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The first part of my post was originally in a quote of one of Birdog's posts. I predicted that one before reading Tom's response. Tom operates on a pretty predictable system. If Birdog gave him a redirect to the original point Tom would claim that Birdog was incapable of having the discussion with him.

 

And "dismissable" isn't a word you jackass.

 

Look up my spelling and come back to me. It's a legitimate word meant for people like you. Although I'm right about the spelling, it's no big deal with such ignorance that you display. Regardless, is this the only way you can try to attack me? If so, you've given up on the intellectual approach. Well, maybe you never had one.

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No, the opening post holds the contention that BoA refused to uphold the conditions of the deal they made. And did so intentionally. It's about the actions of the bank.

 

Yes, and then it was pointed out that there were no conditions on the deal, then it was pointed out "Oh, you're talking about two completely different deals" and that the whole "BofA criminally misused bailout money intended for homeowners" argument birddog made is a great big steaming pile of crap. That's not a "strawman" argument, that's a demonstration of birddog's complete cluelessness - he's can't understand that BofA received money under TARP, then was eligible for more under HAMP, then mismanaged their HAMP program and was a party of a $25B settlement that was completed more than a year ago...and he thinks ALL of them are the same current issue.

 

So yes, "TARP is not HAMP" is entirely relevant.

 

But at least he's merely ignorant. You have to take it to the level of "actively stupid," just so you can cry "DC Tom strawman!" and feel validated.

 

You, on the other hand...you can't even make it that far.

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No, the opening post holds the contention that BoA refused to uphold the conditions of the deal they made. And did so intentionally. It's about the actions of the bank.

 

 

 

Let me answer for Tom.

 

TARP is not HAMP. Therefore your point is invalid.

Ok. TARP is not HAMP. But the settlement ($25billion or so) was agreed to on the contention that the major banks were not following the rules in regard to refis for troubled borrowers. This was not formally contested by the banks in court. The banks obstructionism

made it very difficult for trouble mortgage holders to obtain refi's as prescribed by a govt policy that the banks agreed to (acronyms ignored). Then the banks didn't comply with the conditions of the settlement that obliged them to undo the first wrong resulting in even more unneccesary foreclosures. Is that not correct?

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I'm not an expert on finance or banking. Freely admitted. I can smell skunk when I'm near it. This smells very bad, like the day my dogs cornered one in my garage. The banks are not fulfilling their appointed obligations. That's hurting homeowners that might otherwise be spared foreclosure and thus the economy in general. Agreed?

 

Define "appointed obligation"? That is, frankly, a stupid phrase.

 

The banks have a fiduciary responsibility to foreclose if a homeowner becomes delinquent in their mortgage. They do not have a fiduciary responsibility to help homeowners own homes (no matter what their marketing pamphlets say). They also have a fiduciary responsibility to - putting it simply - loan money to people who can pay it back. The real root of your "evil bank" anger, where they abandoned their "appointed obligation" [sic] goes back to the mid-90s, when lending standards started relaxing, and 2002, when the esoteric mortgage vehicles started becoming prevalent (how do you think I called the housing downturn starting in 2007? Because I saw the **** they were writing in 2002...a wave of defaults starting in April of 2007 was completely predictable). And note that the lenders that most recklessly abandoned that responsibility - Countrywide and Washington Mutual, for example - no longer exist (and many of the BofA practices you're so outraged at are nothing more than liabilities BofA acquired with their purchase of Countrywide.)

 

They also assume a fiduciary responsibility when they participate in regulated programs - such as: meeting the standards of Fannie or Freddie for loans underwritten by them. Or to use money they receive under HAMP to modify mortgages under the guidelines and standards of HAMP (which is an issue that was already settled for $25B more than a year ago).

