Amanpour

[Mickey]

In an interview with James Risen, the reporter who wrote the just released book "State of War" which addresses the NSA wiretapping program we have been discussing over the last week or so, Andrea Mitchell of NBC asked him:

 

"Mitchell: Do you have any information about reporters being swept up in this net?

 

Risen: No, I don't. It's not clear to me. That's one of the questions we'll have to look into the future. Were there abuses of this program or not? I don't know the answer to that

 

Mitchell: You don't have any information, for instance, that a very prominent journalist, Christiane Amanpour, might have been eavesdropped upon?

 

Risen: No, no I hadn't heard that."

 

This was posted at the networks website but then they pulled it, elimentated the question about Amanpour and then put the edited transcript back up. NBC has since explained:

 

"Unfortunately this transcript was released prematurely. It was a topic on which we had not completed our reporting, and it was not broadcast on 'NBC Nightly News' nor on any other NBC News program. We removed that section of the transcript so that we may further continue our inquiry."

 

As for the program of bypassing FISA, it just didn't make sense to me since they can bug whoever they want for anyreason under FISA for a whole year without a warrant and all they have to do is to inform, under seal, a FISA judge and a few congressional big shots. There just didn't seem to be a need for it. I asked quite a few times for those defending the program to provide some reason why this FISA procedure which allows civil rights to be freely discarded, was still too cumbersome to compy with.

 

The only answers that emerged were (suggested by bib I think) that there was some technical reason, based on how the data is "mined", that made complying with these minimal FISA provisions impractical. The other reason would be that they were simply bugging people no one in their right mind would see as having anything to do with national security and everything to do with domestic political ambitions.

 

Apparently NBC has some information that Chritiane Amanpour was bugged but not much. Not even enough to leave the question in the transcript. I note this is not presented as proof that we have any evidence at all to believe this actually happened. Please read that again, I am not suggesting there is any reason to beleive Amanpour was bugged. I am posting the info on the incident just to show that the media, NBC in this instance, is starting to look at the possibility that journalists were targeted.

 

Snipe hunt or the first glimpse at the tip of the iceberg?

 

I know, I know. Snipe hunt.

[KRC]

It's not out of the realm of possibility. She spends a lot of time talking to people in hotbeds of violence. She probably has talked with people who either have had a hand in, or know people who have had a hand in, killing innocent people via terrorist attacks. I am neither saying that it is right nor that she is personally involved in attacks. It is just plausible due to her potential connections in the region.

[Mickey]

It's not out of the realm of possibility. She spends a lot of time talking to people in hotbeds of violence. She probably has talked with people who either have had a hand in, or know people who have had a hand in, killing innocent people via terrorist attacks. I am neither saying that it is right nor that she is personally involved in attacks. It is just plausible due to her potential connections in the region.

555011[/snapback]

Maybe so, and without knowing any details or even if it is so, we can only speculate. I will say this though, whatever the reason, if she was bugged, the administration is going to be in very, very hot water. At the same time they are bugging her to see if she is having an affair with Osama, they are also getting a heads up on all her reporting, her sources, her off the record discussions with domestic political opponents, etc., etc. It would certainly explain why they didn't follow FISA's virtually non-existent rules.

 

Bugging Christaine Amanpour. As Lettermen would say, "Honest to Christ".

[Taro T]

In an interview with James Risen, the reporter who wrote the just released book "State of War" which addresses the NSA wiretapping program we have been discussing over the last week or so, Andrea Mitchell of NBC asked him:

This was posted at the networks website but then they pulled it, elimentated the question about Amanpour and then put the edited transcript back up.  NBC has since explained:

As for the program of bypassing FISA, it just didn't make sense to me since they can bug whoever they want for anyreason under FISA for a whole year without a warrant and all they have to do is to inform, under seal, a FISA judge and a few congressional big shots.  There just didn't seem to be a need for it.  I asked quite a few times for those defending the program to provide some reason why this FISA procedure which allows civil rights to be freely discarded, was still too cumbersome to compy with.

 

The only answers that emerged were (suggested by bib I think) that there was some technical reason, based on how the data is "mined", that made complying with these minimal FISA provisions impractical.  The other reason would be that they were simply bugging people no one in their right mind would see as having anything to do with national security and everything to do with domestic political ambitions.

