Kerry Really Needs To Stop

[Kelly the Dog]

Hmm.

 

Maybe we should send several cases each of duct tape and WD-40.

 

One or the other fixes fully 87% of life's problems.

729225[/snapback]

Or just duct-tape Kim and drop him in a vat of WD-40.

[GG]

An agreement of some sort has to be reached. He has not lived up to any agreement. So all talks must be useless. And doing nothing has proven useless so far, too. In fact, it seems to be worse than talks that he hasn't lived up to. What hasn't been useless?

729223[/snapback]

 

How can you come to the conclusion that not talking has been worse that continuing a bilateral dialogue, especially when you admit that Kim is unreliable and hasn't lived up to any agreement?

 

Logic would dictate that even if US had been talking to him over the past 6 years, he would still build the missiles. The only differences would be are:

a) he would have better technology for those missiles, and

b) he probably wouldn't test fire the missiles, since he wouldn't need to poke Bush in the eye.

 

 

OTOH, by test firing the broken missile, he got Japan's attention and has finally done something to arouse concern of his neighbors who sat on the sidelines during bilateral talks. Any realistic actions on NK would have to involve SK, China & Russia.

 

So tell me, which policy has been more effective in getting the neighbors off their arses?

[Kelly the Dog]

How can you come to the conclusion that not talking has been worse that continuing a bilateral dialogue, especially when you admit that Kim is unreliable and hasn't lived up to any agreement? 

 

Logic would dictate that even if US had been talking to him over the past 6 years, he would still build the missiles.  The only differences would be are:

a) he would have better technology for those missiles, and

b) he probably wouldn't test fire the missiles, since he wouldn't need to poke Bush in the eye. 

OTOH, by test firing the broken missile, he got Japan's attention and has finally done something to arouse concern of his neighbors who sat on the sidelines during bilateral talks.  Any realistic actions on NK would have to involve SK, China & Russia.

 

So tell me, which policy has been more effective in getting the neighbors off their arses?

729232[/snapback]

Neither. It had to come to a head at some point. Everyone knows (at least by now) that any realistic actions would have to involve SK, China and Russia. He seems to have been just doing whatever the hell he wants to for years and years. Whenever we were not talking he was building up his arsenal, too. He has built up more missiles while not talking, yes? The failure, by both Clinton and Bush, and all previous administrations, in pretty equal parts, is really not getting the neighbors. I don't know what the solution is, obviously. I just think that it still has to include all options, including bilateral talks, multi-lateral talks, serious threats and ultimatums.

[Johnny Coli]

Bilateral talks is what Clinton did, which we have already determined to be an abject failure. You are advocating a policy which has proven to be a bad one? Yeah, OK. 

729203[/snapback]

And what good, exactly, are the multiparty talks if NK won't come to the table? And why won't they come to the table? Because the US won't enter into bilateral talks. So, there really aren't any talks.

 

Some might say that playing chicken with an insane person is pretty foolish. Add in the fact that the only bargaining chip KJI has is that he's crazy and has nukes. So, by not talking to him, who's the bigger nut? KJI or The Unitary Executive?

 

A more pessimistic person might draw the conclusion that the Bush admin really has no idea what to do, and is using this tactic hoping that KJI doesn't come to the multi-party table...maybe hoping that their "stern" waiting game forces someone else to solve the problem, or that NK implodes, or that nothing happens until after 1/21/2009.

 

So, they strategically do nothing (Is doing nothing a plan? Where oh where have I heard that ridiculed before?) while a certifiably insane megalomaniac makes more WMDs.

[KRC]

And what good, exactly, are the multiparty talks if NK won't come to the table?  And why won't they come to the table?  Because the US won't enter into bilateral talks.  So, there really aren't any talks.

729295[/snapback]

 

They have always demanded bilateral talks. This has not stopped them from attending multilateral talks, as evidenced by the multiple talks they have already had in the multi-lateral format. Therefore, your point really carries no weight. The multi-lateral call for talks is what got them to back down and attend the talks under the multi-lateral format. Have I mentioned "multi" enough?

 

More after lunch...