 

What they do NOT have is some implied ethical duty to forgive mortgage debt based solely on the moral argument that they received a taxpayer money in a bailout, which is what you posted. Because while you're not an expert on finance, as you said, you clearly are an expert on moral outrage, no matter how ill-informed or misplaced. To abandon your skunk metaphor for waterfowl...sure, "If it walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it's a duck," but that's completely meaningless if you've never seen a duck before.

 

And trust me, you haven't. Never attribute to malice that which can be explained by mere stupidity. I used to deal with this stuff on a semi-regular basis, my wife still does daily. When I told her about this, and told her your "evil bank fraud" theory, she just laughed. The mortgage industry is one of the most fundamentally screwed-up industries imaginable. Really, the entire real estate industry in general is - I could, if I were so inclined, steal your house with you living in it. I've seen it done. I've seen the District of Columbia put an entire condo building up for tax sale because they lost two years of property tax receipts. (Literally "lost"...they credited the money to the wrong account, then couldn't find it, so just said "!@#$ it" and told all the condo owners they were being evicted for non-payment of taxes.) I've seen county recordation offices accept deeds handwritten in pencil. I've seen buyers try to purchase property with joint tenancy when one of the parties had been dead for nine years (good luck getting that signature). I already shared my story above about Wells Fargo's amusing attempt to put us in foreclosure for merely asking about HAMP.

 

I'll tell you what...tomorrow, I'll ask my wife what's the worst thing she had a lender do this week, and I'll post it here. Odds are, you'll be amazed at the unbelievable incompetence and total lack of common sense it represents.

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Look up my spelling and come back to me. It's a legitimate word meant for people like you. Although I'm right about the spelling, it's no big deal with such ignorance that you display. Regardless, is this the only way you can try to attack me? If so, you've given up on the intellectual approach. Well, maybe you never had one.

 

No, it's not a word you jackass.

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I found another story about the new Mass. federal court suit against B of A that seems, from memory alone, to have some details that weren't in the OP's cnbc link (I did not go back to compare the two):

 

http://www.propublic...ed-foreclosures

 

The law suit with the explosive new declarations from former employees is a consolidation of 29 separate suits against the bank from across the country and is seeking class action certification. It covers homeowners who received a trial modification, made all of their required payments, but who did not get a timely answer from the bank on whether they’d receive a permanent modification. Under HAMP, the trial period was supposed to last three months, but frequently dragged on for much longer [8], particularly during the height of the foreclosure crisis in 2009 and 2010.

ProPublica began detailing the failures of HAMP [9] from the start of the program in 2009. HAMP turned out to be a perfect storm created by banks that refused to adequately fund their mortgage servicing operations [10] and lax government oversight [11].

Bank of America was far slower to modify loans than other servicers, as other analyses we've cited have shown. A study last year found that about 800,000 homeowners would have qualified for HAMP if Bank of America and the other largest servicers had done an adequate job of handling homeowner applications.

 

As others have pointed out, we only have one side of the story at this point, because it's early in the lawsuit. And I don't have any idea if the pro publica article is slanted. But the pro publica link above has hyperlinks to the full text of each of the six sworn declarations by former B of A employees - - for the lazy, here's one of the six:

 

http://www.propublic...iam-wilson.html

Edited by ICanSleepWhenI'mDead
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Ok. TARP is not HAMP. But the settlement ($25billion or so) was agreed to on the contention that the major banks were not following the rules in regard to refis for troubled borrowers. This was not formally contested by the banks in court. The banks obstructionism

made it very difficult for trouble mortgage holders to obtain refi's as prescribed by a govt policy that the banks agreed to (acronyms ignored). Then the banks didn't comply with the conditions of the settlement that obliged them to undo the first wrong resulting in even more unneccesary foreclosures. Is that not correct?

 

The only part of that I would debate is "obstructionism," because of my above. I've seen far more incompetence from banks than fraud, particularly after the consolidation of the industry in 2008 and 2009.

