Interesting article from 2003

[Dan Gross]

Long article on New Orleans and hurricane threats, particularly Category 4 and 5. My best shot at key quotes:

 

" The design of the original levees, which dates to the 1960s, was based on rudimentary storm modeling that, it is now realized, might underestimate the threat of a potential hurricane. Even if the modeling was adequate, however, the levees were designed to withstand only forces associated with a fast-moving hurricane that, according to the National Weather Service’s Saffir-Simpson scale, would be placed in category 3. If a lingering category 3 storm—or a stronger storm, say, category 4 or 5—were to hit the city, much of New Orleans could find itself under more than 20 ft (6 m) of water.

 

Some experts worry that even a less severe storm could flood the city. In the 40 years since the design criteria were established for New Orleans’s hurricane protection levees, southeastern Louisiana’s coastline has been subsiding—settling in on top of itself—even as the natural height of the sea rises. A century ago any hurricane heading toward New Orleans would have had to traverse a 50 mi (80 km) buffer of marshland. Today that marsh area is only half as broad and the hurricane would be striking a city that itself sinks lower every day."

 

Hurricane Betsy was used as the benchmark for improving the levee system, and their "modeling" was a rudimentary application of Newton's 2nd law.

 

"According to [ACE Levee project manager Al] Naomi, any concerted effort to protect the city from a storm of category 4 or 5 will probably take 30 years to complete. And the feasibility study alone for such an effort will cost as much as $8 million. Even though Congress has authorized the feasibility study, funding has not yet been appropriated. When funds are made available, the study will take about six years to complete. 'That’s a lot of time to get the study before Congress,' Naomi admits. 'Hopefully we won’t have a major storm before then.'"

 

Estimates from a variety of sources (Red Cross and others) indicate that Cat 4/5 hurricane hitting New Orleans would strand up to 400,000 people (including the 100,000 without transport), and kill 25,000-100,000.

 

A lot in there about other ways to protect the city (including an "interior wall" concept and saving the nearby wetlands (the Coast 2050 plan).

 

EII...your thoughts?

[ExiledInIllinois]

Long article on New Orleans and hurricane threats, particularly Category 4 and 5.  My best shot at key quotes:

 

" The design of the original levees, which dates to the 1960s, was based on rudimentary storm modeling that, it is now realized, might underestimate the threat of a potential hurricane. Even if the modeling was adequate, however, the levees were designed to withstand only forces associated with a fast-moving hurricane that, according to the National Weather Service’s Saffir-Simpson scale, would be placed in category 3. If a lingering category 3 storm—or a stronger storm, say, category 4 or 5—were to hit the city, much of New Orleans could find itself under more than 20 ft (6 m) of water.

 

Some experts worry that even a less severe storm could flood the city. In the 40 years since the design criteria were established for New Orleans’s hurricane protection levees, southeastern Louisiana’s coastline has been subsiding—settling in on top of itself—even as the natural height of the sea rises. A century ago any hurricane heading toward New Orleans would have had to traverse a 50 mi (80 km) buffer of marshland. Today that marsh area is only half as broad and the hurricane would be striking a city that itself sinks lower every day."

 

Hurricane Betsy was used as the benchmark for improving the levee system, and their "modeling" was a rudimentary application of Newton's 2nd law. 

 

"According to [ACE Levee project manager Al] Naomi, any concerted effort to protect the city from a storm of category 4 or 5 will probably take 30 years to complete. And the feasibility study alone for such an effort will cost as much as $8 million. Even though Congress has authorized the feasibility study, funding has not yet been appropriated. When funds are made available, the study will take about six years to complete. 'That’s a lot of time to get the study before Congress,' Naomi admits. 'Hopefully we won’t have a major storm before then.'"

 

Estimates from a variety of sources (Red Cross and others) indicate that Cat 4/5 hurricane hitting New Orleans would strand up to 400,000 people (including the 100,000 without transport), and kill 25,000-100,000.

 

A lot in there about other ways to protect the city (including an "interior wall" concept and saving the nearby wetlands (the Coast 2050 plan). 

 

EII...your thoughts?

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Interesting Dan... June 2003.

 

I fear that Katrina, being a 4 will cloud or scapegoat the issue. The storm passed to the east by about 40 miles and NOLA made it out of the storm... But, not long enough!