 

Apparently NBC has some information that Chritiane Amanpour was bugged but not much.  Not even enough to leave the question in the transcript.  I note this is not presented as proof that we have any evidence at all to believe this actually happened.  Please read that again, I am not suggesting there is any reason to beleive Amanpour was bugged.  I am posting the info on the incident just to show that the media, NBC in this instance, is starting to look at the possibility that journalists were targeted.

 

Snipe hunt or the first glimpse at the tip of the iceberg?

 

I know, I know.  Snipe hunt.

554988[/snapback]

Getting back to your question about why the FISA procedure is too cumbersome, I think that BiB was on the right track. My understanding of FISA is that the wiretaps can proceed once the AG has filled out the paperwork to the court or after the AG has approved them and then eventually tells the proper congresscritters and tells the court about them. FISA doesn't address (at least in my reading) intercepts that are discovered or required BEFORE the AG has approved them. Such an intercept could be desired if a person who was under surveillance using proper FISA procedures was talking to a previously unknown 3rd party and based upon the conversation w/ the 3rd party the tappers knew that 3rd party was going to speak to someone else in the chain. Again, per my reading of FISA, AFTER the tapper has AG approval he can begin tapping 3rd party and or 4th party's communications; but they are NOT legal until AG has given authority. The time lost in getting AG's approval could be very critical in this scenario. The surveillance could also be desired based upon datamining from the broad cell phone intercepts that are conducted and it might not be possible to get the AG's approval soon enough to get anything useful from the newly discovered source. I've seen a lot of discussion revolving around the AG's 72 hours to get his certification to the FISA court, but haven't seen a discussion of what is / isn't permissible before the AG's certification.

 

I had thought this might be a cause of the Admin's sidestepping FISA, but couldn't understand why it would be an issue to them because they weren't using this for criminal prosecutions (or so I thought). Based on my quick reading of the Time article CTM linked, there have been people prosecuted successfully who 1st came under suspicion based upon info gathered BEFORE the AG had officially approved the taps (I should go back and reread, maybe I misread it). Technically, those convictions / plea bargains probably should be overturned on appeal because the evidence was found legally but was looked for because of information collected outside of FISA (i.e., illegally). I am not comfortable with releasing people that want to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge, but also do not like where the potential to abuse this surveillance may lead.

 

I read about a month ago, when this story 1st broke, that the Admin had some concerns about FISA along these lines and planned to get FISA modified to get the gray area of what the status of surveillance before the AG approves it. From what I read, there was not enough support in Congress to modify FISA, but that all parties involved (WH, Congress, AG, intelligence orgs.) would essentially look the other way on the preapproval taps and consider this gray area acceptable under FISA. Sorry, I don't have links to this, as I don't have the time right now to try to regoogle the articles.

 

It seems to me, that this preapproval surveillance needs to be made "legal" to gather, but there also needs to be significant safeguards placed to limit the use of the information gathered from this surveillance. I don't know that our congresscritters are smart enough to come up with a way of modifying FISA that will address both the national security and the personal liberty concerns that this issue raises.

[Alaska Darin]

First, B word when the intelligence services fail. Then, B word when they follow people who have access to sources that it would take a decade to cultivate.

 

The level of ignorance reaches a new high.

[Mickey]

Getting back to your question about why the FISA procedure is too cumbersome, I think that BiB was on the right track.  My understanding of FISA is that the wiretaps can proceed once the AG has filled out the paperwork to the court or after the AG has approved them and then eventually tells the proper congresscritters and tells the court about them.  FISA doesn't address (at least in my reading) intercepts that are discovered or required BEFORE the AG has approved them.  Such an intercept could be desired if a person who was under surveillance using proper FISA procedures was talking to a previously unknown 3rd party and based upon the conversation w/ the 3rd party the tappers knew that 3rd party was going to speak to someone else in the chain.  Again, per my reading of FISA, AFTER the tapper has AG approval he can begin tapping 3rd party and or 4th party's communications; but they are NOT legal until AG has given authority.  The time lost in getting AG's approval could be very critical in this scenario.  The surveillance could also be desired based upon datamining from the broad cell phone intercepts that are conducted and it might not be possible to get the AG's approval soon enough to get anything useful from the newly discovered source.  I've seen a lot of discussion revolving around the AG's 72 hours to get his certification to the FISA court, but haven't seen a discussion of what is / isn't permissible before the AG's certification.