 

Seriously, try calling your lender and asking for a modification under HAMP. You'll be amazed. You start with a $12/hr drone who likely has no financial experience (the one I was dealing with insisted I had to provide a P&L statement for my business for the fiscal year ending June 30. When I pointed out that not only does my fiscal year not end June 30, but I don't even own a business, I was told that I had to provide the P&L statement for my business showing zero income to provide I didn't have a business.)

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Just to muddy the waters a bit, this is from a government website - - the undated document is entitled "Making Home Affordable Program Enhancements to Offer More Help for Homeowners:"

 

http://www.makinghom...2510 FINAL2.pdf

 

I'm no expert on HAMP or TARP, but the document appears to outline an expansion of the HAMP program to include FHA loans, which were not originally eligible for HAMP. Near the bottom of page 3, this document states:

 

TARP funded incentives will be available to borrowers and servicers whose loans are modified under the FHA-HAMP guidelines. The incentives are comparable to the incentive structure of HAMP"

 

The above quote raises more questions than it answers for me, but seems to indicate that TARP and HAMP may not be totally disconnected from each other. I'm not suggesting that birddog's initial overview was right, because this doesn't sound like TARP money intended to keep B of A from failing, but I simply don't know enough to explain the possible connection.

 

For example, if the "incentives are comparable to the incentive structure of HAMP," does that mean that the original incentive structure of HAMP likewise included "TARP funded incentives?" And even if the answer is yes, WTF does that actually mean? Beats the s**t out of me.

 

I now return this thread to your originally scheduled insults and related programming.

 

Edit: Here's a couple links that provide a little more insight and answer some questions about how HAMP was funded by TARP:

 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09837.pdf (see the 1st paragraph on page 2 - - that's all I read)

 

http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/TARP.htm

 

TARP spent $35 billion in FY 2012 for programs to help homeowners modify mortgages and avoid foreclosure. This was part of the Homeowner Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP. In FY 2013, TARP budgeted at $12 billion for HAMP.

 

I'm still not clear on a lot of the details - - if banks only received HAMP funds after successfully modifying non-performing loans, seems like they were incentivized to make HAMP work. Maybe it was mainly a staffing problem for B of A.

Edited by ICanSleepWhenI'mDead
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No, it's not a word you jackass.

 

You're such an idiot. You won't even look it up via of Google or whatever. Fatty, you are a gigantic fool, and your unmitigated dribble in this matter seals it. Google was your friend.

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Just to muddy the waters a bit, this is from a government website - - the undated document is entitled "Making Home Affordable Program Enhancements to Offer More Help for Homeowners:"

 

http://www.makinghom...2510 FINAL2.pdf

 

I'm no expert on HAMP or TARP, but the document appears to outline an expansion of the HAMP program to include FHA loans, which were not originally eligible for HAMP. Near the bottom of page 3, this document states:

 

 

 

The above quote raises more questions than it answers for me, but seems to indicate that TARP and HAMP may not be totally disconnected from each other. I'm not suggesting that birddog's initial overview was right, because this doesn't sound like TARP money intended to keep B of A from failing, but I simply don't know enough to explain the possible connection.

 

That site's dead wrong. The only connection between TARP and HAMP is that TARP gave the Treasury the authority and responsibility to create a set of regulations under which the government would fund banks' modifications of mortgages. HAMP came from a completely different piece of legislation about two years later.

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That site's dead wrong. The only connection between TARP and HAMP is that TARP gave the Treasury the authority and responsibility to create a set of regulations under which the government would fund banks' modifications of mortgages. HAMP came from a completely different piece of legislation about two years later.

Mortgage loan defaults and foreclosures are key factors behind the current economic downturn. In response, Congress passed and the President signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which authorized the Department of the Treasury to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under TARP, Treasury created the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) as its cornerstone effort to meet the act's goal of protecting home values and preserving homeownership.

http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-556T

 

While TARP and HAMP may come from different legislation they seem connected- of course now Tom will say the GAO is wrong

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HAMP is the modification program of the Home Affordable Plan. (HARP is the refinance program.) Lenders can sign up to participate. Banks which received TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) automatically “volunteered” for the HAMP program. Here are the lists of TARP recipients (money paid under Capital Purchase Contracts) and HAMP participants.