[Johnny Coli]

How can you come to the conclusion that not talking has been worse that continuing a bilateral dialogue, especially when you admit that Kim is unreliable and hasn't lived up to any agreement? 

 

Logic would dictate that even if US had been talking to him over the past 6 years, he would still build the missiles.  The only differences would be are:

a) he would have better technology for those missiles, and

b) he probably wouldn't test fire the missiles, since he wouldn't need to poke Bush in the eye. 

OTOH, by test firing the broken missile, he got Japan's attention and has finally done something to arouse concern of his neighbors who sat on the sidelines during bilateral talks.  Any realistic actions on NK would have to involve SK, China & Russia.

 

So tell me, which policy has been more effective in getting the neighbors off their arses?

729232[/snapback]

Actually, wasn't it the hardline stance that the Bush admin took a year after ascending to the throne when NK walked away from the table and booted the inspectors? So, had Bush not labled them a terrorist state, refused to negotiate, and lumped them in with Iraq (who we invaded a short while later...for having wmds) and Iran (who we'll be invading next year), then perhaps there might ne some oversight. Whether that would have made a difference we'll never know, because no one is there, and hasn't been for half a decade now.

 

OTOH, by test firing the broken missile, he got Japan's attention and has finally done something to arouse concern of his neighbors who sat on the sidelines during bilateral talks.  Any realistic actions on NK would have to involve SK, China & Russia.

So, what you are also saying is that it's a good thing for the region that NK fired off some missiles, because it will force Japan, SK and China to do something...something that Bush isn't doing. So, in essence, his plan is to do nothing and let someone else deal with it?

[Alaska Darin]

What would a day on the GOPPP be without the "smartest guys in the room" patting themselves on the back?

728904[/snapback]

Or the lead Dummycrat schill repeating mass media talking points, ad nauseum?

 

You are what you hate, hypocrite. Not that I wouldn't love to drink beer with you and talk about anything but politics.

[Alaska Darin]

Actually, wasn't it the hardline stance that the Bush admin took a year after ascending to the throne when NK walked away from the table and booted the inspectors?  So, had Bush not labled them a terrorist state, refused to negotiate, and lumped them in with Iraq (who we invaded a short while later...for having wmds) and Iran (who we'll be invading next year), then perhaps there might ne some oversight.  Whether that would have made a difference we'll never know, because no one is there, and hasn't been for half a decade now.

So, what you are also saying is that it's a good thing for the region that NK fired off some missiles, because it will force Japan, SK and China to do something...something that Bush isn't doing.  So, in essence, his plan is to do nothing and let someone else deal with it?

729321[/snapback]

I hate when the people actually affected by things in their neighborhood get involved. I'm sorry, where North Korea is concerned the US is supposed to lead but when the Middle East is the topic, the world is supposed to take the baton.

 

Could you get any more ridiculous?

[GG]

Actually, wasn't it the hardline stance that the Bush admin took a year after ascending to the throne when NK walked away from the table and booted the inspectors?  So, had Bush not labled them a terrorist state, refused to negotiate, and lumped them in with Iraq (who we invaded a short while later...for having wmds) and Iran (who we'll be invading next year), then perhaps there might ne some oversight.  Whether that would have made a difference we'll never know, because no one is there, and hasn't been for half a decade now.

 

Your theory would work if you believe that Kim was abiding by the 1994 agreements, and that the UN inspectors were actually accomplishing something as per Agreed Framework.

 

Let's play the GG search game Timelines

21 October 1994

 

The United States and North Korea sign an accord (Agreed Framework), which specifies the actions that both countries will take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Under the terms of the agreement, a US-led international consortium will help North Korea replace its graphite-moderated reactors with two 1,000MW light-water reactors. The international consortium will compensate North Korea for the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the new reactors come online. Second, the United States and North Korea will make efforts to normalize their economic and political relations by reducing investment and trade barriers. Third, both countries will strive towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, North Korea will help strengthen the nonproliferation regime by remaining a member of the NPT. It will also allow the IAEA to implement the safeguards agreement and monitor the freeze on its nuclear facilities.