 

I had thought this might be a cause of the Admin's sidestepping FISA, but couldn't understand why it would be an issue to them because they weren't using this for criminal prosecutions (or so I thought).  Based on my quick reading of the Time article CTM linked, there have been people prosecuted successfully who 1st came under suspicion based upon info gathered BEFORE the AG had officially approved the taps (I should go back and reread, maybe I misread it).  Technically, those convictions / plea bargains probably should be overturned on appeal because the evidence was found legally but was looked for because of information collected outside of FISA (i.e., illegally).  I am not comfortable with releasing people that want to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge, but also do not like where the potential to abuse this surveillance may lead.

 

I read about a month ago, when this story 1st broke, that the Admin had some concerns about FISA along these lines and planned to get FISA modified to get the gray area of what the status of surveillance before the AG approves it.  From what I read, there was not enough support in Congress to modify FISA, but that all parties involved (WH, Congress, AG, intelligence orgs.) would essentially look the other way on the preapproval taps and consider this gray area acceptable under FISA.  Sorry, I don't have links to this, as I don't have the time right now to try to regoogle the articles.

 

It seems to me, that this preapproval surveillance needs to be made "legal" to gather, but there also needs to be significant safeguards placed to limit the use of the information gathered from this surveillance.  I don't know that our congresscritters are smart enough to come up with a way of modifying FISA that will address both the national security and the personal liberty concerns that this issue raises.

555130[/snapback]

I may be missing something but I don't see anywhere in there an explanation as to why they wouldn't simply follow the FISA procedure that lets them tap anyone for any reason without a warrant for up to one year with the only requirement being that they have to notify, underseal, a FISA judge and a few congressional big shots. That's it. Why could they not just do that?

 

I thought there might be some sort of technical problem where they really aren't tapping a person, just examining mass amounts of traffic between points A and B and drilling down to see who is talking to who. For example, they know there is traffic between suspicious point A and suspicious point B. The examine it call by call, not knowing who is talking to who until they do. How then would you notify FISA that you are tapping person of interest X when you don't know who is talking to who when you start listening. Apart from something like that, I just don't know why they couldn't tap their fannies off for a year (extensions are available) and just notify the court and a congressmen or two.

[Mickey]

First, B word when the intelligence services fail.  Then, B word when they follow people who have access to sources that it would take a decade to cultivate.

 

The level of ignorance reaches a new high.

555242[/snapback]

Empty argument.

 

You could say the same thing if people complained about a policy where every passenger on the plane is handcuffed to their seat. First B word about not preventing hijacks, then complain about a procedure that would stop it in its tracks.

Obviously, everyone is willing to strike a balance between civil liberties and security and I don't think its is ignorance to discuss what that balance should be.

 

If there is some connection, apart from fantasy and speculation, between spying on Christiane Amanpour and preventing suicide terrorists, it escapes me. Now, if they want to bug Al Jazeera, that makes sense to me. In any event, we aren't even talking about whether they should or should not bug US journalists, they can if they want to. The question is how do they go about it? The answer is FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, which permits them to do just that. Why they chose to ignore the law when the law itself already gave them a blanck check to tap whoever they want for at least a year is anyone's guess.

 

It might be because they were tapping people for reasons that had nothing to do with national security and everything to do with their domestic political ambitions.

[VABills]

Maybe so, and without knowing any details or even if it is so, we can only speculate.  I will say this though, whatever the reason, if she was bugged, the administration is going to be in very, very hot water.  At the same time they are bugging her to see if she is having an affair with Osama, they are also getting a heads up on all her reporting, her sources, her off the record discussions with domestic political opponents, etc., etc.  It would certainly explain why they didn't follow FISA's virtually non-existent rules.

 

Bugging Christaine Amanpour.  As Lettermen would say, "Honest to Christ".

555064[/snapback]

And when I mentioned several weeks back that it was likely some kind of politico or celeb you laughed it off and said something like , yeah Oprah is helping Al Qaeda.

 

But what do you know it was a celeb and a very good reason to keep it out of any possible public pervue.

[Taro T]

I may be missing something but I don't see anywhere in there an explanation as to why they wouldn't simply follow the FISA procedure that lets them tap anyone for any reason without a warrant for up to one year with the only requirement being that they have to notify, underseal, a FISA judge and a few congressional big shots.  That's it.  Why could they not just do that?

