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You're officially an idiot.

 

 

can you please be respectful?

 

where have i gone wrong? im simply stating a regulated market is better than lawlessness... market incentive does not always work, and where it does not check power, the powerful become more powerful. i also stated that corporations and lobbyists are now writing laws or having a major influence over our political system, rendering our democracy into corporatism. i simply stated we need regs against this and some minimal protection, just like laws with traffic...

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You're officially an idiot.

 

Something is fishy. He joined the board three years ago, has seven posts and a name of Marcell Dareus? He's probably a regular poster here who set up an alternate 3 years ago and then just recently changed the user name and started posting. I can't believe I even put that much effort into this.

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obviously anyone that has studied the banking crisis must realize what deregulation did. not only that, but the deregulation happened, billions were stolen, and then when the money ran out, the govt bailed them out. this is the very definition of corporatism/fascism...

Edited by MARCELL DAREUS POWER
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obviously anyone that has studied the banking crisis must realize what deregulation did. not only that, but the deregulation happened, billions were stolen, and then when the money ran out, the govt bailed them out. this is the very definition of corporatism/fascism...

 

Right, it wasn't panic, it was deregulation.

 

/New York Times

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Right, it wasn't panic, it was deregulation.

 

/New York Times

 

 

and why did the panic start? a few big firms knew they were betting against investments and used aig for the parachute... only aig was deregulated, and after a few margin calls, the dominos were set in motion.

 

these firms were selling **** mortgages that they knew would fail, or had a high chance of failing, hid the info, and bet against them with aig...

 

it was compounded because glass steagall was deregulated...

 

the fbi, not the ny times has reported this, unless you think the fbi is some liberal conspiracy..

 

Over regulation in the form of the CRA and CRAII and democrats leniency with their personal campaign contributers Fannie & Freddie had just a tad to do with the problem.

 

it wasnt regulation, not regulation in the sense that protects people or is rational. it was law that was set in place to protect big business... ie corporatism/fascism.

 

again, its not govt, its when govt is taken over by corporate america...

 

why do you think fannie and freddie did this? its called lobbying, ie deregulation of political contribution, ie bribes...

 

they knew that giving **** loans to people would make big money in the short run, and they knew when the bottom fell out, the govt would protect them... the college loan bubble is the same right now and is a big reason for the debt. if the person defaults, the govt backs the initial loan by 120%. basically you cant lose. who do you think wrote that law?

Edited by MARCELL DAREUS POWER
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and why did the panic start? a few big firms knew they were betting against investments and used aig for the parachute... only aig was deregulated, and after a few margin calls, the dominos were set in motion.

 

these firms were selling **** mortgages that they knew would fail, or had a high chance of failing, hid the info, and bet against them with aig...

 

it was compounded because glass steagall was deregulated...

 

the fbi, not the ny times has reported this, unless you think the fbi is some liberal conspiracy..

 

 

 

it wasnt regulation, not regulation in the sense that protects people or is rational. it was law that was set in place to protect big business... ie corporatism/fascism.

 

again, its not govt, its when govt is taken over by corporate america...

 

why do you think fannie and freddie did this? its called lobbying, ie deregulation of political contribution, ie bribes...

 

 

Sure, forcing banks to lend to people they aren't comfortable lending to in areas they aren't comfortable lending in is protecting big business.

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Sure, forcing banks to lend to people they aren't comfortable lending to in areas they aren't comfortable lending in is protecting big business.

The government operates more like organized crime than any type of "ism". They don't have the balls to come right out and say they function as a dictatorship or a communist manifesto. They do it behind the scenes masked as something else. A perfect example is the "CRA" that I think you are referring to. Strong arming by intimidation and black mail under the guise of assisting the inner city. All the while setting the inner city and the banks for failure. Then, after its all done tag the banks and corporate America with the blame.

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Sure, forcing banks to lend to people they aren't comfortable lending to in areas they aren't comfortable lending in is protecting big business.

 

fannie and freddie was protected by the govt...

 

they knew there was no risk, only risk to the tax payer. they had the govt backed loan plus 20% or so... plus aig.

