Orton's Arm

> 8 million a yr for a guard was not money we really had for that position This is true. There would have been another problem as well. Players playing similar positions on the same team compare their contracts to each other. One of the reasons Jason Peters held out was because he realized he was significantly more valuable than any of our other offensive linemen, but wasn't being paid more than some of the other guys on the line. Overpaying for guys like Derrick Dockery and Langston Walker drove up Jason Peters' price. Levitre is a good, solid offensive lineman. But Glenn looks like he could be a good, solid offensive lineman as well, and he plays a much more valuable position than LG. When healthy, Wood is also a good player, and plays a more valuable position than LG. If we'd paid Levitre $8 million a year, then later on we might have to choose between either paying each of those guys considerably more than $8 million a year, or letting them walk.

There are several possible reasons for Fitz's actions. 1) It's possible that, despite anything he may have said, he'd strongly prefer to be a starter. If that's the case, maybe he'll wait until after the draft before signing with some team. That way he can go to a team which needs a QB, and which didn't fill that need in the draft. 2) It's also possible that Buffalo was offering him less money than he thought he could get as a free agent. 3) In the phone call with Tampa's GM, Buddy said that Fitz would be "fighting for maybe a backup job." If that's how Buddy regards Fitz, I'm sure some of that had to come through in the negotiations. (If only via the size of offers Buddy was prepared to make.) Maybe Fitz thinks he can find some other team where he'll be more highly regarded.

> Dareus, williams, sheppard, Searcy, hairston, white and rogers have all become solid players/rotational/role players for us. Williams? Seriously? I'm not ready to give up on him yet; and there's a chance he'll achieve more at safety than he has at CB. But to bill him as someone who's already proven to be a success story is absurd. Some of the other players on that list have also not achieved enough, for long enough, to be considered success stories. Look at Marv's two drafts, for example. You can point to a number of guys from those drafts who showed flashes during limited playing time, but who never amounted to anything long-term. Not even as backups. > The unbelievable situation that Dareus had to deal with last yr is certainly a reason for his decline last yr, but his arrow is pointed up, make no mistake about it. Dareus was well on his way to having a mediocre second year well before his brother was killed. At least thus far, choosing Dareus over A.J. Green looks like it was a serious mistake. > Glenn had a great yr and should be better if he can stay healthy. I disagree with this as well. For his first few games, Glenn looked like he was on his way to having a great year. Then he got injured. After his return, his level of play wasn't the same. My guess is that he was playing hurt, and that he'll return to form in his second year. But that's only a guess, and a few impressive games early in the season do not "a great year" make. > Graham, despite the fanbases misconceptions, had a solid yr considering his draft position. Graham did nothing his rookie year to prove his detractors wrong. I remember seeing a website--it may have been Football Outsiders--which gave him a very low player grade for what he'd done. I'll grant that sometimes a WR can look like a bust in his first year or two, only to start to play well in year 3 or 4. Perhaps Graham will become like that. But it's mistaken to act as though Graham proved anything as a rookie. He didn't. > Sanders, while stashed on the practice squad, should be expected to push for PT this yr as well. Now you're arguing that a guy on the practice squad should be considered a Nix drafting success? You're reaching here. > in comparison, the 3 yrs prior produced the following players of note: When the Bills draft a player, he'll often get hyped up. The people who drafted him are naturally excited about him: they liked him better than anyone else available at the pick. That excitement spreads to the media, and to these boards. Sometimes the players live up to the hype. Other times they don't. When the latter happens, it takes a while for people--especially here on these boards--to figure out that the front office made a serious mistake. Prior to the Super Bowl, there were still many here who billed Donte Whitner as an above-average or even top-5 SS. Back in 2007 or 2008, many here still thought that guys like Ko Simpson and Ashton Youboty would be good. Some of the names you're throwing around as Nix's drafting successes have achieved less than either of those two. I'd like to see a player achieve significantly more than Youboty or Ko SImpson if I'm going to put him in a different category than them.