 

I thought there might be some sort of technical problem where they really aren't tapping a person, just examining mass amounts of traffic between points A and B and drilling down to see who is talking to who.  For example, they know there is traffic between suspicious point A and suspicious point B.  The examine it call by call, not knowing who is talking to who until they do.  How then would you notify FISA that you are tapping person of interest X when you don't know who is talking to who when you start listening.  Apart from something like that, I just don't know why they couldn't tap their fannies off for a year (extensions are available) and just notify the court and a congressmen or two.

555300[/snapback]

I may be missing something as well, but I do not see anything in FISA that allows for surveillance PRIOR to the AG certification / approval. I can definitely envision scenarios where there can be a need to tap someone's communication before the AG can authorize the surveillance. Since anything obtained from the surveillance prior to AG authorization would necessarily be thrown out as it was obtained "illegally" (as near as I can tell), I can see where the administration is trying to claim that normal provisions of FISA do not apply due to Congress authorizing use of force / all means necessary / etc., etc..

 

It seems to me that this is a glaring weakness of FISA and should be corrected. Again, I don't know that any correction that gets enacted wouldn't necessarily be worse that the original.

 

I also have 1 further question. In my reading of 1802(a), it seems to state fairly clearly that the surveillance minus a court order is only applicable to communications that don't include a "US person". That would imply that the AG cannot authorize surveillance of a US person without the FISA court order. You seem to have a completely different opinion on this matter. Could you please refer me to where you see that the surveillance of US persons is allowed without a court order, or explain to me how I am misinterpreting this section of the Statute? I am not a lawyer and readily admit that I may be misinterpreting this.

[billsfanone]

She's a terrorist sympathizer. She HAS to know something.

[Alaska Darin]

Empty argument.

 

You could say the same thing if people complained about a policy where every passenger on the plane is handcuffed to their seat.  First B word about not preventing hijacks, then complain about a procedure that would stop it in its tracks.

Obviously, everyone is willing to strike a balance between civil liberties and security and I don't think its is ignorance to discuss what that balance should be.

Ladies and gentlemen, we rarely have definition/example day here at PPP but read the first sentence and then the following paragraph and that's exactly what you have.

 

If there is some connection, apart from fantasy and speculation, between spying on Christiane Amanpour and preventing suicide terrorists, it escapes me.

You forgot to add "based on your extensive intelligence community background" at the end of that. How about because Amanpour is able to travel extensively in sketchy circles and get information from sources closer to people that blow sh-- up than our very own agents in the same TOA?

 

Now, if they want to bug Al Jazeera, that makes sense to me.  In any event, we aren't even talking about whether they should or should not bug US journalists, they can if they want to.  The question is how do they go about it?  The answer is FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, which permits them to do just that.  Why they chose to ignore the law when the law itself already gave them a blanck check to tap whoever they want for at least a year is anyone's guess.

OK.

It might be because they were tapping people for reasons that had nothing to do with national security and everything to do with their domestic political ambitions.

555332[/snapback]

Right. How many decisions made by politicians today aren't about their political ambitions? Answer: None.

[Mickey]

I may be missing something as well, but I do not see anything in FISA that allows for surveillance PRIOR to the AG certification / approval.  I can definitely envision scenarios where there can be a need to tap someone's communication before the AG can authorize the surveillance.  Since anything obtained from the surveillance prior to AG authorization would necessarily be thrown out as it was obtained "illegally" (as near as I can tell), I can see where the administration is trying to claim that normal provisions of FISA do not apply due to Congress authorizing use of force / all means necessary / etc., etc.. 

 

It seems to me that this is a glaring weakness of FISA and should be corrected.  Again, I don't know that any correction that gets enacted wouldn't necessarily be worse that the original.

 

I also have 1 further question.  In my reading of 1802(a), it seems to state fairly clearly that the surveillance minus a court order is only applicable to communications that don't include a "US person".  That would imply that the AG cannot authorize surveillance of a US person without the FISA court order.  You seem to have a completely different opinion on this matter.  Could you please refer me to where you see that the surveillance of US persons is allowed without a court order, or explain to me how I am misinterpreting this section of the Statute?  I am not a lawyer and readily admit that I may be misinterpreting this.