 

WIKI-

 

2000s

 

In 2000, because of a re-assessment of the housing market by HUD, anti-predatory lending rules were put into place that disallowed risky, high-cost loans from being credited toward affordable housing goals. In 2004, these rules were dropped and high-risk loans were again counted toward affordable housing goals.[25]

The intent was that Fannie Mae's enforcement of the underwriting standards they maintained for standard conforming mortgages would also provide safe and stable means of lending to buyers who did not have prime credit. As Daniel Mudd, then President and CEO of Fannie Mae, testified in 2007, instead the agency's underwriting requirements drove business into the arms of the private mortgage industry who marketed aggressive products without regard to future consequences: "We also set conservative underwriting standards for loans we finance to ensure the homebuyers can afford their loans over the long term. We sought to bring the standards we apply to the prime space to the subprime market with our industry partners primarily to expand our services to underserved families.

 

"Unfortunately, Fannie Mae-quality, safe loans in the subprime market did not become the standard, and the lending market moved away from us. Borrowers were offered a range of loans that layered teaser rates, interest-only, negative amortization and payment options and low-documentation requirements on top of floating-rate loans. In early 2005 we began sounding our concerns about this "layered-risk" lending. For example, Tom Lund, the head of our single-family mortgage business, publicly stated, "One of the things we don't feel good about right now as we look into this marketplace is more homebuyers being put into programs that have more risk. Those products are for more sophisticated buyers. Does it make sense for borrowers to take on risk they may not be aware of? Are we setting them up for failure? As a result, we gave up significant market share to our competitors."[26]

 

On January 26, 2005, the Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005 (S.190) was first introduced in the Senate by Sen. Chuck Hagel.[27] The Senate legislation was an effort to reform the existing GSE regulatory structure in light of the recent accounting problems and questionable management actions leading to considerable income restatements by the GSE's. After being reported favorably by the Senate's Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in July 2005, the bill was never considered by the full Senate for a vote.[28] Sen. John McCain's decision to become a cosponsor of S.190 almost a year later in 2006 was the last action taken regarding Sen. Hagel's bill in spite of developments since clearing the Senate Committee. Sen. McCain pointed out that Fannie Mae's regulator reported that profits were "illusions deliberately and systematically created by the company's senior management" in his floor statement giving support to S.190.[29][30]

 

At the same time, the House also introduced similar legislation, the Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005 (H.R. 1461), in the Spring of 2005. The House Financial Services Committee had crafted changes and produced a Committee Report by July 2005 to the legislation. It was passed by the House in October in spite of President Bush's statement of policy opposed to the House version.[31] The legislation met with opposition from both Democrats and Republicans at that point and the Senate never took up the House passed version for consideration after that.[32]

 

[edit] The mortgage crisis from late 2007

 

Following their mission to meet federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) housing goals, GSEs such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) have striven to improve home ownership of low and middle income families, underserved areas, and generally through special affordable methods such as "the ability to obtain a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage with a low down payment... and the continuous availability of mortgage credit under a wide range of economic conditions." (HUD 2002 Annual Housing Activities Report) Then in 2003-2004, the subprime mortgage crisis began.[33] The market shifted away from regulated GSEs and radically toward Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) issued by unregulated private-label securitization conduits, typically operated by investment banks.

As mortgage originators began to distribute more and more of their loans through private label MBS, GSEs lost the ability to monitor and control mortgage originators. Competition between the GSEs and private securitizers for loans further undermined GSEs power and strengthened mortgage originators. This contributed to a decline in underwriting standards and was a major cause of the financial crisis.[34]

 

Investment bank securitizers were more willing to securitize risky loans because they generally retained minimal risk. Whereas the GSEs guaranteed the performance of their MBS, private securitizers generally did not, and might only retain a thin slice of risk.[34] Often, banks would offload this risk to insurance companies or other counterparties through credit default swaps, making their actual risk exposures extremely difficult for investors and creditors to discern.[35]

The shift toward riskier mortgages and private label MBS distribution occurred as financial institutions sought to maintain earnings levels that had been elevated during 2001-2003 by an unprecedented refinancing boom due to historically low interest rates. Earnings depended on volume, so maintaining elevated earnings levels necessitated expanding the borrower pool using lower underwriting standards and new products that the GSEs would not (initially) securitize. Thus, the shift away from GSE securitization to private-label securitization (PLS) also corresponded with a shift in mortgage product type, from traditional, amortizing, fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) to nontraditional, structurally riskier, nonamortizing, adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), and in the start of a sharp deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards.[33] The growth of PLS, however, forced the GSEs to lower their underwriting standards in an attempt to reclaim lost market share to please their private shareholders. Shareholder pressure pushed the GSEs into competition with PLS for market share, and the GSEs loosened their guarantee business underwriting standards in order to compete. In contrast, the wholly public FHA/Ginnie Mae maintained their underwriting standards and instead ceded market share.[33]