The HAMP contract with the United States Treasury requires that all Treasury guidelines be followed, including this one which states that “Any foreclosure action will be temporarily suspended during the trial period, or while borrowers are considered for alternative foreclosure prevention options.“ See Page 3 of Home Affordable Modification Program Guidelines, dated March 4, 2009.

http://www.bankruptcylawnetwork.com/tarp-and-hamp-require-that-foreclosure-be-suspended/

 

HAMP is authorized by sections 101 and 109 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which has been amended by section 7002 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (collectively "The Acts").[3] Congress has several enumerated purposes under the Acts. The main purpose is to provide the U.S. Treasury Department with the authority and mechanisms necessary to restore stability to the United States' financial system—which includes—(1) protecting home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life savings, (2) preserving homeownership, (3) promoting jobs and economic growth, and (4) protecting the interests of taxpayers. [4]

As a result of the authority it received under the Acts, the U.S. Treasury Department developed HAMP.[5] Under HAMP, mortgage servicers (commonly referred to as mortgage lenders) are provided with the opportunity to enter into contracts with the Federal Government (the U.S. Treasury) to modify homeowners' mortgage loans in a particular and uniform fashion and receive incentive payments in return.[6]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Affordable_Modification_Program

 

sec 101 of Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008

 

 

TITLE I--TROUBLED ASSETS RELIEF PROGRAM

SEC. 101. PURCHASES OF TROUBLED ASSETS.

(a) Offices; Authority-

(b) Consultation- In exercising the authority under this section, the Secretary shall consult with the Board, the Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

© Necessary Actions- The Secretary is authorized to take such actions as the Secretary deems necessary to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation, the following:

(d) Program Guidelines- Before the earlier of the end of the 2-business-day period beginning on the date of the first purchase of troubled assets pursuant to the authority under this section or the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall publish program guidelines, including the following:

(e) Preventing Unjust Enrichment- In making purchases under the authority of this Act, the Secretary shall take such steps as may be necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of financial institutions participating in a program established under this section, including by preventing the sale of a troubled asset to the Secretary at a higher price than what the seller paid to purchase the asset. This subsection does not apply to troubled assets acquired in a merger or acquisition, or a purchase of assets from a financial institution in conservatorship or receivership, or that has initiated bankruptcy proceedings under title 11, United States Code.


  • (1) AUTHORITY- The Secretary is authorized to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (or ‘TARP’) to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary, and in accordance with this Act and the policies and procedures developed and published by the Secretary.
    (2) COMMENCEMENT OF PROGRAM- Establishment of the policies and procedures and other similar administrative requirements imposed on the Secretary by this Act are not intended to delay the commencement of the TARP.
    (3) ESTABLISHMENT OF TREASURY OFFICE-

    • (A) IN GENERAL- The Secretary shall implement any program under paragraph (1) through an Office of Financial Stability, established for such purpose within the Office of Domestic Finance of the Department of the Treasury, which office shall be headed by an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, except that an interim Assistant Secretary may be appointed by the Secretary.
      (B) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS-

      • (i) TITLE 5- Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended in the item relating to Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury, by striking ‘(9)’ and inserting ‘(10)’.
        (ii) TITLE 31- Section 301(e) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘9’ and inserting ‘10’.

        •  

    (1) The Secretary shall have direct hiring authority with respect to the appointment of employees to administer this Act.

    (2) Entering into contracts, including contracts for services authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.

    (3) Designating financial institutions as financial agents of the Federal Government, and such institutions shall perform all such reasonable duties related to this Act as financial agents of the Federal Government as may be required.

    (4) In order to provide the Secretary with the flexibility to manage troubled assets in a manner designed to minimize cost to the taxpayers, establishing vehicles that are authorized, subject to supervision by the Secretary, to purchase, hold, and sell troubled assets and issue obligations.

