1 + 0.1 +.07 - 4.48 = -2.21. Obviously, you never make decisions that give you a negative expected value, so if those were the right percentages, you kick the FG. Obviously, I think those percentages are totally WRONG, but that's a different argument than just saying "take the points".

 

IMHO, We probably have a 60-70% chance of making it and if we don't make it Tampa has maybe a 10% chance of driving 98yards in under 2mins with no (or 1?) timeouts.

 

It's an imperfect science, but that's not a reason to completely disregard the science/math behind the decision.

 

And to answer someone else's question, I remember watching an interview that Bellichick did with 60 minutes a few years ago where he talked about just these types of analyses (expected value vs. punting vs. FG, etc).

[eball]

So...if the Bills had a 60% chance of ending the game right then and there (by either making the 1st down or scoring a TD), versus a 95% chance of being up 13 points with 2:00 on the clock and Tampa receiving a kickoff, are there really people who logically opt for the latter? Particularly when you realize that the 40% on the other side of option #1 is still a 10 point lead with your opponent at their own 2-yd line and no timeouts?

 

Statistically speaking, I still think it's a pretty easy choice. But to each his own.

[DonInBuffalo]

Clearly the odds of a "disaster" such as a block being returned for a TD are much lower on a FG attempt compared to running a play from the LOS.

 

By going up 13, you're forcing the opponent to drive the entire length of the field twice. If you're only up by 10, they only have to get to about the 40 to attempt a field goal. So even if they score a TD and recover an onsides kick, they would still have to gain about 60 more yards to get the 2nd TD. If they only needed a FG, they would only need to gain about 20 more yards. Considering the limited amount of time left in the game, that 40 yard difference more than justifies the Bills kicking the FG.

[Tcali]

I applaud you for trying to fight the good fight and presenting the analytical framework for why you should go for it there (given the circumstances) but I'm guessing that it'll fall on deaf ears. It's long been ingrained that you always "take the points" no matter what - regardless of the circumstances. And it's a lot easier to call you a nerd/smarty-pants than address the logic of your arguments.

 

I'm with you though, I say go for it. There is an expected probability of making the 1st down (>50%, maybe as high as 75%). You can then adjust that up or down based on your own team's experience: Buffalo was 2 for 2 on 4th down conversions in their first 2 games (adjust up), but had just lost a starting lineman(adjust down). Weigh that versus the likely outcome if you don't make it. In this case, since we were on the 2yrd line, there is a chance they get sacked in the endzone (given leftwich's lack of mobility & throwing motion this isn't that far fetched of an outcome), there's a chance they throw an interception, there's a chance you make them go 4-and-out, and there's a chance they drive it 98yards for a touchdown.

 

Another common mistake is assuming that by doing the above analysis the Analytical/Go-For-It crowd are trying to criticize Jauron's decision. I don't think that's necessarily the case. Perhaps Jauron thinks that the odds of us making the 1st are only 30%, the odds of us getting a safety are 5% and the chances of them driving the field are 64%, then his expected value of going for it is 0.3(7)+.05(2)+.01(7).64(-7) = 2.1 + 0.1 +.07 - 4.48 = -2.21. Obviously, you never make decisions that give you a negative expected value, so if those were the right percentages, you kick the FG. Obviously, I think those percentages are totally WRONG, but that's a different argument than just saying "take the points".

 

IMHO, We probably have a 60-70% chance of making it and if we don't make it Tampa has maybe a 10% chance of driving 98yards in under 2mins with no (or 1?) timeouts.

 

It's an imperfect science, but that's not a reason to completely disregard the science/math behind the decision.

 

And to answer someone else's question, I remember watching an interview that Bellichick did with 60 minutes a few years ago where he talked about just these types of analyses (expected value vs. punting vs. FG, etc).

Fact is--you rush for 1 yard--game over. You kick the FG--you give them a chance.