 

The growth of private-label securitization and lack of regulation in this part of the market resulted in the oversupply of underpriced housing finance[33] that led, in 2006, to an increasing number of borrowers, often with poor credit, who were unable to pay their mortgages - particularly with adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), caused a precipitous increase in home foreclosures. As a result, home prices declined as increasing foreclosures added to the already large inventory of homes and stricter lending standards made it more and more difficult for borrowers to get mortgages. This depreciation in home prices led to growing losses for the GSEs, which back the majority of US mortgages. In July 2008, the government attempted to ease market fears by reiterating their view that "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a central role in the US housing finance system". The US Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve took steps to bolster confidence in the corporations, including granting both corporations access to Federal Reserve low-interest loans (at similar rates as commercial banks) and removing the prohibition on the Treasury Department to purchase the GSEs' stock. Despite these efforts, by August 2008, shares of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had tumbled more than 90% from their one-year prior levels.

On Oct 21, 2010 FHFA estimates revealed that the bailout of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will likely cost taxpayers $224–360 billion in total, with over $150 billion already provided.[36]

Edited by MARCELL DAREUS POWER
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fannie and freddie was protected by the govt...

 

they knew there was no risk, only risk to the tax payer. they had the govt backed loan plus 20% or so... plus aig.

 

WIKI-

 

2000s

 

In 2000, because of a re-assessment of the housing market by HUD, anti-predatory lending rules were put into place that disallowed risky, high-cost loans from being credited toward affordable housing goals. In 2004, these rules were dropped and high-risk loans were again counted toward affordable housing goals.[25]

The intent was that Fannie Mae's enforcement of the underwriting standards they maintained for standard conforming mortgages would also provide safe and stable means of lending to buyers who did not have prime credit. As Daniel Mudd, then President and CEO of Fannie Mae, testified in 2007, instead the agency's underwriting requirements drove business into the arms of the private mortgage industry who marketed aggressive products without regard to future consequences: "We also set conservative underwriting standards for loans we finance to ensure the homebuyers can afford their loans over the long term. We sought to bring the standards we apply to the prime space to the subprime market with our industry partners primarily to expand our services to underserved families.

 

"Unfortunately, Fannie Mae-quality, safe loans in the subprime market did not become the standard, and the lending market moved away from us. Borrowers were offered a range of loans that layered teaser rates, interest-only, negative amortization and payment options and low-documentation requirements on top of floating-rate loans. In early 2005 we began sounding our concerns about this "layered-risk" lending. For example, Tom Lund, the head of our single-family mortgage business, publicly stated, "One of the things we don't feel good about right now as we look into this marketplace is more homebuyers being put into programs that have more risk. Those products are for more sophisticated buyers. Does it make sense for borrowers to take on risk they may not be aware of? Are we setting them up for failure? As a result, we gave up significant market share to our competitors."[26]

 

On January 26, 2005, the Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005 (S.190) was first introduced in the Senate by Sen. Chuck Hagel.[27] The Senate legislation was an effort to reform the existing GSE regulatory structure in light of the recent accounting problems and questionable management actions leading to considerable income restatements by the GSE's. After being reported favorably by the Senate's Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in July 2005, the bill was never considered by the full Senate for a vote.[28] Sen. John McCain's decision to become a cosponsor of S.190 almost a year later in 2006 was the last action taken regarding Sen. Hagel's bill in spite of developments since clearing the Senate Committee. Sen. McCain pointed out that Fannie Mae's regulator reported that profits were "illusions deliberately and systematically created by the company's senior management" in his floor statement giving support to S.190.[29][30]

 

At the same time, the House also introduced similar legislation, the Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005 (H.R. 1461), in the Spring of 2005. The House Financial Services Committee had crafted changes and produced a Committee Report by July 2005 to the legislation. It was passed by the House in October in spite of President Bush's statement of policy opposed to the House version.[31] The legislation met with opposition from both Democrats and Republicans at that point and the Senate never took up the House passed version for consideration after that.[32]

 

[edit] The mortgage crisis from late 2007

 

Following their mission to meet federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) housing goals, GSEs such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) have striven to improve home ownership of low and middle income families, underserved areas, and generally through special affordable methods such as "the ability to obtain a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage with a low down payment... and the continuous availability of mortgage credit under a wide range of economic conditions." (HUD 2002 Annual Housing Activities Report) Then in 2003-2004, the subprime mortgage crisis began.[33] The market shifted away from regulated GSEs and radically toward Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) issued by unregulated private-label securitization conduits, typically operated by investment banks.