 

The best word is "Band-Aid."

 

The constant encroachment on the north marshland is a problem... They will tax for levee improvements before education...

 

To sit there all these years while they keep sticking a "Band-Aid" on it is troubling.

 

This is a classic example of the hound not getting the fox because he was to busy taking a sh--.

[ExiledInIllinois]

Finally disected it and here are my comments.

 

Again this article was done in June 2003. The work the Corps was working on was stopped in June 2004 because the NO District was massively cut by 71.5 million dollars. At that time Al Naomi was quoted attacking those cuts.

 

In 1999 the Corps was authorized by Congress to study the feasibility of various proposals for protecting the city against such devastating storms. An obvious possibility would be to raise the current levees to a height deemed acceptable by an AdCirc analysis. That, however, would also require widening the levees, which may not be possible in many areas because of the proximity of homes. Among other alternatives, Naomi will investigate the possibility of creating an immense wall between Lake Pontchartrain and the gulf to keep water out of the lake during a severe storm. Such a project would involve constructing massive floodgates at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes, where storm surge would enter the lake.

 

According to Naomi, any concerted effort to protect the city from a storm of category 4 or 5 will probably take 30 years to complete. And the feasibility study alone for such an effort will cost as much as $8 million. Even though Congress has authorized the feasibility study, funding has not yet been appropriated. When funds are made available, the study will take about six years to complete. “That’s a lot of time to get the study before Congress,” Naomi admits. “Hopefully we won’t have a major storm before then.”

 

 

I don't understand where this whole 2006 and it resuming thing got started?

 

Hey, if they were working on it and studying it when Katrina hit, fine. They were not. The project was mothballed.

 

This was a race... A 30 year race that ended quickly and all too early with Katrina.

 

I can live with that. I can't live with the stoppages.

 

There should have been a concerted effort to make do with what they had, making sure that the system in place was very well maintained.

 

The quick-fix local response was opposed by the Corps:

 

That prospect—and the amount of time it would take the Corps to construct adequate levee protection against a storm of category 4—have inspired Suhayda to push for what he calls a community haven project. His idea is for the city to construct a 30 ft (9 m) tall wall equipped with floodgates through the center of town to protect the heart of New Orleans and such culturally important areas as the French Quarter. That portion of the city lies between two bends in the Mississippi River and is therefore already protected by adequate levees on three sides. With its gates closed, the wall would complete a waterproof ring around the area.

 

Suhayda says the wall would be cheaper and faster to build than the larger projects under consideration by the Corps. It could be constructed along an existing right-of-way and act as a sound wall most of time. “We’re going to build sound barriers along most of these roads anyway,” Suhayda says. “So for a small added cost, go ahead and make them capable of withstanding wind loads and hydrostatic heads.”

 

The Corps would not necessarily be involved in the construction of such a wall because the latter would be land based. Even so, Naomi is adamantly opposed to the idea. “How do you protect people from two-hundred-mile-per-hour winds?” he asks. “Where do they go? What buildings are designed to withstand that? Where do they get their power and their food, and where do they rest their heads at night? Just keeping the water out isn’t enough. You don’t want to give people a false sense of security by saying that this is a refuge unless you have a place for them to go.”

 

Sure seems like keeping the water out from Katrina would have been enough? Why not include the SuperDome and Convention Center in this plan? I think they sit between the bends in the river? The people went there anyway?

 

Seems like we got competing interests here?

 

It is no doubt that the power of the Corps would win out, they are the engineering establishment. In Katrina, it would have been better than nothing?

 

Coast 2050 seemed promising... Wonder if the Corps was backing it, never said?

 

But the Coast 2050 Plan currently has widespread support among environmentalists, the oil and gas industry, and hurricane protection specialists.

 

People such as Windell Curole consider it the last, best chance to save southeastern Louisiana. Curole (pronounced “cure-all”) is the general manager of the South Lafourche levee district, which maintains hurricane protection levees around Bayou Lafourche, a rural area west of New Orleans and the place where he was raised. Decades ago Curole’s grandfather paddled through the wetlands there in a hollowed-out cypress tree collecting oysters. Today much of the same area is completely submerged in salt water.