555447[/snapback]

 

The more you read that thing, the more you want to scream. It has been amended by several later pieces of legislation, including the Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act and a few others I believe.

 

You have to read all the definitions of terms like "US Persons", "Foreign agent", "terrorist", etc. They were expanded by the Patriot Act. The gray area is where you have a target that fits the definition of "US Person" and "Foreign Agent" or "Terrorist" (those last two may be interchangeable). I think if a person meets the definition of foreign agent, he can't be a US person or even if he is, you can bug the crap out of him.

 

The AG certification is simply a notification under seal that says the target is a bad guy as far as the AG is concerned. That is all. That is what lets them do that for a whole year with extensions and no court order. On top of that you have the emergency provisions which let you tap for 3 days without an order. And on top of that, the only real penalty is that you can't use the info obtained in court. Since the President has the power to detain anyone he declares an enemy combatant, that isn't really an issue. Then, on top of all that, there is the 99% success rate for warrant requests to the court. They never say no.

 

I may not be able to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that FISA compliance was always a slam dunk, cake walk 100% of the time but really that is all there is left to argue about. Maybe FISA was actually, once in a blue freaking moon, more than a quick rubber stamp but it was never more than that in terms of being too cumbersome for the administration to obey.

 

We will just have to wait to see what info slowly drips out of the pipes. I think they are in trouble but only if there is a real investigation. If Republicans end up investigating Republicans, I figure it will all eventually go away for most politicians. Libertarians will probably raise hell no matter how it turns out.

[Mickey]

Ladies and gentlemen, we rarely have definition/example day here at PPP but read the first sentence and then the following paragraph and that's exactly what you have.

You forgot to add "based on your extensive intelligence community background" at the end of that.  How about because Amanpour is able to travel extensively in sketchy circles and get information from sources closer to people that blow sh-- up than our very own agents in the same TOA?

OK.

 

Right.  How many decisions made by politicians today aren't about their political ambitions?  Answer: None.

555618[/snapback]

As usual, I can't tell if you have an actual position you are arguing or are just bitching. Do you or do you not think it is permissible for the NSA to bug anyone they want, for any reason, anywhere, with no oversight and in violation of law?

 

Why don't you list for me some concrete examples of the "sketchy circles" Christiane Amanpour is close to. Do you think Osama is calling her for dates?

 

Forgive me for being suspicious but I wonder if maybe bugging her home phones might have more to do with the fact that her husband was John Kerry's foreign policy advisor during the election campaign than with any worry that she was going to receive a hot tip on the next terrorist attack. I may not be an expert in surveillance but I am not stupid enough to suspect that I am going to get any useful information from bugging the phones of a network news starlet. Its not like she wears a trench coat and hides in bars herself looking for clues to the latest caper. She goes where her producers send her, complete with her makeup team and wardrobe consultants. If she ever did stumble on anything, she'd do a report on it faster than they could ever type up the intercepts.

 

This isn't about Amanpour, its about what they can bug and what they can't. If your answer is that they can bug anyone, anywhere, for any reason, regardless of any law to the contrary, then say so rather than making a half wit argument that bugging a news diva is just good old fasioned police work so in that limited case it is okay.

[Crap Throwing Monkey]

The more you read that thing, the more you want to scream.  It has been amended by several later pieces of legislation, including the Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act and a few others I believe.

 

You have to read all the definitions of terms like "US Persons", "Foreign agent", "terrorist", etc.  They were expanded by the Patriot Act.  The gray area is where you have a target that fits the definition of "US Person" and "Foreign Agent" or "Terrorist" (those last two may be interchangeable).  I think if a person meets the definition of foreign agent, he can't be a US person or even if he is, you can bug the crap out of him.

 

The AG certification is simply a notification under seal that says the target is a bad guy as far as the AG is concerned.  That is all.  That is what lets them do that for a whole year with extensions and no court order.  On top of that you have the emergency provisions which let you tap for 3 days without an order.  And on top of that, the only real penalty is that you can't use the info obtained in court.  Since the President has the power to detain anyone he declares an enemy combatant, that isn't really an issue.  Then, on top of all that, there is the 99% success rate for warrant requests to the court.  They never say no.

 

I may not be able to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that FISA compliance was always a slam dunk, cake walk 100% of the time but really that is all there is left to argue about.  Maybe FISA was actually, once in a blue freaking moon, more than a quick rubber stamp but it was never more than that in terms of being too cumbersome for the administration to obey. 

