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Posted

Guess the returning vets had something more than mom's apple pie on their mind.

The japanese forced Korean, Chinese, and probably other nationalities of women into prostitution- called them comfort women,

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Posted
No doubt. As much as American industrial capabilities, there's the factor of Japanese industrial incapability as well. The Japanese had very good engineers, but very poor manufacturing technique, and when given a good weapon design simply couldn't manufacture it - usually at all, never mind in quantity. The Japanese had absolutely no depth to their industrial or economic base (the main reason they went to war to begin with), and were completely unable to sustain a long war over great distances.

 

True, however, it should be noted that the geography of Japan played a key role in thier being able to field ANY machines of war at all. The locations of many of thier factories for making planes and other armaments were so inaccessable, and the weather usually so poor, that the Allies (really the US) were inneffective at bombing these factories, and was partly the reason why they resorted to the massive fire bombing campaigns which reduced the paper cities of the Empire to dust...

Posted
Great points...in the final analysis I think it would be worth positing to the Japanese leaders--WHAT THE HELL WERE YOU THINKING? They would have been far better off not screwing with us. And once Hitler declared war, I suspect outcome of the entire war was pretty much decided. We could fight, but better than our fighting was our capability of production. We ought to be thinking about that as we outsource our manufacturing capacity.

 

 

As Tom pointed out, most of thier motives for attacking were economic to begin with, and they had been essentially at war in China for a over a decade when the attack at the Pearl happened.

 

Keep in mind that the Japanese high command had NO illusions about defeating the US in a head to head confrontation. Thier entire stratagy was to wear down the morale of the American populace to wage a destructive and costly war so far away from home. They only hoped to broker a peace accord which would afford them both a morale and economic victory that they could live with...

Posted
Porsche- Tiger tanks

 

Henschel, actually. Porsche's design never went into production, but the chassis became the "Ferdinand" and "Elefant" .

Posted
Henschel, actually. Porsche's design never went into production, but the chassis became the "Ferdinand" and "Elefant" .

You are forgetting the Porsche turret designed for the King Tiger.

Posted
True, however, it should be noted that the geography of Japan played a key role in thier being able to field ANY machines of war at all. The locations of many of thier factories for making planes and other armaments were so inaccessable, and the weather usually so poor, that the Allies (really the US) were inneffective at bombing these factories, and was partly the reason why they resorted to the massive fire bombing campaigns which reduced the paper cities of the Empire to dust...

 

The effectiveness of strategic bombing used directly against production capacity is at best questionable. In both Europe and the Pacific, bombing was far more effective against transportation means (i.e. railroads and shipping), thus starving factories of resources, than it was against factories directly.

 

It also ignores the fact that the Japanese produced quite a bit of military equipment before and early in the way (and even later in the war), but the deficiency in industrial methods meant that equipment was of generally low quality and/or simple design. The Japanese never managed to produce a truly useful and reliable inline or advanced radial aircraft engine not because of a lack of capacity or American bombing, but because they simply didn't have the precision industrial methods to manufacture it (they could design it - as a prototype, with all hand-machined parts.) Ditto for a lot of other stuff - airframes (the Zero was basically a 1936-era fighter, because anything more advanced was beyond Japan's capacity to manufacture), turbine blades, artillery, etc.

 

Bombing didn't help, but Japan's economic insufficiency for fighting a world war had nothing to do with Allied measures - Japan's economic base was insufficient for fighting China, well before they ever decided to take on the rest of the world. In fact, their insufficient economic base for fighting China was why they took on the rest of the world.

Posted
You are forgetting the Porsche turret designed for the King Tiger.

 

No, I'm not. I'm assuming, quite reasonably, that when you said "Tiger" you meant the whole vehicle, otherwise you would have said "turret for late-war King Tiger tanks".

Posted
As Tom pointed out, most of thier motives for attacking were economic to begin with, and they had been essentially at war in China for a over a decade when the attack at the Pearl happened.

 

Keep in mind that the Japanese high command had NO illusions about defeating the US in a head to head confrontation. Thier entire stratagy was to wear down the morale of the American populace to wage a destructive and costly war so far away from home. They only hoped to broker a peace accord which would afford them both a morale and economic victory that they could live with...

In hindsight, they got what they wanted (except for the being nuked thing). They won.

Posted
As Tom pointed out, most of thier motives for attacking were economic to begin with, and they had been essentially at war in China for a over a decade when the attack at the Pearl happened.

 

Keep in mind that the Japanese high command had NO illusions about defeating the US in a head to head confrontation. Thier entire stratagy was to wear down the morale of the American populace to wage a destructive and costly war so far away from home. They only hoped to broker a peace accord which would afford them both a morale and economic victory that they could live with...

Guess they didn't see the big picture. We had lend-lease going on and pretty heavy duty behind the scenes support of both England and Russia. What we didn't have was a clear justification for going to war. Thank you very much, Japan. You not only didn't knock out our fleet, didn't effect our morale in any negative fashion, you gave us a reason to get into the war. When push came to shove we kind of ended up on top economically at the end of that war. Not to mention that rather significant payback of the firebombing of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki....

Posted
No, I'm not. I'm assuming, quite reasonably, that when you said "Tiger" you meant the whole vehicle, otherwise you would have said "turret for late-war King Tiger tanks".

 

You're right. I yield. I always thought the Porsche turret was more elegant.

Posted

. Not to mention that rather significant payback of the firebombing of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki....

 

 

Nagasaki and Hiroshima were left relatively untouched so as to more accurately determine the effects of fat man and little boy.