 

On a recent sunny morning, Curole visited a freshwater diversion project near New Orleans called Davis Pond, one of only two such diversions from the Mississippi River. The project involves a canal west of the city that releases about 1,000 cfs (28 m3/s) of freshwater from the top of the river into a 9,300 acre (3,700 ha) pond that eventually feeds into Lake Cataouatche. By filling the marsh with freshwater, the idea is to decrease its salinity while feeding it valuable nutrients, in this way mimicking the marsh environment that would have existed before the sides of the Mississippi were dammed.

 

First authorized by Congress in the late 1960s, Davis Pond was completed by the Corps in March 2002. In the 1960s it was seen as a fairly aggressive step toward addressing the issue of coastal erosion. Today, in Curole’s words, it is seen more as a “Band-Aid.” The project—which does not divert sediment into the marsh in any measurable quantity—is meant to alleviate a total of about 1 sq mi (2.6 km2) of land loss. By most estimates, coastal Louisiana is losing as much as 35 sq mi (90.6 km2) of land per year to subsidence. Despite this grim reality, Curole refuses to see anything in Davis Pond except signs of hope. “It’s a little leak for the river,” he says, looking over the water, “but a giant leak for mankind.”

 

This is Curole’s first trip to Davis Pond, a place that he and other supporters of the Coast 2050 Plan hope will be viewed as a sort of pilot project for future diversion efforts. Traveling by airboat over thick, floating marshes and rounded levees, he enthusiastically points at countless alligators, scurrying nutrias, and several bald eagle nests. He snaps pictures of waterfowl as if he has never seen them before, or, more likely, as if he might never see them again.

 

The boat stops at the end of the pond near a rock weir separating it from Lake Cataouatche, the New Orleans skyline in the distance. “It’s just so nice to see the growth here, the green growth,” Curole says. Smiling large, eternally optimistic, he continues: “If we run this thing harder, up to six thousand cfs, or even more, I think we’ll start seeing white shrimp up in here again. That is a major hurdle. If we can start running this at six thousand cfs, who knows what we can do.”

[ExiledInIllinois]

I am going to start a new post because the previous ones are cluttered with italicized quotes.

 

The local wall or Community Haven idea is negatively dismissed by the Corps. This shows the Corps oppostion to anything but their own agenda. The Corps for years has been seen as a rogue agency stuck on itself.

 

How dare someone come up with another idea! And it is land based to boot.

 

What striking is it is so Longitudesque. If you don't know what I am talking about... Sometime ago I made reference to the novel:

 

Longitude

 

The book is about the race to solve the longitude problem.

 

The thorniest scientific problem of the eighteenth century was how to determine longitude. Many thousands of lives had been lost at sea over the centuries due to the inability to determine an east-west position. This is the engrossing story of the clockmaker, John "Longitude" Harrison, who solved the problem that Newton and Galileo had failed to conquer, yet claimed only half the promised rich reward.

 

The scientific establishment had the ear of the king, the power and prestige. They weren't gonna be out done by a "mechanic", a simple clock maker in their centuries time consuming quest to map all the heavens.

 

British ships were getting lost routinely because of this problem. They didn't have hundreds of years sitting in the southern hemisphere mapping the skys. A solution was needed QUICKLY.

 

To get back to the point... The Corps reminds me of that science establishment during that day.

[ExiledInIllinois]

Bump

[Dan Gross]

I'll try not to go all FFS on ya, but here are some points that the article seemed to make clear, more than anything else:

--There's no way conceivable that the levees would/could have been reinforced in a way to support a category 4 between the time that it was determined that "it might be a good idea" ('99) and now, even with full budgets.

--The scope of the project that was due to be proposed (the 30 year project) would obviously be hugely expensive and it would be unclear who would pay for it. Obviously you get into "what's the worth of human lives?" debate, but it would be more "how much insurance do you need?" In this day and age of scrutinized budgets, there would be a lot of gnashing of teeth if the Fed gov't was looked to in order to spend several billion on a "local" project like that. Sure, spread out over time it would probably on a yearly basis not look too unlike other "pet projects," highway improvements, etc, but there would be "sticker shock." If there's a "plus side" to Katrina it's that there will be a virtual clean slate to work with on the rebuild.

--You already picked at the haughty attitude of the USACE, that if it's not their idea, it's not worthy.

