UConn James Posted February 11, 2012 Share Posted February 11, 2012 (edited) The Saturday Essay : Foreign-policy pundits increasingly argue that democracy and free markets could thrive without U.S. predominance. If this sounds too good to be true, writes Robert Kagan, that's because it is. American power may diminish, the political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues, but "the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive." The commentator Fareed Zakaria believes that even as the balance shifts against the U.S., rising powers like China "will continue to live within the framework of the current international system." And there are elements across the political spectrum—Republicans who call for retrenchment, Democrats who put their faith in international law and institutions—who don't imagine that a "post-American world" would look very different from the American world. If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is. The present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will change to suit their interests and preferences. Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve it, even if they wanted to. ... There is little reason to believe that a return to multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has in the past. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. President Bill Clinton left office believing that the key task for America was to "create the world we would like to live in when we are no longer the world's only superpower," to prepare for "a time when we would have to share the stage." It is an eminently sensible-sounding proposal. But can it be done? For particularly in matters of security, the rules and institutions of international order rarely survive the decline of the nations that erected them. They are like scaffolding around a building: They don't hold the building up; the building holds them up. Some macrocosmic soup for everyone to enjoy this fine Saturday. For anyone wishing and hoping for a decline in American hegemony, or for those who think we should retract because we can't afford it anymore (cough Ron Paul cough), the continuation of world order as we've set it up is hardly guaranteed. And after we lose Superpower status either by volition or debt, it's pretty certain we'll be singing the geopolitical equivalent of "Big Yellow Taxi" (You Don't Know What You've Got 'Til It's Gone). Now, a small sliver of Ron Paul's arguments do have some resonance for me. Essentially, it is what Bill Gates told European powers on his farewell address there: those countries that by-and-large share American ideals must expect to stop getting a partial free ride with protection from the U.S. military's capabilities while they keep small armies that they've been hesitant to use, and when they do, usually only as token support to missions started by the UN or America. The Libyan campaign seemed the first major use of force from Europe for decades. Time for them to stop spending so much on social welfare, put it into their military and protect themselves so America can make some marginal cuts and use its resources more effectively. But let's get one thing straight, as it says here. If and when America is no longer the lead dog, there will be blood. Edited February 11, 2012 by UConn James Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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