As mortgage originators began to distribute more and more of their loans through private label MBS, GSEs lost the ability to monitor and control mortgage originators. Competition between the GSEs and private securitizers for loans further undermined GSEs power and strengthened mortgage originators. This contributed to a decline in underwriting standards and was a major cause of the financial crisis.[34]

 

Investment bank securitizers were more willing to securitize risky loans because they generally retained minimal risk. Whereas the GSEs guaranteed the performance of their MBS, private securitizers generally did not, and might only retain a thin slice of risk.[34] Often, banks would offload this risk to insurance companies or other counterparties through credit default swaps, making their actual risk exposures extremely difficult for investors and creditors to discern.[35]

The shift toward riskier mortgages and private label MBS distribution occurred as financial institutions sought to maintain earnings levels that had been elevated during 2001-2003 by an unprecedented refinancing boom due to historically low interest rates. Earnings depended on volume, so maintaining elevated earnings levels necessitated expanding the borrower pool using lower underwriting standards and new products that the GSEs would not (initially) securitize. Thus, the shift away from GSE securitization to private-label securitization (PLS) also corresponded with a shift in mortgage product type, from traditional, amortizing, fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) to nontraditional, structurally riskier, nonamortizing, adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), and in the start of a sharp deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards.[33] The growth of PLS, however, forced the GSEs to lower their underwriting standards in an attempt to reclaim lost market share to please their private shareholders. Shareholder pressure pushed the GSEs into competition with PLS for market share, and the GSEs loosened their guarantee business underwriting standards in order to compete. In contrast, the wholly public FHA/Ginnie Mae maintained their underwriting standards and instead ceded market share.[33]

 

The growth of private-label securitization and lack of regulation in this part of the market resulted in the oversupply of underpriced housing finance[33] that led, in 2006, to an increasing number of borrowers, often with poor credit, who were unable to pay their mortgages - particularly with adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), caused a precipitous increase in home foreclosures. As a result, home prices declined as increasing foreclosures added to the already large inventory of homes and stricter lending standards made it more and more difficult for borrowers to get mortgages. This depreciation in home prices led to growing losses for the GSEs, which back the majority of US mortgages. In July 2008, the government attempted to ease market fears by reiterating their view that "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a central role in the US housing finance system". The US Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve took steps to bolster confidence in the corporations, including granting both corporations access to Federal Reserve low-interest loans (at similar rates as commercial banks) and removing the prohibition on the Treasury Department to purchase the GSEs' stock. Despite these efforts, by August 2008, shares of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had tumbled more than 90% from their one-year prior levels.

On Oct 21, 2010 FHFA estimates revealed that the bailout of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will likely cost taxpayers $224–360 billion in total, with over $150 billion already provided.[36]

 

That's mostly wrong.

 

where have i gone wrong? im simply stating a regulated market is better than lawlessness... market incentive does not always work, and where it does not check power, the powerful become more powerful. i also stated that corporations and lobbyists are now writing laws or having a major influence over our political system, rendering our democracy into corporatism. i simply stated we need regs against this and some minimal protection, just like laws with traffic...

 

You're an idiot for pretending corporatism and fascism are the same.

 

can you please be respectful?

 

I was. I didn't call you a !@#$ing idiot.

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What part?

 

What part of "mostly" do you not understand?

 

But in particular...virtually everything you bolded. The only part you bolded that wasn't wrong was "The growth of private-label securitization and lack of regulation in this part of the market resulted in the oversupply of underpriced housing finance that led, in 2006, to an increasing number of borrowers, often with poor credit, who were unable to pay their mortgages - particularly with adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), caused a precipitous increase in home foreclosures." But that was also so bloody obvious that I predicted it years before it actually happened - you'd have to be almost a complete intellectual cripple to get that wrong.

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That's mostly wrong.

 

 

 

You're an idiot for pretending corporatism and fascism are the same.

 

WIKI

 

 

 

 

I was. I didn't call you a !@#$ing idiot.