 

13 October 1995

 

IAEA Director General Hans Blix says in a report to the UN Security Council that North Korea has denied the IAEA inspectors permission to evaluate the plutonium levels in the nuclear spent fuel. Blix adds that North Korea has only provided the IAEA with minimal access to its Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

 

18 March 1996

 

IAEA Director General Hans Blix tells the IAEA Board of Governors that North Korea is not cooperating with IAEA efforts to ascertain the quantity of plutonium held at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. IAEA inspectors have made a number of attempts to photograph the facility since September 1995, in accordance with agreements reached with North Korea. However, they have been restricted from taking photographs. North Korea has also been slow in granting visas for IAEA inspectors.

 

1 June 1997

 

After reviewing the implementation of the IAEA safeguards in 1996 with North Korea, the IAEA Board of Governors reports that it is still unable to verify the initial declaration made by North Korea, and that North Korea still remains in non-compliance of its nuclear safeguards agreement.

 

24 March 1999

 

IAEA officials report that critical parts of the North Korean 50MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon have been missing since 1994 when IAEA inspectors first arrived at the site. The parts are vital for controlling the nuclear reaction in the reactor's graphite core. The equipment can be used in the construction of another nuclear reactor.

Of course, it was Cowboy Dub's lobbing NK into the evil axis ring that really set Kooky Kim off to fire the missiles. The policy was really working under the unnamed administration.

So, what you are also saying is that it's a good thing for the region that NK fired off some missiles, because it will force Japan, SK and China to do something...something that Bush isn't doing.  So, in essence, his plan is to do nothing and let someone else deal with it?

729321[/snapback]

 

No it's not a good thing, but the current admin has always advocated a multi-lateral solution to the crisis. Too bad it took a missile to spring them to action.

 

But I want to be sure that I get your point. Seeking other countries' help in diffusing an international crisis is now bad? Check.

[Orton's Arm]

No, see, destroying Hizb'Allah is the wrong way to go about it.  We should really be engaging both sides diplomatically...say, sending the Secretary of State to talk to everyone involved, because

The president has been so absent on diplomacy when it comes to issues affecting the Middle East

This, of course, being the exact same "diplomacy" that failed in Iraq, after he voted against it, after he voted for it...

We have to destroy Hizbollah

sh-- like this is the reason I didn't vote for the guy.

I'll agree the Kerry quotes were foolish, but not for the reasons you mentioned. When Kerry accused Bush of being absent on diplomacy when it came to the Middle East, he was probably thinkinging the U.S. should have built a broad coalition for situations like Iraq, instead of approaching them with few allies. When he said the U.S. should destroy Hizbollah, he may have been envisioning a broad coalition such as the one in Afghanistan.

 

This leads to deeper questions about a Kerry-inspired foreign policy. If the U.S. should destroy Hizbollah (a terrorist organization targeting Israel), maybe it should also target the Chechneyan terrorist groups targeting Russia, Muslim organizations committing terrorist acts in Western China, various Latin American death squads or communist guerrilla organizations, and African governments or rebel groups which engage in tribally-based exterminations. There are so many governments and organizations which sponsor terrorist acts the U.S can't possibly deal with all of them. Apparently, Kerry doesn't see the wisdom in focusing only on those groups which are focused on us.

 

Also, if Kerry insists on working through diplomacy and consensus, he may find it extremely difficult to destroy Hizbollah. It's nearly impossible to imagine Muslim nations cooperating with such a move, and I doubt we'd see much enthusiasm in Europe either.

[KRC]

Everything has proven to be an abject failure at this point. There are a finite number of generalized solutions, and its seems ridiculous to call all bilateral talks useless, just as it would be ridiculous to call all ultimatums, one on one or multi-lateral talks useless. It seems clear to me that no one has yet been able to get the right combination of strength, threat (individual and combined), and diplomacy at the right time.

729213[/snapback]

 

Actually, things are moving in the right direction under the current scheme, so I strongly disagree with your first statement. Coli likes to point out that missiles were fired and the DPRK has nukes, therefore the policy is a failure. As a result, we need to go back to the policy whereby the DPRK fired missiles and had nukes. In fact, under Coli's scheme, the DPRK made more advancements in their nuclear and ballistic missile technology than anytime under Bush.