 

We will just have to wait to see what info slowly drips out of the pipes.  I think they are in trouble but only if there is  a real investigation.  If Republicans end up investigating Republicans, I figure it will all eventually go away for most politicians.  Libertarians will probably raise hell no matter how it turns out.

556141[/snapback]

 

I think that observation gets to the root of the problem: that while law enforcement unequivocably requires warrants for this sort of thing, and national security organizations operating outside US territory unequivocably don't, the point where there is crossover involves a tangled mess of legislation and precedent. I've been trying to untie all this crap for a week now...yesterday, I'd figured out the NSA didn't need warrants because they couldn't operate legally inside the US anyway (so how do you get a warrant for something's that's illegal regardless?)...yet although it's not stated directly in the PATRIOT Act (God, I hate that name), there is a de facto requirement for them to operate in the US for the NSA to satisfy the information-sharing requirements. So the NSA is doing something it's not mandated to do (or mandated NOT to do) as required by law, not operating in a way that's not required by law for them, but required by virtually everyone else...and people wonder how this happened???? It happened because the legislation's !@#$ed up.

 

At least, that's what I thought yesterday. Today I think that analysis is wrong. I don't know what I'll think tomorrow. The only two things I'm really sure about are:

 

1) the relevant legislation and regulations are !@#$ed up, and

2) this is what happens when you let politicians whoring for votes run with their knee-jerk reactions without thinking things through.

 

And not only was most of this predictable, some of it was predicted. It's not difficult to find credible analysis (i.e. outside of rense.com and the like) from as early as December of 2001 that the PATRIOT Act and related decisions would lead to US intelligence organizations engaging in extra-judicial domestic operations.

[Taro T]

The more you read that thing, the more you want to scream.  It has been amended by several later pieces of legislation, including the Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act and a few others I believe.

 

You have to read all the definitions of terms like "US Persons", "Foreign agent", "terrorist", etc.  They were expanded by the Patriot Act.  The gray area is where you have a target that fits the definition of "US Person" and "Foreign Agent" or "Terrorist" (those last two may be interchangeable).  I think if a person meets the definition of foreign agent, he can't be a US person or even if he is, you can bug the crap out of him.

 

The AG certification is simply a notification under seal that says the target is a bad guy as far as the AG is concerned.  That is all.  That is what lets them do that for a whole year with extensions and no court order.  On top of that you have the emergency provisions which let you tap for 3 days without an order.  And on top of that, the only real penalty is that you can't use the info obtained in court.  Since the President has the power to detain anyone he declares an enemy combatant, that isn't really an issue.  Then, on top of all that, there is the 99% success rate for warrant requests to the court.  They never say no.

 

I may not be able to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that FISA compliance was always a slam dunk, cake walk 100% of the time but really that is all there is left to argue about.  Maybe FISA was actually, once in a blue freaking moon, more than a quick rubber stamp but it was never more than that in terms of being too cumbersome for the administration to obey. 

 

We will just have to wait to see what info slowly drips out of the pipes.  I think they are in trouble but only if there is  a real investigation.  If Republicans end up investigating Republicans, I figure it will all eventually go away for most politicians.  Libertarians will probably raise hell no matter how it turns out.

556141[/snapback]

Mickey, thanks for the clarification on agent of a foreign power and US person. I remember thinking you were correct on that point when all this 1st came out, but when revisiting the statute today could not figure out why.

 

I also agree with your interpretation (to a substantial extent) about the AG certification simply being a statement from the AG stating "we think ___ is a bad guy". I don't mean to be painfully obtuse, but I can't help but come away with the impression that surveillance performed prior to the AG certification doesn't fall under the acceptable bounds of FISA. I know that does not make any sense rationally, as this is a type of problem that FISA was meant to correct; but everytime I look at FISA, I keep coming away with the impression that surveillance conducted prior to AG "certification" falls outside of acceptable FISA procedures and any convictions stemming from it (such as the guy who was part of the plot to sabotage the Brooklyn Bridge) would be overturned on appeal.

 

Also, I agree 100% with your points in your 1st and last sentences.

[GG]

The only two things I'm really sure about are:

 

1) the relevant legislation and regulations are !@#$ed up, and

2) this is what happens when you let politicians whoring for votes run with their knee-jerk reactions without thinking things through.

