What Iraq tells us about ourselves

[X. Benedict]

Then WHY are the Iraqis of all stripes seemingly not caring about the abandonment of those instituions and not working together to restore normalcy?

 

Because in the absence of a functioning government (or fear of it) the tribe is a more cohesive institution than civil laws or public institutions. The state may fail but your tribe is likely to survive any borders on a map or nation state, just as it always has.

[DC Tom]

Because in the absence of a functioning government (or fear of it) the tribe is a more cohesive institution than civil laws or public institutions. The state may fail but your tribe is likely to survive any borders on a map or nation state, just as it always has.

 

The second sentence, more than the first. Generally, tribalism in Southwest Asia predates every other social structure by a wide margin (most of the problems in the Islamic world have less to do with Islam than they have tribalism). There's a long history of tribal loyalty and resistance to extra-tribal authority, even in the presence of a functioning central government.

 

And in fact, functioning central governments in tribal regions tend not to last long unless they're very weak and willing to let tribal law take precedent in tribal regions. Some of the historic Afghanistan governments are a good example.

[GG]

The second sentence, more than the first. Generally, tribalism in Southwest Asia predates every other social structure by a wide margin (most of the problems in the Islamic world have less to do with Islam than they have tribalism). There's a long history of tribal loyalty and resistance to extra-tribal authority, even in the presence of a functioning central government.

 

And in fact, functioning central governments in tribal regions tend not to last long unless they're very weak and willing to let tribal law take precedent in tribal regions. Some of the historic Afghanistan governments are a good example.

 

Yet it is interesting that so far, Afghanistan's central government has been a better model than the Iraqi central government.

 

Which brings me to the question the original link. Was it too far out of the realm of reality to think before the invasion that since Iraqis were generally more westernized and accepting of non traditional moires, that the transition to the new government would not have been as problematic? Also, why in the world would keeping the Baathists in power would have been a good thing, when Baathists are behind most of the violence in Iraq now? Would they have been more willing to cede more power to Shias if they were still in control, and would Shias just accept a new Iraq, just like the old Iraq?

[X. Benedict]

Yet it is interesting that so far, Afghanistan's central government has been a better model than the Iraqi central government.

 

Which brings me to the question the original link. Was it too far out of the realm of reality to think before the invasion that since Iraqis were generally more westernized and accepting of non traditional moires, that the transition to the new government would not have been as problematic? Also, why in the world would keeping the Baathists in power would have been a good thing, when Baathists are behind most of the violence in Iraq now? Would they have been more willing to cede more power to Shias if they were still in control, and would Shias just accept a new Iraq, just like the old Iraq?

 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm

 

The Baathists, at least rhetorically speaking, were against the tribal systems. Although ruthless, they were a secular and centralizing force (even if they exploited and advantaged some tribes at the same time). But for all the Baathist pan-arab rhetoric they could never really get around the fact that power remained structured among families in the Arab world. (The Assads in Syria, the Sauds, or even the the families of Tikrit). The Baathist gave women the vote and also nurtured a secular professional class of doctors, lawyers, professors, engineers and bankers, (and bartenders!)

 

The idea was to decapitate this power structure and leave the functioning part of civil society, but the DeBaathification and the disinigration of the army has pushed power to the conservative/tribal/theocratic elements of society. We wanted something more akin to a guardian coup - but now we got Imams, jihadis, and sectarian schisms.

[chicot]

Yet it is interesting that so far, Afghanistan's central government has been a better model than the Iraqi central government.

 

Which brings me to the question the original link. Was it too far out of the realm of reality to think before the invasion that since Iraqis were generally more westernized and accepting of non traditional moires, that the transition to the new government would not have been as problematic? Also, why in the world would keeping the Baathists in power would have been a good thing, when Baathists are behind most of the violence in Iraq now? Would they have been more willing to cede more power to Shias if they were still in control, and would Shias just accept a new Iraq, just like the old Iraq?

 

Who was in favour in keeping the Baathists in power? The point is that debaathification went much too far, removing people such as doctors and teachers from their jobs simply because they happened to be a member of the Baath party (in many cases, being a member of the party was simply a quick route to getting a decent job). There is no reason why it should not have been possible to remove the upper echelons of the Baath party from power without going to such ridiculous lengths and punishing people who were guilty of no crime. As stated in the article I linked to, this had the effect of removing much of the "human infrastructure" of Iraq.