 

Before talking about specific ways to negotiate with the DPRK, an understanding of their negotiating tactics needs to be discussed. Negotiations with the DPRK are extremely difficult, but there is a specific scheme that they use in their negotiating tactics. Most of all, it takes patience in dealing with the DPRK. You need to look at not only the positions and tactics of the DPRK negotiators in the talks, but you also need to pay close attention to public statements, specific types of media comments and attempts to employ “brinkmanship” and crisis-oriented tactics designed to create an atmosphere to weaken the opponent’s position and extract concessions. Inflexibility in the initial stages of a negotiation is often used as a tactic to induce concessions and to demonstrate to superiors in Pyongyang that negotiators are strongly pursuing the DPRK’s interests; however, it may also signal an unwillingness to negotiate or a determination that the atmosphere is not favorable to the DPRK. Following an initial hard stance, indications of flexibility signal that DPRK negotiators are looking for a deal. This flexibility has been seen in public and media statements over the past several years. They talk tough, but then show flexibility. The negotiating partners need to be conscious of this and formulate their policy in such a way as to allow the DPRK to save face.

 

Before engaging in an actual negotiation, DPRK negotiators analyze their opponent’s positions and determine if there is any flexibility. This can take place in either formal or informal discussions. During informal talks, DPRK negotiators float trial proposals to test their opponent’s reactions. These trial proposals may find their way into formal talks or they may be retracted, depending on the response. The main purpose of this is to “feel-out” their opponents and to determine if there are any inconsistencies in their opponents negotiating stance.

 

When negotiations begin, protocols are established. The DPRK quickly ignores those protocols and moves to create their own agenda and to put them on the same level as the United States. While the U.S. is making their opening statement, the DPRK attentively listens to the U.S. to see if there are any inconsistencies with previous statements either in the media or at previous rounds of negotiations.

 

The real progress is made during the informal discussions. Transcripts of the formal sessions are sent to Pyongyang for analysis. Informal sessions are “off the record.” This is where specific wording of any agreement is done. Obviously, the wording is extremely important to all sides. As I mentioned previously, the informal sessions are also where the DPRK tests new proposals. The DPRK negotiators are more relaxed and more willing to discuss their true position, why they hold that specific position and where concessions can be made.

 

When you get to the agreement stage, the DPRK usually does not negotiate specific points. They accept or reject proposals as a whole instead of compromising. Appearances of flexibility disappear as you get closer to an agreement. This is designed to wear down their opponents in order to gain additional concessions, along with signaling Pyongyang that they are approaching the end of what they can get out of their opponents.

 

I have mentioned this previously, but Western approaches to negotiations are linear. This philosophy dictates that there is a clear beginning, middle and end to the negotiations and progress can be measured. Negotiations with the DPRK are cyclical. Issues are constantly revisited and re-hashed. This gives the appearance that the negotiations are failing, but it is how things are done. There is no clear beginning, middle and end in order to measure progress. This section of the negotiations are very long and drawn out as each issue is revisited and revisited again. The DPRK will again try for additional concessions during this phase. Even after all sides have come to an agreement, the DPRK will still try for additional concessions.

 

As any agreement gets to its final stages, the terms of the agreement are tested. During this testing, the DPRK will harden its stance, along with raising new questions. This is, again, another opportunity to find inconsistencies in their opponent’s position and exploit those inconsistencies to gain additional concessions.

 

Throughout the process, you will see attempts at brinkmanship and crisis-oriented tactics. Creating a “crisis” is used to move the agenda away from current discussions and onto an agenda of the DPRK’s choosing. The recent missile tests are an example of this. They were reaching the end of what they could get regarding the nuclear issue, so they change up the issue to missiles. In the past, they used unloading of fuel rods, threats to walk away from talks, manufacturing deadlines and (shockingly) missile tests for this same purpose.