There were warning signs. Even during that 5-2 stretch, Fitz wasn't a particularly accurate passer. At the time that stretch was occurring, I wrote that Gailey had seemingly designed an offense to take advantage of Fitz's strengths (quick decision-making and intelligence) while minimizing his weaknesses (accuracy and arm strength). That offense was predicated on Fitz throwing to the mismatched target. The throw itself was generally supposed to be easy; and was not supposed to require anything close to a Montana level of accuracy to result in a completion. At the time that offense was being implemented, I pointed out that it was an experiment; and that only time would tell whether defensive coordinators would figure out an answer for it. They did; starting with that Bengals game. Later on in that 5-2 stretch, I pointed out that the Bills' method of winning was unsustainable. Started a thread on the subject. If I could see the warning signs, why couldn't the Bills' front office?

> I don't consider "-centric" to be pejorative nor did I mean it that way. Fair enough. > Not having read the book I can't judge it. But based on your description it certainly seemed like the cultural scope of the book was based solely on British culture. Fischer's theory is that the four main regional cultures which currently exist in America were derived from four different regional British cultures. On the other hand, the book is intended to be the first in a two part series. The first book (the one I described) is focused primarily on the 1600s through 1800s. The second book will dwell on more recent changes. British influence in America has obviously been diluted by comparatively recent large-scale non-British immigration. I recall there having been a large wave of such immigration in the late 1800s; and another wave which began with LBJ's 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act; and which is continuing into the present and foreseeable future. Obviously all that immigration has produced (and is producing) cultural changes; but those changes have been to recent for Fischer to cover them in Albion's Seed. When Fischer does discuss recent (post-1900) events, it's to illustrate the four cultural groups, or their interactions with each other. During WWII, some captured German submariners were held in a POW camp in the deep South. Two managed to escape. They then began wandering the countryside in search of food and shelter. They knocked on someone's door to ask for water. An elderly woman answered the door. After a brief conversation--in which each side found it hard to understand the other--she grabbed a gun, and shot and killed both men. She then informed the sheriff of her actions. The sheriff told her she'd just killed two Germans, at which point she broke down and started to cry. The sheriff asked her who in "tarnation" she thought she was shooting at. "I thought they was Yankees." Each of the four cultural groups disliked and distrusted the other three. These emotions were only deepened by increased familiarity.

In that case it's just as well I never changed my screen name to Fitz's_Arm!

Good post. Elsewhere, I've noted that Holcomb, Losman, Edwards, and Fitzpatrick each have very similar yards per attempt stats. After looking at your link, I see that Drew Bledsoe, while with the Bills, had a yards per attempt stat which put him right in the middle of the Edwards/Losman/Fitz pack. Flutie had a higher yards per attempt stat than any of the QBs listed above, and Johnson's YPA stat was higher still. Yards per attempt overstates the quality of Rob Johnson's play, because it doesn't take sacks into account. On the one hand, the Bills had a putrid OL back in the late '90s, and many of those sacks weren't Johnson's fault. But any time you have the most sacked QB in NFL history, there's plenty of blame to go around. Much of that blame belongs to Johnson. Despite the sacks, it's quite possible that both Flutie and Johnson represented better QB play than anything we've seen since. Not that either Flutie or Johnson were good enough to be long-term answers at QB.

"______centric" words are political words, at least when used in a pejorative sense. If (for example) a researcher focuses his attention on the fish that lived during the Mesozoic, few would use words like "aqua-centric" to disparage him or his research. Criticism like that only appears rational when there is some kind of political or ideological subtext to muddy the waters, so to speak. That being said, Fischer's theory is the following: 1) There are four major geographically-based cultures present in the U.S. 2) These cultures were the offshoots of four different British cultural groups 3) When non-British immigrants arrived in regions already settled by British cultural groups, the non-British immigrants tended to adopt the cultural values of the local British cultural group. For example, non-British immigrants in Borderer areas adopted Borderer values, Scandinavian immigrants to the Midwest adopted Puritan values, etc. 4) There are some areas of the U.S. which do not belong to any of the four major regional cultures. The most notable such area is New York City, which has its own culture. You are correct to point out that New Orleans and other areas settled by the French Acadians has a unique culture. Fischer may have touched on that briefly. But the primary focus of his work was in-depth exploration of the four main regional cultures.