 

 

WIKI-

Fascist corporatism-

 

Fascism's theory of economic corporatism involved management of sectors of the economy by government or privately controlled organizations (corporations). Each trade union or employer corporation would, theoretically, represent its professional concerns, especially by negotiation of labor contracts and the like. This method, it was theorized, could result in harmony amongst social classes.[30] Authors have noted, however, that de facto economic corporatism was also used to reduce opposition and reward political loyalty.[31]

 

In Italy from 1922 until 1943, corporatism became influential amongst Italian nationalists led by Benito Mussolini. The Charter of Carnaro gained much popularity as the prototype of a 'corporative state', having displayed much within its tenets as a guild system combining the concepts of autonomy and authority in a special synthesis. This appealed to Hegelian thinkers who were seeking a new alternative to popular socialism and syndicalism which was also a progressive system of governing labor and still a new way of relating to political governance. Alfredo Rocco spoke of a corporative state and declared corporatist ideology in detail. Rocco would later become a member of the Italian Fascist regime Fascismo.[32]

 

Italian Fascism involved a corporatist political system in which economy was collectively managed by employers, workers and state officials by formal mechanisms at the national level.[33] This non-elected form of state officializing of every interest into the state was professed to reduce the marginalization of singular interests (as would allegedly happen by the unilateral end condition inherent in the democratic voting process). Corporatism would instead better recognize or 'incorporate' every divergent interest into the state organically, according to its supporters, thus being the inspiration for their use of the term totalitarian, perceivable to them as not meaning a coercive system but described distinctly as without coercion in the 1932 Doctrine of Fascism as thus:

 

 

When brought within the orbit of the State, Fascism recognizes the real needs which gave rise to socialism and trade unionism, giving them due weight in the guild or corporative system in which divergent interests are coordinated and harmonized in the unity of the State.[34]

 

and

 

 

[The state] is not simply a mechanism which limits the sphere of the supposed liberties of the individual... Neither has the Fascist conception of authority anything in common with that of a police ridden State... Far from crushing the individual, the Fascist State multiplies his energies, just as in a regiment a soldier is not diminished but multiplied by the number of his fellow soldiers.[34]

 

This prospect of Italian fascist corporatism claimed to be the direct heir of Georges Sorel's anarcho-collectivist, such that each interest was to form as its own entity with separate organizing parameters according to their own standards, only however within the corporative model of Italian fascism each was supposed to be incorporated through the auspices and organizing ability of a statist construct. This was by their reasoning the only possible way to achieve such a function, i.e. when resolved in the capability of an indissoluble state. Much of the corporatist influence upon Italian Fascism was partly due to the Fascists' attempts to gain endorsement by the Roman Catholic Church that itself sponsored corporatism.[35]

 

However fascism's corporatism was a top-down model of state control over the economy while the Roman Catholic Church's corporatism favored a bottom-up corporatism, whereby groups such as families and professional groups would voluntarily work together.[35][36] The fascist state corporatism influenced the governments and economies of a number of Roman Catholic countries, such as the government of Engelbert Dollfuss in Austria and António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal, but also Konstantin Päts and Karlis Ulmanis in non-Catholic Estonia and Latvia. Fascists in non-Catholic countries also supported Italian Fascist corporatism, including Oswald Mosley of the British Union of Fascists who commended corporatism and said that "it means a nation organized as the human body, with each organ performing its individual function but working in harmony with the whole".[37] Mosley also considered corporatism as an attack on laissez-faire economics and "international finance".[37]

Edited by MARCELL DAREUS POWER
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WIKI-

Fascist corporatism-

 

Fascism's theory of economic corporatism involved management of sectors of the economy by government or privately controlled organizations (corporations). Each trade union or employer corporation would, theoretically, represent its professional concerns, especially by negotiation of labor contracts and the like. This method, it was theorized, could result in harmony amongst social classes.[30] Authors have noted, however, that de facto economic corporatism was also used to reduce opposition and reward political loyalty.[31]

 

In Italy from 1922 until 1943, corporatism became influential amongst Italian nationalists led by Benito Mussolini. The Charter of Carnaro gained much popularity as the prototype of a 'corporative state', having displayed much within its tenets as a guild system combining the concepts of autonomy and authority in a special synthesis. This appealed to Hegelian thinkers who were seeking a new alternative to popular socialism and syndicalism which was also a progressive system of governing labor and still a new way of relating to political governance. Alfredo Rocco spoke of a corporative state and declared corporatist ideology in detail. Rocco would later become a member of the Italian Fascist regime Fascismo.[32]

 