--Obviously this wasn't a direct hit so that perhaps the numbers wouldn't add up, but perhaps there is some small consolation in that the situation looks like it paces behind the predicted toll.

--Bush Bad...Oh, I'm just kidding. Frick, I've been kinda sticking up for the guy through this.

 

Here's a semi-related National Geogrphic article, focusing more on efforts to save the protective wetlands.

[Crap Throwing Monkey]

Someone explain to me...how does "The Wall" differ from the Superdome evacuation in anything but scale? Ultimately, you still have a group of people behind concrete that are functionally isolated from the outside world by the surrounding water.

[KD in CA]

My brother is a civil engineer. He said he studied the N.O. levees in school 20 years ago and even then everyone knew the basic fact that it was a system designed to stop Cat 3 hurricanes.

 

This is just like 9-11 in that while the general populous couldn't ever have imagined this senario, those responsible have known this day was coming for years.

[ExiledInIllinois]

I'll try not to go all FFS on ya, but here are some points that the article seemed to make clear, more than anything else:

--There's no way conceivable that the levees would/could have been reinforced in a way to support a category 4 between the time that it was determined that "it might be a good idea" ('99) and now, even with full budgets.

--The scope of the project that was due to be proposed (the 30 year project) would obviously be hugely expensive and it would be unclear who would pay for it.  Obviously you get into "what's the worth of human lives?" debate, but it would be more "how much insurance do you need?"  In this day and age of scrutinized budgets, there would be a lot of gnashing of teeth if the Fed gov't was looked to in order to spend several billion on a "local" project like that.  Sure, spread out over time it would probably on a yearly basis not look too unlike other "pet projects," highway improvements, etc, but there would be "sticker shock."  If there's a "plus side" to Katrina it's that there will be a virtual clean slate to work with on the rebuild.

--You already picked at the haughty attitude of the USACE, that if it's not their idea, it's not worthy.

--Obviously this wasn't a direct hit so that perhaps the numbers wouldn't add up, but perhaps there is some small consolation in that the situation looks like it paces behind the predicted toll.

--Bush Bad...Oh, I'm just kidding.  Frick, I've been kinda sticking up for the guy through this.

 

Here's a semi-related National Geogrphic article, focusing more on efforts to save the protective wetlands.

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Thanks.

 

Nice.

[ExiledInIllinois]

Someone explain to me...how does "The Wall" differ from the Superdome evacuation in anything but scale?  Ultimately, you still have a group of people behind concrete that are functionally isolated from the outside world by the surrounding water.

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I think psychologically it would have been a boost for all the people that couldn't (yes, and wouldn't) leave.

 

A secure area that would see very minimal flooding.

 

You brought up the idea of compartmentalizing the levee and canal system. This would basically do it for humans... Give them a safe haven.

 

Of course the SuperDome would house some of the people... I feel there would have to be other shelters set up that could withstand the storm.

 

The place is still below sea level... If you could keep it dry... Being low would negate some of the wind? I don't know.

 

The whole idea would have promoted a plan that could be maintained by the local authorities... By putting the kabosh on it made the was city even more tied to the Corps plans.

 

In the old days weren't the north marshes there?... Basically the haven plan brings the city back to it's historical area.

 

I see insurance problems with the plan though.

 

But... From a human side, it would have been like bringing the serfs into the castle during times of war. From within that castle... Room for planing would have taken place.

 

NOLA would have not been beholden to the Corps... They could have did what they wanted to the devastated area outside the wall.

[ExiledInIllinois]

My brother is a civil engineer.  He said he studied the N.O. levees in school 20 years ago and even then everyone knew the basic fact that it was a system designed to stop Cat 3 hurricanes.

 

This is just like 9-11 in that while the general populous couldn't ever have imagined this senario, those responsible have known this day was coming for years.

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And to do absolutely nothing but press on with a long range plan was irresponsible.

 

Saying things like: "Hope we don't get one in 30 years." Shows a total lack of reguard for human life.

 

From the article, I am not even sure if the Corps is behind Coast 2050? They really don't say. The article mentions that there is a trickle being provided for the marshes and there are hopes more water will be realised.

