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Been reading about Iwo Jima


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Just thinking out loud here...

 

I recently picked up the "Flags of our Fathers" book written by James Bradley about his father's role as one of the flag-raisers on Iwo Jima. I'm only halfway through it, but its chilling to read what those boys went through after landing -- grouped on the beach for 20 minutes without a hint of trouble, and suddenly came under assault from 22,000 Japanese furrowed into hidden, underground pillboxes and concrete. Hand to hand combat, inch by inch over eight square miles of "Sulfur Island"'s volcanic ash/sand for 36 days.

 

Iwo Jima was only possible, of course, after training these Marines to work under conditions of dangerous amphibious assaults -- disembarking to landing craft, jumping onto beaches for cover, etc. By coincidence, last night the military channel had an hour-long show on the strategy of amphibious assaults, highighting both Iwo Jima and MacArthur's Inchon invasion in Korea in 1950. What I didn't know until watching it was that after World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (under Omar Bradley) had officially phased out the strategy of large-scale amphibious assault landings by 1949. What we saw at Normandy and Iwo Jima would never happen again.

 

What the show didn't do was fully explain (to a non-expert history buff like me) more of why this tactic was permanently shelved. Yeah, we didn't have 300,000 marines anymore, but the show only said the U.S.'s decision came in the context of an "overreaction" to the new realities of atomic warfare. I guess meant that any future Hitler or Hirohito would know that you can't ultimately repel 100,000 to 200,000 Marines coming ashore with nests of machine guns -- so you might as well nuke them.

 

Because of this change and the lack of men and equipment, MacArthur didn't have the option of a mass landing in South Korea to hurl the North Koreans back...leading him to take a more limited crew into Seoul and the Han Valley to cut off supply routes. (Employing his brilliant multi-phased tactics to coincide with the quick-moving tides of of that peninsula).

 

For the military history buffs out there: what do you of all think the various reasons for why the mass amphibious assault was officially retired -- and whether that might have been a mistake given what MacArthur was faced with later in Korea. Were there other issues, such as a Navy/Marines split on tactics (the Marines were not happy with the lack of support Navy fliers gave at Iwo Jima)? Why did the Army have no interest in adapting the tactic? Was it just the new paradigm of atomic weapons, where you risked losing hundreds of thousands of men in seconds, or did Iwo Jima just prove that you couldn't pull them off without massive losses anymore? (No doubt aiding in Truman's decision on Hiroshima).

 

Finally, did the loss of the amphibious warfare option hurt us later in Vietnam? It seems a little farfetched there, since the Pentagon decided early it would never invade N. Vietnamese territory (but instead would bomb it to smithereens). Maybe the Soviets and China wouldn't have stood back if 200,000 men came ashore east of Hanoi in 1965 , but perhaps the threat we COULD have done it might have pressured Ho Chi Minh into an earlier settlement of hostilities? Ho was obviously very brave about throwing away the lives of his loyal Vietcong around Saigon, but if he personally faced the threat of buggin out...who knows.

 

 

Like I said, just curious thoughts...

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For the military history buffs out there: what do you of all think the various reasons for why the mass amphibious assault was officially retired -- and whether that might have been a mistake given what MacArthur was faced with later in Korea. Were there other issues, such as a Navy/Marines split on tactics (the Marines were not happy with the lack of support Navy fliers gave at Iwo Jima)? Why did the Army have no interest in adapting the tactic? Was it just the new paradigm of atomic weapons, where you risked losing hundreds of thousands of men in seconds, or did Iwo Jima just prove that you couldn't pull them off without massive losses anymore? (No doubt aiding in Truman's decision on Hiroshima).

 

The same reason virtually every other operational doctrine was sh---canned post-WWII: "nuclear weapons made it irrelevent". It's the typical and common overreaction to new military technology; people think it makes the "old" obsolete. Usually it doesn't.