Italian Fascism involved a corporatist political system in which economy was collectively managed by employers, workers and state officials by formal mechanisms at the national level.[33] This non-elected form of state officializing of every interest into the state was professed to reduce the marginalization of singular interests (as would allegedly happen by the unilateral end condition inherent in the democratic voting process). Corporatism would instead better recognize or 'incorporate' every divergent interest into the state organically, according to its supporters, thus being the inspiration for their use of the term totalitarian, perceivable to them as not meaning a coercive system but described distinctly as without coercion in the 1932 Doctrine of Fascism as thus:

 

 

When brought within the orbit of the State, Fascism recognizes the real needs which gave rise to socialism and trade unionism, giving them due weight in the guild or corporative system in which divergent interests are coordinated and harmonized in the unity of the State.[34]

 

and

 

 

[The state] is not simply a mechanism which limits the sphere of the supposed liberties of the individual... Neither has the Fascist conception of authority anything in common with that of a police ridden State... Far from crushing the individual, the Fascist State multiplies his energies, just as in a regiment a soldier is not diminished but multiplied by the number of his fellow soldiers.[34]

 

This prospect of Italian fascist corporatism claimed to be the direct heir of Georges Sorel's anarcho-collectivist, such that each interest was to form as its own entity with separate organizing parameters according to their own standards, only however within the corporative model of Italian fascism each was supposed to be incorporated through the auspices and organizing ability of a statist construct. This was by their reasoning the only possible way to achieve such a function, i.e. when resolved in the capability of an indissoluble state. Much of the corporatist influence upon Italian Fascism was partly due to the Fascists' attempts to gain endorsement by the Roman Catholic Church that itself sponsored corporatism.[35]

 

However fascism's corporatism was a top-down model of state control over the economy while the Roman Catholic Church's corporatism favored a bottom-up corporatism, whereby groups such as families and professional groups would voluntarily work together.[35][36] The fascist state corporatism influenced the governments and economies of a number of Roman Catholic countries, such as the government of Engelbert Dollfuss in Austria and António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal, but also Konstantin Päts and Karlis Ulmanis in non-Catholic Estonia and Latvia. Fascists in non-Catholic countries also supported Italian Fascist corporatism, including Oswald Mosley of the British Union of Fascists who commended corporatism and said that "it means a nation organized as the human body, with each organ performing its individual function but working in harmony with the whole".[37] Mosley also considered corporatism as an attack on laissez-faire economics and "international finance".[37]

 

"Fascist corporatism" does not make "fascism" and "corporatism" the same thing. But thanks for verifying that you are, in fact, an idiot.

 

No disrespect intended.

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What part of "mostly" do you not understand?

 

But in particular...virtually everything you bolded. The only part you bolded that wasn't wrong was "The growth of private-label securitization and lack of regulation in this part of the market resulted in the oversupply of underpriced housing finance that led, in 2006, to an increasing number of borrowers, often with poor credit, who were unable to pay their mortgages - particularly with adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), caused a precipitous increase in home foreclosures." But that was also so bloody obvious that I predicted it years before it actually happened - you'd have to be almost a complete intellectual cripple to get that wrong.

 

 

Sorry, i didnt think mostly was specific enough, but hey.. w/e..

 

i guess we can just stop now. you want no regs, i do. this conversation would take about 12 hours.. so unless you live near by and want to get a beer, i will just stop now...

 

"Fascist corporatism" does not make "fascism" and "corporatism" the same thing. But thanks for verifying that you are, in fact, an idiot.

 

No disrespect intended.

 

 

i never said they were the same thing, only implied they are related, ie corporatism leads to fascism...

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Sorry, i didnt think mostly was specific enough, but hey.. w/e..

 

i guess we can just stop now. you want no regs, i do. this conversation would take about 12 hours.. so unless you live near by and want to get a beer, i will just stop now...

 

Yeah, that's what I said. I wasn't telling you that you're grievously misinformed, I was promoting an anarchic market. Shame on me for arguing with a wikiwarrior who obviously knows what I think better than I do.

 

 

i never said they were the same thing, only implied they are related, ie corporatism leads to fascism...

 

Which is even stupider than saying they're the same thing.

 

Something is fishy. He joined the board three years ago, has seven posts and a name of Marcell Dareus? He's probably a regular poster here who set up an alternate 3 years ago and then just recently changed the user name and started posting. I can't believe I even put that much effort into this.

 

Oh...hey, it's John Dellapelle. I remember him. He really is an idiot. Was years ago. Still is.

 

Great, now I can just copy and paste all my responses from back then. Save me a boatload of time.

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