 

All of their tactics are based in the philosophy of being on the same level as the United States (which means that they have weakened the United States to the point of them being equal - an important psychological point). Using multi-lateral discussions mutes this and puts the DPRK on the level where they belong. Multi-lateral discussions also show the DPRK that the entire region is speaking, not just the U.S. While they can live without the U.S., they cannot live without the ROK, China and Russia (which is a direct contradiction to the Juche philosophy, but that is for another time). All three provide valuable aid. The only way you are going to make progress is to have the entire region collectively working towards a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. This means that you need more people at the negotiating table than just the DPRK and U.S. The proof is in the results and there is a definite shift not only in the DPRK, but China, Russia, Japan and the ROK. You are seeing all of them move more toward a unified front with the United States. It takes years to do this, but it is necessary. You cannot get that from bilateral discussions.

 

Now, you talked about using multiple tactics to get the job done. This is exactly the approach that is being used now. Multi-lateral talks with bilateral sidebars in the informal sessions. Couple this with PSI, pressure from the other negotiating partners and allies and economic sanctions. You also have the war games in the area, which is a tactic typically used to elicit a response.

 

The problem is that people want a quick solution. Quick solutions give us the 1994 Agreed Framework, which we all know was worth less than the paper it was printed on. Long-term solutions require time. Unfortunately, that does not fit conveniently into U.S. election cycles.

[Crap Throwing Monkey]

I'll agree the Kerry quotes were foolish, but not for the reasons you mentioned.  When Kerry accused Bush of being absent on diplomacy when it came to the Middle East, he was probably thinkinging the U.S. should have built a broad coalition for situations like Iraq, instead of approaching them with few allies.  When he said the U.S. should destroy Hizbollah, he may have been envisioning a broad coalition such as the one in Afghanistan.

 

Actually, that's a very good point...it's not so much that Bush isn't engaging the current issues diplomatically, as much as Kerry doesn't recognize it as diplomacy because it doesn't fit his definition. Which, by the way, still makes his statement bull sh--, as there's a difference between "bad diplomacy" and "no diplomacy", a difference Kerry clearly didn't recognize.

 

This leads to deeper questions about a Kerry-inspired foreign policy.  If the U.S. should destroy Hizbollah (a terrorist organization targeting Israel), maybe it should also target the Chechneyan terrorist groups targeting Russia, Muslim organizations committing terrorist acts in Western China, various Latin American death squads or communist guerrilla organizations, and African governments or rebel groups which engage in tribally-based exterminations.  There are so many governments and organizations which sponsor terrorist acts the U.S can't possibly deal with all of them.  Apparently, Kerry doesn't see the wisdom in focusing only on those groups which are focused on us.

 

Also, if Kerry insists on working through diplomacy and consensus, he may find it extremely difficult to destroy Hizbollah.  It's nearly impossible to imagine Muslim nations cooperating with such a move, and I doubt we'd see much enthusiasm in Europe either.

729344[/snapback]

 

That was pretty much the gist of my complaint. "Use diplomacy" and "destroy Hezbollah"? That's pretty contradictory. Unless you're Joe Stalin (which I don't think Kerry is).

[Taro T]

Actually, wasn't it the hardline stance that the Bush admin took a year after ascending to the throne when NK walked away from the table and booted the inspectors?  So, had Bush not labled them a terrorist state, refused to negotiate, and lumped them in with Iraq (who we invaded a short while later...for having wmds) and Iran (who we'll be invading next year), then perhaps there might ne some oversight.  Whether that would have made a difference we'll never know, because no one is there, and hasn't been for half a decade now.

So, what you are also saying is that it's a good thing for the region that NK fired off some missiles, because it will force Japan, SK and China to do something...something that Bush isn't doing.  So, in essence, his plan is to do nothing and let someone else deal with it?

729321[/snapback]

You don't happen to know which month we'll be invading do you?

 

I'd be interested in buying some futures calls and that information would be helpful in choosing my positions.

[Crap Throwing Monkey]

You don't happen to know which month we'll be invading do you?

 

I'd be interested in buying some futures calls and that information would be helpful in choosing my positions.

729410[/snapback]

 

March. Best time, weather-wise.