 

And not only was most of this predictable, some of it was predicted.  It's not difficult to find credible analysis (i.e. outside of rense.com and the like) from as early as December of 2001 that the PATRIOT Act and related decisions would lead to US intelligence organizations engaging in extra-judicial domestic operations.

556171[/snapback]

 

That was my totally uneducated guess. Everyone talks about breaking the law, but then no one is quite sure exactly which law is broken. FISA is the most quoted one, but there are enough loopholes in it for the snooping to occur without breaking it.

[/dev/null]

is CA an American citizen? I know she's Iranian and lives in England, but does anyone know her citizenship?

 

if she's American and was spyed on, that would be quite disturbing. The Feds should have no right to do that even with Tedy Bruschi Act

if she's not American, I wouldn't give a rats arse about the US govt spying on her

[Crap Throwing Monkey]

That was my totally uneducated guess.  Everyone talks about breaking the law, but then no one is quite sure exactly which law is broken.  FISA is the most quoted one, but there are enough loopholes in it for the snooping to occur without breaking it.

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There's enough loopholes simply via the fact that fighting terrorism falls in the gray area between military action and law enforcement, and our protections are not designed to recognize that gray area. Attempts at recognizing them - FISA and PATRIOT Act, for example - have been generally insufficient. I've been saying for a few years now that as part of prosecuting and winning the war on terrorism, we have to give serious consideration to the societal implications and decide what kind of a society we want to be 50 years down the road. When I've said that, it's just this sort of issues I've been imagining. Too bad no one listens to me. Sometimes I feel like I'm the only one actually thinking about this sh-- rather than having knee-jerk reactions to the news story of the day.

 

And even though I think about this...I still don't have a solution. Best one I've thought of is: rigorous adherence to constitutional protections intra-nationally, no constitutional protections extra-nationally. Basically, the "border" between law enforcement and military action goes from being a vague philosophical gray area to a well-defined line represented physically by the country's borders. And that's a patently sh------- idea (not the least of which because it's still ambiguous - it still doesn't solve the current problem under discussion of NSA wiretaps on international calls). It's just the best I've had.

[Scraps]

That was my totally uneducated guess.  Everyone talks about breaking the law, but then no one is quite sure exactly which law is broken.  FISA is the most quoted one, but there are enough loopholes in it for the snooping to occur without breaking it.

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Its a specious argument. Nobody here knows what laws were broken because nobody here know what happened since everything is classified.

[Alaska Darin]

As usual, I can't tell if you have an actual position you are arguing or are just bitching.  Do you or do you not think it is permissible for the NSA to bug anyone they want, for any reason, anywhere, with no oversight and in violation of law?

No.

 

Why don't you list for me some concrete examples of the "sketchy circles" Christiane Amanpour is close to.

Yeah, that's likely. Neither of us knows much about her but you can pretend she's above board because it fits your political agenda.

Do you think Osama is calling her for dates?

Is this an example of your cross examination techniques?

 

Forgive me for being suspicious but I wonder if maybe bugging her home phones might have more to do with the fact that her husband was John Kerry's foreign policy advisor during the election campaign than with any worry that she was going to receive a hot tip on the next terrorist attack.

Plausible. Does that mean that anyone who is politically connected but also travels regularly in the Middle East is off limits?

 

I may not be an expert in surveillance but I am not stupid enough to suspect that I am going to get any useful information from bugging the phones of a network news starlet. 

Again, based upon your vast intelligence community experience and your devout knowledge of the person in question?

Its not like she wears a trench coat and hides in bars herself looking for clues to the latest caper.  She goes where her producers send her, complete with her makeup team and wardrobe consultants.  If she ever did stumble on anything, she'd do a report on it faster than they could ever type up the intercepts.

Right, because all journalism is performed in front of a camera. Ms. Amanpour does no research or backstory, just waits around until somebody gives her the "be ready in five" sign, smoking cigarettes and getting her nails polished.

 

This isn't about Amanpour, its about what they can bug and what they can't.  If your answer is that they can bug anyone, anywhere, for any reason, regardless of any law to the contrary, then say so rather than making a half wit argument that bugging a news diva is just good old fasioned police work so in that limited case it is okay.

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I never said it was OK to bug just anyone, nor did I infer it - despite your ridiculous attempt to portray it as such.