    (5) Issuing such regulations and other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the authorities or purposes of this Act.


    •  

    (1) Mechanisms for purchasing troubled assets.

    (2) Methods for pricing and valuing troubled assets.

    (3) Procedures for selecting asset managers.

    (4) Criteria for identifying troubled assets for purchase.


    •  

 

sec 109 of Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008

 

SEC. 109. FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS.

(a) Residential Mortgage Loan Servicing Standards- To the extent that the Secretary acquires mortgages, mortgage backed securities, and other assets secured by residential real estate, including multifamily housing, the Secretary shall implement a plan that seeks to maximize assistance for homeowners and use the authority of the Secretary to encourage the servicers of the underlying mortgages, considering net present value to the taxpayer, to take advantage of the HOPE for Homeowners Program under section 257 of the National Housing Act or other available programs to minimize foreclosures. In addition, the Secretary may use loan guarantees and credit enhancements to facilitate loan modifications to prevent avoidable foreclosures.

(b) Coordination- The Secretary shall coordinate with the Corporation, the Board (with respect to any mortgage or mortgage-backed securities or pool of securities held, owned, or controlled by or on behalf of a Federal reserve bank, as provided in section 110(a)(1)©), the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and other Federal Government entities that hold troubled assets to attempt to identify opportunities for the acquisition of classes of troubled assets that will improve the ability of the Secretary to improve the loan modification and restructuring process and, where permissible, to permit bona fide tenants who are current on their rent to remain in their homes under the terms of the lease. In the case of a mortgage on a residential rental property, the plan required under this section shall include protecting Federal, State, and local rental subsidies and protections, and ensuring any modification takes into account the need for operating funds to maintain decent and safe conditions at the property.

© Consent to Reasonable Loan Modification Requests- Upon any request arising under existing investment contracts, the Secretary shall consent, where appropriate, and considering net present value to the taxpayer, to reasonable requests for loss mitigation measures, including term extensions, rate reductions, principal write downs, increases in the proportion of loans within a trust or other structure allowed to be modified, or removal of other limitation on modifications.


  •  

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr1424/text

 

Bank Of America Lied To Homeowners And Encouraged Foreclosures, Former Workers Allege

 

The court documents paint a picture of customer service operations where managers roamed the floor with headsets, able to listen into any call without warning. Service representatives were told to lie to homeowners, telling them their paperwork and payments had not been received, when in reality they had.

"This is exactly what's been happening to homeowners for years," said Danielle Kelley, a foreclosure defense lawyer in Florida. "No matter how many times they send in their paperwork, or how often they make their payments, they simply can't get loan modifications. They wind up in foreclosure instead."

The former employees said they were told to falsify electronic records and string homeowners along in foreclosure as long as possible. The problem was exacerbated because the bank did not have enough employees handling modifications, adding to the backlog of cases purged during the "blitz" operations.

Once a HAMP application was delayed or rejected, Bank of America would offer an in-house alternative, charging as high as 5 percent when the loan could have been modified for 2 percent under HAMP, according to an affidavit by William Wilson, who worked at the bank's Charlotte, North Carolina office.

 

http://www.businessinsider.com/former-workers-allege-bank-of-america-lied-to-home-owners-and-rewarded-employees-who-foreclosed-on-homes-2013-6

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GAO is wrong.

 

And I already explained it. Go look up the regulations and legislation yourself if you want to argue with me.

right on cue. so why are you correct? so far we have the gao and writers from several prominent financial and legal publications in agreement that HAMP and TARP are linked and then there's you and no one else claiming that they're not. where's the independent confirmation of your position?
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right on cue. so why are you correct? so far we have the gao and writers from several prominent financial and legal publications in agreement that HAMP and TARP are linked and then there's you and no one else claiming that they're not. where's the independent confirmation of your position?

 

Because that's what the relevant laws and regulations say.

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