[Taro T]

Actually, things are moving in the right direction under the current scheme, so I strongly disagree with your first statement. Coli likes to point out that missiles were fired and the DPRK has nukes, therefore the policy is a failure. As a result, we need to go back to the policy whereby the DPRK fired missiles and had nukes.    In fact, under Coli's scheme, the DPRK made more advancements in their nuclear and ballistic missile technology than anytime under Bush.

 

...

 

The problem is that people want a quick solution. Quick solutions give us the 1994 Agreed Framework, which we all know was worth less than the paper it was printed on. Long-term solutions require time. Unfortunately, that does not fit conveniently into U.S. election cycles.

729389[/snapback]

Ken,

 

One rather rudimentary question for you. (Sorry, I'm sure I could find a lot of this on GG's site, but when an expert is available I prefer to start there.) How much or how often do the 4 other parties meet with the US on this when the DPRK isn't involved?

[KRC]

Ken,

 

One rather rudimentary question for you.  (Sorry, I'm sure I could find a lot of this on GG's site, but when an expert is available I prefer to start there.)  How much or how often do the 4 other parties meet with the US on this when the DPRK isn't involved?

729416[/snapback]

 

As a group, they don't. That is something Bush is pushing for right now. They want to have five-party talks if the DPRK refuses to come back to the table. This gives them the opportunity to talk not only about the DPRK issues, but also other regional issues. Right now, China is against it. I do see, however, that they would be willing to warm up to it if the DPRK continues to refuse to attend the talks.

 

As individual countries, they meet on a regular basis. Christopher Hill regularly visits the countries (namely the ROK and China) to discuss things. There are also regular meetings here in the U.S. and there are regional meetings like ASEAN going on right now. Rice, Rumsfeld and Bush all remain on top of things and have regular meetings with officials of all of the countries involved, along with discussing things with the EU and UN.

[Taro T]

As a group, they don't. That is something Bush is pushing for right now. They want to have five-party talks if the DPRK refuses to come back to the table. This gives them the opportunity to talk not only about the DPRK issues, but also other regional issues. Right now, China is against it. I do see, however, that they would be willing to warm up to it if the DPRK continues to refuse to attend the talks.

 

As individual countries, they meet on a regular basis. Christopher Hill regularly visits the countries (namely the ROK and China) to discuss things. There are also regular meetings here in the U.S. and there are regional meetings like ASEAN going on right now. Rice, Rumsfeld and Bush all remain on top of things and have regular meetings with officials of all of the countries involved, along with discussing things with the EU and UN.

729423[/snapback]

Thanks for the info.

 

If there was a meeting of the 5, would you expect the DPRK to view that as an "oh, sh*t" occurrance or wouldn't it alter their stance substantially (or both)?

[KRC]

Thanks for the info.

 

If there was a meeting of the 5, would you expect the DPRK to view that as an "oh, sh*t" occurrance or wouldn't it alter their stance substantially (or both)?

729438[/snapback]

 

I don't think that it would change their apparent stance, but it would change the dynamic of the negotiations. Their apparent stance does not change, regardless of what happens. Their actual stance does change, albeit with subtle changes. It would move things towards an "oh sh--" in their mind, but it would not actually reach the "oh sh--" stage. What it does do is knock the DPRK down a peg (more of a "those mother fvckers" and not really an "oh sh--"). As I mentioned, they want to be on the same level as the U.S. Holding a meeting between the five parties shows that they are not in control of the process. They will try to regain control of the process using brinkmanship and crisis-oriented tactics (missile tests anyone? How about playing with their fuel rods?). These tactics worked very well in the 90's and they still think that it will have a chance of working now. Just look at some of the reactions to the missile tests here in the U.S. There is still part of the country that is unwilling to see things through and wants a quick solution to the problem. It doesn't work. It hasn't worked in the past, why the hell would it work now or in the future?

 

If five-party talks were to happen, you can expect the DPRK to immediately blast the "U.S. aggressive maneuvers against the DPRK" and then submit and return to the talks. You just need to get China on board. All that takes is patience. They will come around. They have come around on everything else (intelligence reports, sanctions, willingness on the part of the U.S. to negotiate, etc), so I see no reason why they would not come around on this, as well.