 

The other reasons...pretty much minor. The Army never went much for amphibious tactics anyway (the Marines specialized in it, damn near invented the doctrine), Navy air support was somewhat of a non-issue, considering the Marine Corps have an organic air component (still do, have since the 1920'2, they largely invented the doctrine of close air support too). And a large part of it was budgetary: an independent, nuclear-armed Air Force can strike anywhere quick, an amphibious Marine Corps, not so much. Where are you going to put your money in the post-war budgetary draw-down? Most of Dougout Doug's troubles in Korea were brought on by budget issues (and issues of his own competence - not having a single combat-ready unit to deploy across the Sea of Japan was due in part to not having enough resources to outfit his units properly...and also in part to his gross dereliction of duty to his army occupying Japan in not keeping ANY of them combat-ready). MacArthur's problems in Korea, much like every other problem he ever ran into in his career, were largely of his own making; what problems weren't his were budgetary. Neither really had anything to do with Iwo Jima.

 

Finally,  did  the loss of the amphibious warfare option hurt us later in Vietnam? It seems a little farfetched there, since the Pentagon decided early it would never invade N. Vietnamese territory (but instead would bomb it to smithereens). Maybe the  Soviets and China wouldn't have stood back if 200,000 men came ashore east of Hanoi in 1965  , but perhaps the threat we COULD have done it might have pressured Ho Chi Minh into an earlier settlement of hostilities? Ho was obviously very brave about throwing away the lives of his loyal Vietcong around Saigon, but if he personally faced the threat of buggin out...who knows.

859993[/snapback]

 

No. Amphibious doctrine was alive and well, even in the immediate post-war period when the equipment and manpower was drawn down. Still is now, and it was during Vietnam. The reason North Vietnam was never invaded is the same reason Iraq is such a mess now - heavy conventional forces are handcuffed when fighting a non-war (i.e. "police action") against an insurgent force. Though it made pure military strategic sense, we couldn't invade North Vietnam to support the war in South Vietnam then anymore than we can realistically invade Iran to support operations in Iraq now. That, and air power is "cheaper"; the political leaders during Vietnam bought the story the Air Force has always tried to sell about air power being a war-winning force all on its own.

 

The idea that the bloodletting at Iwo (and, perhaps, Okinawa - which had a much greater effect on Truman's decision to bomb Hiroshima than Iwo did) led to a shying away from amphibious doctrine in the Cold War is certainly interesting. Obviously, judging by my post, I don't believe it to be true. But it's an interesting enough idea that I'm going to look into it further, regardless of what I think.

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Just thinking out loud here...

 

I recently picked up the "Flags of our Fathers" book written by James Bradley about his father's role as one of the flag-raisers on Iwo Jima. I'm only halfway through it, but its chilling to read what those boys went through after landing -- grouped on the beach for 20 minutes without a hint of trouble, and suddenly came under assault from 22,000 Japanese furrowed into hidden, underground pillboxes and concrete.  Hand to hand combat, inch by inch over eight square miles of "Sulfur Island"'s volcanic ash/sand for 36 days.

 

Iwo Jima was only possible, of course, after training these Marines to work under conditions of dangerous amphibious assaults -- disembarking to landing craft, jumping onto beaches for cover, etc. By coincidence, last night the military channel had an hour-long show on the strategy of amphibious assaults, highighting both Iwo Jima and MacArthur's Inchon invasion in Korea in 1950. What I didn't know until watching it was that after World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (under Omar Bradley) had officially phased out the strategy of large-scale amphibious assault landings by 1949. What we saw at Normandy and Iwo Jima would never happen again. 

 

What the show didn't do was fully explain (to a non-expert history buff like me) more of why this tactic was permanently shelved. Yeah, we didn't have 300,000 marines anymore, but the show only said the U.S.'s decision came in the context of an "overreaction" to the new realities of atomic warfare. I guess meant that any future Hitler or Hirohito would know that you can't ultimately repel 100,000 to 200,000 Marines coming ashore with nests of machine guns -- so you might as well nuke them.

 

Because of this change and the lack of men and equipment, MacArthur didn't have the option of a mass landing in South Korea to hurl the North Koreans back...leading him to take a more limited crew into Seoul and the Han Valley to cut off supply routes.  (Employing his brilliant multi-phased tactics to coincide with the quick-moving tides of of that peninsula).

