Going for it on 4th down...

[eball]

The numbers seem to suggest so. For any of you who are SI subscribers, there's a very interesting article in this week's edition (p. 18) about a high school football coach who *never* punts. Never. The coach isn't just brash or stupid, either -- he supports his strategy with facts, analyzing the statistical tradeoffs of converting vs. not converting on 4th down. And his teams win, despite not always having the best or biggest athletes.

 

The stat that really got my attention was a 2005 study by an economist suggesting that over the course of three NFL seasons there were 1,068 4th-down situations in which teams, mathematically, would have been better off going for it. How many times did they? 109, or about 10%.

 

The philosophy doesn't translate perfectly to the major college or NFL game, obviously, but it's a damn shame there hasn't been a coach willing to really go outside the norm. There's just too much pressure and scrutiny in the pro football world for a coach to take this sort of chance, though.

 

Anyway, it just goes to show how the "conventional wisdom" may really not be all that wise.

[silvermike]

It's interesting. THere's more charts and graphs here, if you like'em:

 

http://www.advancednflstats.com/2009/09/4t...udy-part-1.html

 

Basically, I think it that coaches' decisions are usually rational, it's just that their goal is to not get fired, rather than to win. So you're risk adverse, and don't make decisions that call attention to your coaching. Being stopped on 3rd down reads as the players' fault, being stopped on 4th down is a coaching blunder.

[plenzmd1]

The numbers seem to suggest so. For any of you who are SI subscribers, there's a very interesting article in this week's edition (p. 18) about a high school football coach who *never* punts. Never. The coach isn't just brash or stupid, either -- he supports his strategy with facts, analyzing the statistical tradeoffs of converting vs. not converting on 4th down. And his teams win, despite not always having the best or biggest athletes.

 

The stat that really got my attention was a 2005 study by an economist suggesting that over the course of three NFL seasons there were 1,068 4th-down situations in which teams, mathematically, would have been better off going for it. How many times did they? 109, or about 10%.

 

The philosophy doesn't translate perfectly to the major college or NFL game, obviously, but it's a damn shame there hasn't been a coach willing to really go outside the norm. There's just too much pressure and scrutiny in the pro football world for a coach to take this sort of chance, though.

 

Anyway, it just goes to show how the "conventional wisdom" may really not be all that wise.

 

Easterbrook has been yapping about that coach for two years...and I think he claims, somewhat in jest, that the coach got the idea from him. Easterbrrok is one smart dude(not talking about his football sense) and he as well talked about the statistics of the whole thing. Pretty interesting theory, would love to see a coach who had some balls try it

[C.Biscuit97]

It's an interesting point for sure. However, I've also saw an interview about punting with Moorman (don't have the link), where he said that pining an opponent inside their own 10 yard line leads to your team scoring about 70% of the time.

 

I could go both ways on the issue. I love the aggressiveness of going for it on 4th down. But you risk field position and giving up momenteum if you are stopped. Just look at the 2 4th down stop the Bills had against the Pats* this week. But in Tecmo Bowl, I'm always going for it on 4th down.

[Sisyphean Bills]

The maroon zone...

[Coach55]

Once the ball hits midfield, IMO, you should be planning to go for it on 4th down every time. Whether or not you do is a different story. However, if your players are aware that the coach will go on 4th down (i.e. the Pats*) you can strategically play 3rd down differently. If you have a 3rd and long (10+), rather than trying to force the 1st down, you may be willing to get close if that is all that is available. For example, if I am TE and sitting with a 3rd and 12 knowing that DJ is sure to punt if don't get the first down, I am going to stretch the field and pass long. Given the defense knows this, this is a low probability pass, risks sacks and turnovers. However if I am Tom Brady* in the same situation knowing that BB* is going to go for it on 4th and under 5, I am more willing to take what the defense gives me and throw underneath (7-8 yard range) which is a high probability completion. At that point, the receiver may still get the first down after the catch, but if he doesn't, you have a 4th and short. Ultimately, you will get burned on 4th downs, but it will work more often than not.

[PromoTheRobot]

Against the Bills it's probably a good move.

 

PTR

[TheLynchTrain]

Against the Bills it's probably a good move.

 

PTR

 

Correction: almost always

[eball]

However, if your players are aware that the coach will go on 4th down (i.e. the Pats*) you can strategically play 3rd down differently.

This is exactly the point. The strategy to get 10 yards over 4 plays is markedly different than getting it over 3 plays. A completely different mentality. For example, a nice gain on 1st down gives a team TWO shots to hit a big play before focusing on just moving the chains.

[SouthGeorgiaBillsFan]

The numbers seem to suggest so. For any of you who are SI subscribers, there's a very interesting article in this week's edition (p. 18) about a high school football coach who *never* punts. Never. The coach isn't just brash or stupid, either -- he supports his strategy with facts, analyzing the statistical tradeoffs of converting vs. not converting on 4th down. And his teams win, despite not always having the best or biggest athletes.