 

It is all moving in a positive direction, regardless of what the fear-mongers want you to believe.

[Kelly the Dog]

Actually, things are moving in the right direction under the current scheme, so I strongly disagree with your first statement. Coli likes to point out that missiles were fired and the DPRK has nukes, therefore the policy is a failure. As a result, we need to go back to the policy whereby the DPRK fired missiles and had nukes.    In fact, under Coli's scheme, the DPRK made more advancements in their nuclear and ballistic missile technology than anytime under Bush.

 

Before talking about specific ways to negotiate with the DPRK, an understanding of their negotiating tactics needs to be discussed. Negotiations with the DPRK are extremely difficult, but there is a specific scheme that they use in their negotiating tactics. Most of all, it takes patience in dealing with the DPRK. You need to look at not only the positions and tactics of the DPRK negotiators in the talks, but you also need to pay close attention to public statements, specific types of media comments and attempts to employ “brinkmanship” and crisis-oriented tactics designed to create an atmosphere to weaken the opponent’s position and extract concessions. Inflexibility in the initial stages of a negotiation is often used as a tactic to induce concessions and to demonstrate to superiors in Pyongyang that negotiators are strongly pursuing the DPRK’s interests; however, it may also signal an unwillingness to negotiate or a determination that the atmosphere is not favorable to the DPRK. Following an initial hard stance, indications of flexibility signal that DPRK negotiators are looking for a deal. This flexibility has been seen in public and media statements over the past several years. They talk tough, but then show flexibility. The negotiating partners need to be conscious of this and formulate their policy in such a way as to allow the DPRK to save face.

 

Before engaging in an actual negotiation, DPRK negotiators analyze their opponent’s positions and determine if there is any flexibility. This can take place in either formal or informal discussions. During informal talks, DPRK negotiators float trial proposals to test their opponent’s reactions. These trial proposals may find their way into formal talks or they may be retracted, depending on the response. The main purpose of this is to “feel-out” their opponents and to determine if there are any inconsistencies in their opponents negotiating stance.

 

When negotiations begin, protocols are established. The DPRK quickly ignores those protocols and moves to create their own agenda and to put them on the same level as the United States. While the U.S. is making their opening statement, the DPRK attentively listens to the U.S. to see if there are any inconsistencies with previous statements either in the media or at previous rounds of negotiations.

 

The real progress is made during the informal discussions. Transcripts of the formal sessions are sent to Pyongyang for analysis. Informal sessions are “off the record.” This is where specific wording of any agreement is done. Obviously, the wording is extremely important to all sides. As I mentioned previously, the informal sessions are also where the DPRK tests new proposals. The DPRK negotiators are more relaxed and more willing to discuss their true position, why they hold that specific position and where concessions can be made.

 

When you get to the agreement stage, the DPRK usually does not negotiate specific points. They accept or reject proposals as a whole instead of compromising. Appearances of flexibility disappear as you get closer to an agreement. This is designed to wear down their opponents in order to gain additional concessions, along with signaling Pyongyang that they are approaching the end of what they can get out of their opponents.

 

I have mentioned this previously, but Western approaches to negotiations are linear. This philosophy dictates that there is a clear beginning, middle and end to the negotiations and progress can be measured. Negotiations with the DPRK are cyclical. Issues are constantly revisited and re-hashed. This gives the appearance that the negotiations are failing, but it is how things are done. There is no clear beginning, middle and end in order to measure progress. This section of the negotiations are very long and drawn out as each issue is revisited and revisited again. The DPRK will again try for additional concessions during this phase. Even after all sides have come to an agreement, the DPRK will still try for additional concessions.

 

As any agreement gets to its final stages, the terms of the agreement are tested. During this testing, the DPRK will harden its stance, along with raising new questions. This is, again, another opportunity to find inconsistencies in their opponent’s position and exploit those inconsistencies to gain additional concessions.

 

Throughout the process, you will see attempts at brinkmanship and crisis-oriented tactics. Creating a “crisis” is used to move the agenda away from current discussions and onto an agenda of the DPRK’s choosing. The recent missile tests are an example of this. They were reaching the end of what they could get regarding the nuclear issue, so they change up the issue to missiles. In the past, they used unloading of fuel rods, threats to walk away from talks, manufacturing deadlines and (shockingly) missile tests for this same purpose.