 

For the military history buffs out there: what do you of all think the various reasons for why the mass amphibious assault was officially retired -- and whether that might have been a mistake given what MacArthur was faced with later in Korea. Were there other issues, such as a Navy/Marines split on tactics (the Marines were not happy with the lack of support Navy fliers gave at Iwo Jima)? Why did the Army have no interest in adapting the tactic? Was it just the new paradigm of atomic weapons, where you risked losing hundreds of thousands of men in seconds, or did Iwo Jima just prove that you couldn't pull them off without massive losses anymore? (No doubt aiding in Truman's decision on Hiroshima).

 

Finally,  did  the loss of the amphibious warfare option hurt us later in Vietnam? It seems a little farfetched there, since the Pentagon decided early it would never invade N. Vietnamese territory (but instead would bomb it to smithereens). Maybe the  Soviets and China wouldn't have stood back if 200,000 men came ashore east of Hanoi in 1965  , but perhaps the threat we COULD have done it might have pressured Ho Chi Minh into an earlier settlement of hostilities? Ho was obviously very brave about throwing away the lives of his loyal Vietcong around Saigon, but if he personally faced the threat of buggin out...who knows.

Like I said, just curious thoughts...

859993[/snapback]

I too read the book and was in awe of what those young men went through! I think a couple of reasons on the abandonment of the amphb. assaults might be our fascination with "air superiority" and possibly the press being more invoveled and being able to relay the horrors of war much faster than during WWII. I was extremely annoyed and dissapointed in our nations media in the lack of coverage today on the 65th anniv. of Pearl Harbor!! I was reading the USA today and there was just a small blurb on the upper left of page three about the day! just very dissapointing for me in the lack of respect for that generation! Seems the media and public would rather discuss what crap ass celebrity did or some idiot crying foul because he was harrassed for not standing for the pledge of allegience at the start of school! These brave men and woman are passing away at an alarming rate and soon will be gone!! What they did for our country and the world is astounding!! God Bless all WWII vets and anyone else who has served for the very country that I love!! You are all truly heros!!!!!!

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Reasons to shelve amphibious assults?  Two words: Air Superiority

 

Bomb the crap out of them, then stroll/drive/boat on in to pick off the pieces.

860223[/snapback]

I think William Manchester wrote a book about Iwo Jima. If I'm not mistaken, I think he was a veteran of that battle as well.

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Reasons to shelve amphibious assults?  Two words: Air Superiority

 

Bomb the crap out of them, then stroll/drive/boat on in to pick off the pieces.

860223[/snapback]

 

American air forces pounded Iwo in the longest sustained aerial offensive of the war.

"No other island received as much preliminary pounding as did Iwo Jima."

. . . Admiral Nimitz, CINPAC

 

Incredibly, this ferocious bombardment had little effect. Hardly any of the Japanese underground fortresses were touched.

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American air forces pounded Iwo in the longest sustained aerial offensive of the war. 

"No other island received as much preliminary pounding as did Iwo Jima."

. . . Admiral Nimitz, CINPAC 

 

Incredibly, this ferocious bombardment had little effect. Hardly any of the Japanese underground fortresses were touched.

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The technology these days doesn't allow that to happen anymore. The new degree of bunker busting ordinance as well as the gps and laser guidance the weapons have make the initial bombardment much, much more effective when softening up an objective.

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The technology these days doesn't allow that to happen anymore.  The new degree of bunker busting ordinance as well as the gps and laser guidance the weapons have make the initial bombardment much, much more effective when softening up an objective.

860321[/snapback]

Right...we have those "smart bombs" that just worked so perfectly in the gulf war and this war in Iraq. Hell..we might as well bring the troops home and let the smart bombs sort out the terrorists from the insurgents from the militias from the allegedly innocent from the actually innocent.

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Right...we have those "smart bombs" that just worked so perfectly in the gulf war and this war in Iraq.  Hell..we might as well bring the troops home and let the smart bombs sort out the terrorists from the insurgents from the militias from the allegedly innocent from the actually innocent.