 

The stat that really got my attention was a 2005 study by an economist suggesting that over the course of three NFL seasons there were 1,068 4th-down situations in which teams, mathematically, would have been better off going for it. How many times did they? 109, or about 10%.

 

The philosophy doesn't translate perfectly to the major college or NFL game, obviously, but it's a damn shame there hasn't been a coach willing to really go outside the norm. There's just too much pressure and scrutiny in the pro football world for a coach to take this sort of chance, though.

 

Anyway, it just goes to show how the "conventional wisdom" may really not be all that wise.

 

The decision to go for it on 4th down has to be situational to be effective.

 

For example:

 

Team is down by 9 points. Fourth and two at the opposing team's 27 yard line. No matter how good your offense is here, you have to kick the field goal. You need 2 scores no matter how you slice it, and so you take the opportunity now to get your 3 points. If you are in this same scenario down by 12 points however, you clearly go for it. The same logic would apply in a situation where your team is on the 27 yard line and up by 4 points. Again you need to kick the field goal in this situation, because to fail to convert here could cost you the game. It should always be a function of what the score is. Granted, are you going to score more points by going for it all the time? Of course. The problem is you have no way to know whether or not the opposing team will score more points than they would have otherwise. And there is still the conundrum that *if* your offense is good enough that you feel you can essentially profit by going for it aggressively, then why would you not take the safe play with confidence that your offense will be good enough to find the end zone on the next possession?

 

As video games have become more popular we have seen an increase in the number of people who feel that being more aggressive on fourth down leads to greater success. But the flaw in their thinking is that in a typical John Madden game this is a much greater disparity in talent of the players than in a real game, because you have 2 people affecting the outcome of the video game, and a team of forty or more people affecting the outcome of a real game. In essence what I am saying is that if your team is substantially better than the opposition, then yea, going for it on fourth down is going to pay dividends. But on the same token, if your team *is* that much better than the opposition that they can consistently convert questionable fourth down attempts, then you really shouldn't even be seeing that many fourth downs or have the game close enough where the decision is making a significant impact on the outcome.

 

Bottom line is that it requires that your team be substantially better than the opposing team to consistently benefit from risky decisions to go for it on fourth down, and the vast majority of the time, when that is the case, going for it is irrelevant to the outcome anyway, and thus makes little sense.

 

It is not public scrutiny imo that keeps pro coaches from adapting more aggressive philosophies. It is the fact that they are better able to grasp the logic that governs situations in a football game than a fan posting on a forum or playing John Madden football, which is why they get paid a lot of money to coach pro teams and fans and ESPN analysts do not.

[SouthGeorgiaBillsFan]

Against the Bills it's probably a good move.

 

PTR

 

2/2 times it did not appear to be a good move for the best offense in the league against the Bills, so why don't you just shut the !@#$ up?

[eball]

The decision to go for it on 4th down has to be situational to be effective.

 

For example:

 

Team is down by 9 points. Fourth and two at the opposing team's 27 yard line. No matter how good your offense is here, you have to kick the field goal. You need 2 scores no matter how you slice it, and so you take the opportunity now to get your 3 points. If you are in this same scenario down by 12 points however, you clearly go for it. The same logic would apply in a situation where your team is on the 27 yard line and up by 4 points. Again you need to kick the field goal in this situation, because to fail to convert here could cost you the game. It should always be a function of what the score is. Granted, are you going to score more points by going for it all the time? Of course. The problem is you have no way to know whether or not the opposing team will score more points than they would have otherwise. And there is still the conundrum that *if* your offense is good enough that you feel you can essentially profit by going for it aggressively, then why would you not take the safe play with confidence that your offense will be good enough to find the end zone on the next possession?

 

As video games have become more popular we have seen an increase in the number of people who feel that being more aggressive on fourth down leads to greater success. But the flaw in their thinking is that in a typical John Madden game this is a much greater disparity in talent of the players than in a real game, because you have 2 people affecting the outcome of the video game, and a team of forty or more people affecting the outcome of a real game. In essence what I am saying is that if your team is substantially better than the opposition, then yea, going for it on fourth down is going to pay dividends. But on the same token, if your team *is* that much better than the opposition that they can consistently convert questionable fourth down attempts, then you really shouldn't even be seeing that many fourth downs or have the game close enough where the decision is making a significant impact on the outcome.

 

Bottom line is that it requires that your team be substantially better than the opposing team to consistently benefit from risky decisions to go for it on fourth down, and the vast majority of the time, when that is the case, going for it is irrelevant to the outcome anyway, and thus makes little sense.

 

It is not public scrutiny imo that keeps pro coaches from adapting more aggressive philosophies. It is the fact that they are better able to grasp the logic that governs situations in a football game than a fan posting on a forum or playing John Madden football, which is why they get paid a lot of money to coach pro teams and fans and ESPN analysts do not.

Sorry, SouthGeorgia, but you've failed to grasp the concept here. It is in fact LOGIC and STATISTICS that lead to the conclusion it's often mathematically favorable to go for it on 4th down. Your example above is situational, and fails to take into account what the score of the game might have been if a team was going for it all the way throughout, and not just in that one particular situation.