 

That must mean the Corps is holding back that water? The Corps must be giving in somewhat to satisfy their environmental committment. A committment that they claim to be whole heartly honoring or are they giving it lip service.

 

The Missouri river and the water war there shows where the Corps really stands.

 

Environmentally they will appease. Somehow these environmental answers have to invade their workable plans... For now, like the article said, it is just a leak.

[ExiledInIllinois]

I forgot... Even in my embarrassment, I will ask.

 

What does FFS mean Dan?

 

[Dan Gross]

I forgot... Even in my embarrassment, I will ask.

 

What does FFS mean Dan?

 

 

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Fake-Fat-Sunny

didn't want to get too long-winded, especially when I'm home dealing with water problems of my own today, on both input (Pipe running in from well leaks) and output (effluent pump for my septic system died). Trust me, compared with all this sub-board is about I'm not complaining, I'm just saying I didn't have time (or inclination, really) to ramble...

[ExiledInIllinois]

Fake-Fat-Sunny

didn't want to get too long-winded, especially when I'm home dealing with water problems of my own today, on both input (Pipe running in from well leaks) and output (effluent pump for my septic system died).  Trust me, compared with all this sub-board is about I'm not complaining, I'm just saying I didn't have time (or inclination, really) to ramble...

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Oh... I like FFS, he is so rational.

 

I am just trying to point out the political trick-bag NOLA has been put into. Stuff like this bothers the heck out of me.

 

I'll just agree to disgree. The federal government should be more responsible for this mess given what NOLA brings to the nation economically.

 

Hope your water woes get healed!

[Crap Throwing Monkey]

I think psychologically it would have been a boost for all the people that couldn't  (yes, and wouldn't) leave.

 

A secure area that would see very minimal flooding.

 

You brought up the idea of compartmentalizing the levee and canal system.  This would basically do it for humans... Give them a safe haven.

 

Of course the SuperDome would house some of the people... I feel there would have to be other shelters set up that could withstand the storm.

 

The place is still below sea level... If you could keep it dry... Being low would negate some of the wind?  I don't know.

 

The whole idea would have promoted a plan that could be maintained by the local authorities... By putting the kabosh on it made the was city even more tied to the Corps plans.

 

In the old days weren't the north marshes there?... Basically the haven plan brings the city back to it's historical area.

 

I see insurance problems with the plan though.

 

But... From a human side, it would have been like bringing the serfs into the castle during times of war.  From within that castle... Room for planing would have taken place.

 

NOLA would have not been beholden to the Corps... They could have did what they wanted to the devastated area outside the wall.

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But my compartmentalization idea wasn't meant to provide safe haven. It was meant to slow city-wide flooding (or even stop it), trading portions of the city for time to organize a proper response. This walled-up "safe haven" idea sounds like just the opposite, trading most of the city to keep a portion of it dry. There's no particular reason to think it would solve the problem they had: that things went so bad so fast that in the absence of a coherent plan (or even an incoherent half-assed one) no one had any opportunity to react. You've still got all the problems you had at the Superdome - isolation, infrastructure damage (unless you're postulating encompassing all municipal services inside "The Citadel"), supply stockpiling or lack thereof - but on an even greater scale, enough so that it's not completely unrealistic to postulate that such a solution could cause even greater problems than the existing situation did. The simple fact is that modern cities, unlike medieval cities centered on walled castles, aren't designed to withstand a siege for any length of time. Back then people actually stockpiled...nowadays, it's an "on demand" just-in-time-delivery world. In short, I still don't see how there's any way that would work.

[ExiledInIllinois]

But my compartmentalization idea wasn't meant to provide safe haven.  It was meant to slow city-wide flooding (or even stop it), trading portions of the city for time to organize a proper response.  This walled-up "safe haven" idea sounds like just the opposite, trading most of the city to keep a portion of it dry.  There's no particular reason to think it would solve the problem they had: that things went so bad so fast that in the absence of a coherent plan (or even an incoherent half-assed one) no one had any opportunity to react.  You've still got all the problems you had at the Superdome - isolation, infrastructure damage (unless you're postulating encompassing all municipal services inside "The Citadel"), supply stockpiling or lack thereof - but on an even greater scale, enough so that it's not completely unrealistic to postulate that such a solution could cause even greater problems than the existing situation did.  The simple fact is that modern cities, unlike medieval cities centered on walled castles, aren't designed to withstand a siege for any length of time.  Back then people actually stockpiled...nowadays, it's an "on demand" just-in-time-delivery world.  In short, I still don't see how there's any way that would work.