 

All of their tactics are based in the philosophy of being on the same level as the United States (which means that they have weakened the United States to the point of them being equal - an important psychological point). Using multi-lateral discussions mutes this and puts the DPRK on the level where they belong. Multi-lateral discussions also show the DPRK that the entire region is speaking, not just the U.S. While they can live without the U.S., they cannot live without the ROK, China and Russia (which is a direct contradiction to the Juche philosophy, but that is for another time). All three provide valuable aid. The only way you are going to make progress is to have the entire region collectively working towards a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. This means that you need more people at the negotiating table than just the DPRK and U.S. The proof is in the results and there is a definite shift not only in the DPRK, but China, Russia, Japan and the ROK. You are seeing all of them move more toward a unified front with the United States. It takes years to do this, but it is necessary. You cannot get that from bilateral discussions.

 

Now, you talked about using multiple tactics to get the job done. This is exactly the approach that is being used now. Multi-lateral talks with bilateral sidebars in the informal sessions. Couple this with PSI, pressure from the other negotiating partners and allies and economic sanctions. You also have the war games in the area, which is a tactic typically used to elicit a response.

 

The problem is that people want a quick solution. Quick solutions give us the 1994 Agreed Framework, which we all know was worth less than the paper it was printed on. Long-term solutions require time. Unfortunately, that does not fit conveniently into U.S. election cycles.

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Thanks. That's a great answer, and makes sense. It still seems to me, however, that it is a mess now and not really moving in the direction we have wanted to, but back and forth, sometimes looking favorable and then blowing up in our face. And they will just be doing this same cycle you explained so eloquently, until China and Russia and Japan etc. put their foot down. I just don't see that happening in the near future. I see russia and China turning on us when we need them. And after 6-7 years of this particular policy, DPRK is just as strong if not stronger. And I'm surely not saying Clinton's efforts or lack thereof were any better. Maybe I'm wrong.

[KRC]

Thanks. That's a great answer, and makes sense. It still seems to me, however, that it is a mess now and not really moving in the direction we have wanted to, but back and forth, sometimes looking favorable and then blowing up in our face. And they will just be doing this same cycle you explained so eloquently, until China and Russia and Japan etc. put their foot down. I just don't see that happening in the near future. I see russia and China turning on us when we need them. And after 6-7 years of this particular policy, DPRK is just as strong if not stronger. And I'm surely not saying Clinton's efforts or lack thereof were any better. Maybe I'm wrong.

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That is exactly what they want you to believe. It is done on purpose to wear down the other negotiating partners and to force them into giving the DPRK more concessions. Again, there is no clear beginning, middle and end to the negotiations. There is no linear progression. They want you to think that you are starting all over again and that all of your efforts have been wasted. They want you to think that things are the same (if not worse) than when you started.

 

The only way you can really tell that progress is being made is to analyze daily statements from the DPRK and watch for trends and shifts in their rhetoric. You especially need to pay close attention to their rhetoric immediately after U.S. statements and demands and how it may or may not shift over the subsequent weeks when they monitor the reactions of the U.S. to counter statements and demands. This happens both during the negotiating sessions and outside of the talks. The changes can be subtle, but they say a lot about their willingness to negotiate and their willingness to back off of their demands. You are not going to get that type of analysis from the mainstream media or talking heads becuase it is too much effort. I have had to do that myself and that is how I have come to the conclusions that I have expressed here and elsewhere.

 

Japan is taking a lead in pushing the DPRK. They are the ones who pushed for the UN resolution and they are the ones who refused to accept a resolution that did not contain sanctions. China steadfastly refused any sort of sanctions, either through the UN or elsewhere. They have now come around. Russia will just follow China. The ROK still thinks the appeasement route is the way to go. They are continually getting screwed, but are firm in appeasing the DPRK. As elections get closer, however, you will see a shift in Korean policy. That is exactly what is happening in Japan right now, which is why you are seeing the tougher talk out of them.