 

Yes, certain things about pre-invasion Iraq needed changing and I have no doubt that most Iraqis would admit that. The problem was that the US seemed to think it was their responsibility to completely remold the country, almost in a Khmer Rouge year zero sort of manner. Things such as the selling off of previously state-owned Iraqi industries were a matter for Iraqis to decide on, not something to be passed down by imperial diktat. The priority from the start should have been to get the country up and running again as fast as possible, rather than dismantling it completely and then attempting to rebuild it as some sort of new America in the middle east.

[GG]

Yes, certain things about pre-invasion Iraq needed changing and I have no doubt that most Iraqis would admit that. The problem was that the US seemed to think it was their responsibility to completely remold the country, almost in a Khmer Rouge year zero sort of manner. Things such as the selling off of previously state-owned Iraqi industries were a matter for Iraqis to decide on, not something to be passed down by imperial diktat. The priority from the start should have been to get the country up and running again as fast as possible, rather than dismantling it completely and then attempting to rebuild it as some sort of new America in the middle east.

 

This is partly blame shifting. No one will deny that the occupation and restoration has gone wrong. But the debaathification is not the primary reason. The US had zero intention of destroying the Iraqi social and economic infrastructure. That job was done perfectly capably for them before the reconstruction effort started.

 

July 2003 conversation

[chicot]

This is partly blame shifting. No one will deny that the occupation and restoration has gone wrong. But the debaathification is not the primary reason. The US had zero intention of destroying the Iraqi social and economic infrastructure. That job was done perfectly capably for them before the reconstruction effort started.

 

July 2003 conversation

 

The oft-repeated claim that the Iraqi army "disappeared" and couldn't be found is nonsense. The US knew exactly where they were - they were the guys demonstrating in the streets when they were laid off. They were the people queueing up for payments that the CPA reluctantly agreed to make to them as compensation. They could just have easily been re-employed. The fact of the matter is that, for whatever reason, the powers that be did not want to re-employ them.

[GG]

The oft-repeated claim that the Iraqi army "disappeared" and couldn't be found is nonsense. The US knew exactly where they were - they were the guys demonstrating in the streets when they were laid off. They were the people queueing up for payments that the CPA reluctantly agreed to make to them as compensation. They could just have easily been re-employed. The fact of the matter is that, for whatever reason, the powers that be did not want to re-employ them.

 

Nonsense according to whom?

 

National Review

 

Salon

 

You mean the four week delay in getting paid? Even accounts highly critical of the administration don't argue about the army not disintegrating.

[chicot]

Nonsense according to whom?

 

National Review

 

Salon

 

You mean the four week delay in getting paid? Even accounts highly critical of the administration don't argue about the army not disintegrating.

 

It's nonsense to pretend that this meant that it could not be reconstituted. If the army can be found to make payments to, then it could have been employed rather than put out to pasture (join the insurgency in many cases). Bremer made a political decision to dissolve it - he was not forced to do so by circumstances.

[GG]

It's nonsense to pretend that this meant that it could not be reconstituted. If the army can be found to make payments to, then it could have been employed rather than put out to pasture (join the insurgency in many cases). Bremer made a political decision to dissolve it - he was not forced to do so by circumstances.

 

Damned if you do damned if you don't. The decision to not reconstitute the army had logic in lessening the baathist infiltration in the armed forces. If many former servicemen joined the insurgents, as you claim, what are the chances they would be on the new government's side if they joined the new Iraqi army?

[chicot]

Damned if you do damned if you don't. The decision to not reconstitute the army had logic in lessening the baathist infiltration in the armed forces. If many former servicemen joined the insurgents, as you claim, what are the chances they would be on the new government's side if they joined the new Iraqi army?

 

Money talks. Double their salaries and that will buy you a lot of loyalty. Expensive? Not nearly as expensive as keeping a lid on an insurgency that, certainly in the early days at least, was heavily dependent upon disgruntled former members of the Iraqi military.