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Why so negative?

 

Better than nothing.

 

Like getting everybody to another place OUTSIDE the city is a possibility.

 

So basically you are saying no local plan would work.

 

The on-demand part you hit the nail on the head.

 

That is were the FRP comes. NOLA is unlike any other place and depends on that outside help.

 

NOLA in this scenario is 100% certain to be overwhelmed in it's state and local capacities.

 

It couldn't have hurt.

 

Couple the wall plan with an on-demand FRP... What's the argument?

[KD in CA]

And to do absolutely nothing but press on with a long range plan was irresponsible.

 

Saying things like: "Hope we don't get one in 30 years."  Shows a total lack of reguard for human life.

 

 

 

It sure does. Unfortunately, the "well, it's not coming today so let's worry about something else" mentality is a normal human reaction, and it is practically dogma for government.

 

My point of course was that the morons crying about Bush's levee funding are completely missing the point (as usual) that the size and scope of any project that would have upgraded the entire system to withstand Cat 5 storms would take billions of dollars and decades to complete (as the article correctly points out). And that was an elephant in the room that has been ignored by everyone who had the power to change it for as long as anyone can remember.

[ExiledInIllinois]

It sure does.  Unfortunately, the "well, it's not coming today so let's worry about something else" mentality is a normal human reaction, and it is practically dogma for government.

 

My point of course was that the morons crying about Bush's levee funding are completely missing the point (as usual) that the size and scope of any project that would have upgraded the entire system to withstand Cat 5 storms would take billions of dollars and decades to complete (as the article correctly points out).  And that was an elephant in the room that has been ignored by everyone who had the power to change it for as long as anyone can remember.

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The Article clearly shows the Corps' one way thinking.

 

The project has got to start somewhere?

 

My whole point was that Bush was the unlucky dog who bought the lemon.

 

Of course, I am not blaming him solely. The USACE bears a huge burden for not swaying him and breaking the past cycle.

 

Bush's watch is on the "breakdown point"... If he would have been doing things to reverse the actions of the last 30 years ago, I could let him off the hook.

 

GWB's fault is that he played along with the same game... Possibly accelerating these existing problems with the cuts.

 

The wheel chair was headed off the cliff to begin with... He gave it that extra spiteful push never thinking it would go over on his watch. Well, it did George!

 

He wasn't even trying... Even making things worse.

 

You don't drive a beater 100 mph down the highway and not put oil in it.

 

Not sure the time line... Didn't he have the outs with the former sec. of Army? He then replaced him with his boy.

 

Stuff like that strongly dictates Corps policy.

 

 

I have been posing this question for a week now.

 

Do you think the massive cuts to the NO District Corps last year possibly took it toll on levee maintainence?

 

Nobody is mentioning it. The storm is clouding the issue (GWB best scapegoat).

 

The pumps failing after the surge washed over and before the breaks points to something other than the "storm."

 

If everything was working fine... Could the levees have handled it and not failed completely?

[KD in CA]

Bush's watch is on the "breakdown point"... If he would have been doing things to reverse the actions of the last 30 years ago, I could let him off the hook.

 

 

Ok, I'm waiting......let's hear you officially let Bush off the hook.

 

http://www.stadiumwall.com/index.php?showt...=0entry433893

[ExiledInIllinois]

Ok, I'm waiting......let's hear you officially let Bush off the hook.   

 

http://www.stadiumwall.com/index.php?showt...=0entry433893

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Why should Bush be off the hook?

 

You sure it has nothing to do with flood control?

 

The locks down there are very similar to the ones here in Chicago. Our mission is very much water control.

 

Since the beginning, I have questioned the role of the locks during this flood.

 

I have been saying all along the Corps is the problem. I have also said that the Corps wields a lot of power.

 

The Bush administrations cuts only compounded the problem. The Corps stuck to its canal projects and its special interests.

 

This seems to be a battle between the Corps and the cuts.

 

BOTH are to blame.

 

I never once let the Corps off the hook.

 

It seems BOTH are between a rock and a hard place.