Posted

We are in Oahu with a group of 31. My son and 4 others went too Pearl yesterday. They left waaaay to early for me though. 4.30 am!!! No way lol. Going to go later this week though. Always wanted to go to Pearl Harbour. It really would have been nice to go yesterday since it was the anniversary but I just didn't want to deal with the lines, waiting and so on. Will go when its calmer.

Posted

I visited Pearl Harbor this past August on my honeymoon. They show you a 30 minute video before taking you to the Memorial. Two things stuck out:

 

1. A video clip of the USS Arizona seconds before the first bomb hit and then quite possibly the most violent explosion I've ever seen caught on tape.

 

2. The amount of procedural failures that occurred prior to the attack was maddening. So many lives would be been spared if just one person didn't ignore the signs, radar, warnings, etc.

Posted
The effectiveness of strategic bombing used directly against production capacity is at best questionable. In both Europe and the Pacific, bombing was far more effective against transportation means (i.e. railroads and shipping), thus starving factories of resources, than it was against factories directly.

 

It also ignores the fact that the Japanese produced quite a bit of military equipment before and early in the way (and even later in the war), but the deficiency in industrial methods meant that equipment was of generally low quality and/or simple design. The Japanese never managed to produce a truly useful and reliable inline or advanced radial aircraft engine not because of a lack of capacity or American bombing, but because they simply didn't have the precision industrial methods to manufacture it (they could design it - as a prototype, with all hand-machined parts.) Ditto for a lot of other stuff - airframes (the Zero was basically a 1936-era fighter, because anything more advanced was beyond Japan's capacity to manufacture), turbine blades, artillery, etc.

 

Bombing didn't help, but Japan's economic insufficiency for fighting a world war had nothing to do with Allied measures - Japan's economic base was insufficient for fighting China, well before they ever decided to take on the rest of the world. In fact, their insufficient economic base for fighting China was why they took on the rest of the world.

 

I agree, or at least attempted to, however, it seems I did not make my post very clear. Japan's weather and topography made our attempts to knock out thier factory infrastructure exceedingly difficult...

Posted
2. The amount of procedural failures that occurred prior to the attack was maddening. So many lives would be been spared if just one person didn't ignore the signs, radar, warnings, etc.

 

 

You can say that for just about every seminal event. The signs are there...but only clear in retrospect. At the time, although plenty of signs pointed to war, not one shred of evidence unambiguously suggested Hawaii would be attacked. There's also little to suggest that a warning would have made much of a difference - both the Philippines and the British Pacific Fleet had unambiguous advanced warning of attack (Manila, eight to twelve hours; Singapore even more), both commands were soundly thrashed in the opening battles of their respective theaters despite that warning.

 

 

And from a military perspective, you have to give the Japanese their due: the bombing of Pearl Harbor was one of the best planned and executed surprise attacks in history. The whole opening of the Pacific War, from Dec 1941 to about April 1942, is an amazing case study of how to plan and execute a combined arms offensive.

Posted
Bombing didn't help, but Japan's economic insufficiency for fighting a world war had nothing to do with Allied measures - Japan's economic base was insufficient for fighting China, well before they ever decided to take on the rest of the world. In fact, their insufficient economic base for fighting China was why they took on the rest of the world.

i seem to remember their army lost out to the navy as regards to production and resources (there were two major Japanese schools of thought in the lead up to the war reflecting on where they thought they should land grab). And aircraft were seen as secondary to surface ships and fleet submarines. They made nice stuff for the navy. Subs were top notch, the big battleships pretty good, cruisers solid. But they got all the resources. And they only really had enough resources for one of their service arms, and even then it was insufficient.

 

If it was not for the Washington Treaty they would have had less carriers and more battleships in any case and Pearl may have been impossible as a result.

Posted
I visited Pearl Harbor this past August on my honeymoon. They show you a 30 minute video before taking you to the Memorial. Two things stuck out:

 

1. A video clip of the USS Arizona seconds before the first bomb hit and then quite possibly the most violent explosion I've ever seen caught on tape.

 

2. The amount of procedural failures that occurred prior to the attack was maddening. So many lives would be been spared if just one person didn't ignore the signs, radar, warnings, etc.

What stood out to me was that more than half the people visiting the site when I was there were Japanese.

Posted
i seem to remember their army lost out to the navy as regards to production and resources (there were two major Japanese schools of thought in the lead up to the war reflecting on where they thought they should land grab). And aircraft were seen as secondary to surface ships and fleet submarines. They made nice stuff for the navy. Subs were top notch, the big battleships pretty good, cruisers solid. But they got all the resources. And they only really had enough resources for one of their service arms, and even then it was insufficient.

 

If it was not for the Washington Treaty they would have had less carriers and more battleships in any case and Pearl may have been impossible as a result.

 

Only because naval power requires a lot of heavy industry; it was impossible for Japan to be a military force without a navy, and hence impossible without devoting a lot of heavy industry to building the navy. But again, it comes down to good designs not backed by capable industry - given the time, the Japanese could build limited numbers of good weapons, but not mass-produce them, which itself is not as great an issue in naval construction. And when you get down to the smaller ships, more easily mass-produced ships - destroyers, DE's, smaller escort vessels and the like - the basic immaturity of Japanese industry becomes evident again.

 

And while you're right about the IJN's view w/r/t air power, that makes them no different from anyone else...and you also have to consider that until 1942 they were the most doctrinally forward-thinking country in the world concerning the naval air power. They were the first by a wide margin to introduce the multi-carrier task force (the Brits and Americans operated single-carrier task forces until late '43), the first to integrate land-based air with fleet strategy and operations, and the first to embrace air power in an attack role (as opposed to the scouting role, which the US maintained until Pearl Harbor left them no option, and the Brits for substantially longer).

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