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I know I'm speaking to a veteran about this. The infantry will always have a place in combat no matter what. This thread was just talking about the extinction of mass beach landings and how iwo jima was heavily fortified against aerial bombardment. Urban warefare is completely different than what I was talking about.

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The technology these days doesn't allow that to happen anymore.

 

True, but I was talking about Iwo.

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The network of caves on that island is incredible. Can you imagine being a Japanese soldier sitting inside a cave that's been bulldozered shut, just sitting around waiting to run out of air..... Everything I've seen about that battle for Iwo Jima is stunning, and the courage that the Americans put forth to take it is historic.

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The network of caves on that island is incredible.  Can you imagine being a Japanese soldier sitting inside a cave that's been bulldozered shut, just sitting around waiting to run out of air.....  Everything I've seen about that battle for Iwo Jima is stunning, and the courage that the Americans put forth to take it is historic.

860383[/snapback]

 

 

"Among the Americans serving on Iwo island, uncommon valor was a common virtue." (Adm. Chester A. Nimitz)

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The technology these days doesn't allow that to happen anymore.  The new degree of bunker busting ordinance as well as the gps and laser guidance the weapons have make the initial bombardment much, much more effective when softening up an objective.

860321[/snapback]

 

Untrue. Even with modern ordnance, it's still tough to root out a dug-in enemy. Tora Bora is as rugged and fortified as Iwo was, and it still took some hard fighting by soldiers on the ground during and after the bombardment to take that region.

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I have sand from Iwo Jima. We had an chance to go there for a PME (professional military education) when I was stationed in Iwakuni. I brought back some black sand in a little jar. VERY SURREAL experience. Stood atop Mt. Surabachi. It actually brought a tear to my eye to be in such a place. Just as it did when I was on the Arizona. :wallbash:

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Untrue.  Even with modern ordnance, it's still tough to root out a dug-in enemy.  Tora Bora is as rugged and fortified as Iwo was, and it still took some hard fighting by soldiers on the ground during and after the bombardment to take that region.

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True, bunkers inside of mountains or networks that go upwards of 50 feet below ground level are virtually impervious to anything but the controversial new nuclear bunker busters. However, the tactics of using 1,000 and 1,500 lb on staggered strikes have been effective at neutralizing some very hardened targets

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I have sand from Iwo Jima. We had an chance to go there for a PME (professional military education) when I was stationed in Iwakuni. I brought back some black sand in a little jar. VERY SURREAL experience. Stood atop Mt. Surabachi. It actually brought a tear to my eye to be in such a place. Just as it did when I was on the Arizona.  :doh:

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USMC, You know as well as I do the the "Blue/Green Team" is still alive and well!

:wallbash::censored::w00t:

 

Maybe not to the same extent as it was 65 years ago, but Amphib Ops are a daily occurrence on dozens of Gators around the world.

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True, bunkers inside of mountains or networks that go upwards of 50 feet below ground level are virtually impervious to anything but the controversial new nuclear bunker busters.  However, the tactics of using 1,000 and 1,500 lb on staggered strikes have been effective at neutralizing some very hardened targets

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And history still shows that, even when heavy ordnance neutralizes hardened targets, some poor ground-pounder still has to go in and do heavy fighting. Buna-Gona is a great example: an entire National Guard division was sent into a swamp with one artillery piece in support, and fought their way through hell for months to gain yards at a time. When they finally got support commenserate with their unit and mission (some Aussie 25-lb guns and light tanks), they finally cracked the defenses around Buna...and fought their way through hell for another month.

 

Of course, Buna's an extreme example, since (with the possible exceptions of Milne Bay and New Georgia) it might very well be the most malignant terrain on the entire planet. But heavy support weapons - bunker-busting bombs, heavy artillery, etc. - usually doesn't make the bloody infantry's job any easier. Just quicker.

 

That's also something to keep in mind when you see and hear military and political leaders talk about making war "friendlier", or about fighting wars exclusively from the air (a la Bill Clinton). Never works. Never. War always sucks, because it always involves some poor schmuck wallowing in the mud while dying from a high-velocity gunshot wound.

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