One of the best history books I've ever read is Albion's Seed. According to it, there are four major cultural groups in America: the Puritans, the Cavaliers, the Quakers, and the Borderers. The Puritans came from London and the area east of London. They settled New England, upstate New York, the Midwest, and northern California. The Cavaliers from London and west of London. They settled near the coast, in places like eastern Maryland, eastern Virginia, and southern Alabama. The Quakers came from the North Midlands, and settled in eastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. The Borderers came from the six northernmost counties of England and from the Scotch Lowlands. They settled in Appalachia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Southwest. Of the four cultural groups, the Borderers' values are most conducive to making good football players. There was a seven hundred year period during which only two English monarchs did not send some kind of armed expedition to wage war against Scotland. The borderlands from which the Borderers came were in a state of constant war, and that war led them to adopt warrior values. For example: a man from Kentucky and another from western Virginia decided to fight. They were asked if they wanted to fight fair, or "rough and tumble" style. They chose the latter. When the fight began, the man from western Virginia used his fingers to grab the other man's hair; then used his thumbs to gouge out his eyes. Then--still holding onto the hair--he pulled the other man's head forward, and bit off his opponent's nose. Then he let go of the hair, and pulled off the man's ears. At that point, his opponent gave up. The crowd celebrated the Virginian's victory, and afterwards treated him like a hero. The other three cultural groups looked upon the Borderers as barbarians. But barbarians or no, Borderers were as tough as nails. Also, their leaders had the other virtues one expects of warriors: quick, decisive, intelligent decisions in the heat of battle, strong leadership, and a killer instinct. This is why so many good quarterbacks have come from Southwest Pennsylvania (which is Borderer territory), and why Borderer states produce a disproportionate number of professional football players.

I'm against drafting T'eo, because a top-10 pick is a very scarce resource for a team like the Bills; and that resource should be used to improve the pass offense or pass defense. I don't see T'eo making the kind of impact on the pass defense which would justify the 8th overall pick. As far as Rey Manaluga: I would have no objection if he was signed to a contract commensurate with his value. But that value may not be particularly high.

> There has never been any evidence that this scheme would work. It's been over 30 years since the last time something like this has been tried. If a particular experiment isn't attempted, there isn't going to be any empirical evidence either to prove or disprove the validity of the premise being tested. > His path to job security would be much better served by finding a franchise QB. Obviously. The problem being that typically, there are only about eight franchise QBs in the league at any one time. Even if the best QB on your roster isn't quite franchise level--let's say he's the 12th best or 15th best QB in the league--odds are he's going to be considerably better than the second-best QB on your roster. The OP's suggestion only makes sense if the two best QBs on your roster are of about equal caliber. > But it will always be a one man job at QB--at no time in the history of the game has this been more true than now. Why? What changes to the game have occurred to make the OP's suggestion less applicable now than in the past? > Going in the opposite direction is inconceivable. Suppose you have two roughly equal QBs, each of whom is a one trick pony. But each QB's trick differs from the other. Why not prepare both QBs for game day? Then, if it turns out the defense has prepared against Trent Edwards and his short passing game, you bring Losman and his long bomb to the field. Conversely, if the defense is focused on taking away the long bomb to Lee Evans, you bring on Trent Edwards and his short passing game. Edwards and Losman each had a good year before defenses figured out how to stop them. You could say the same about Flutie. Rob Johnson also had some initial success before defenses figured out how to deal with him. The thinking here is that if a defense has figured out the solution to one of your quarterbacks, you emphasize the play of your other QB. Sooner or later, odds are that defensive coordinators will figure out the solutions to both your QBs, and will adapt on the fly to your in-game substitutions. But you could probably squeeze several years of good play out of that QB duo before that happened.

Good post. Even if the formatting makes my eyes blur! The first stat I looked for in all that mess was yards per attempt. YPA was as follows: Ryan Fitzpatrick: 6.7 JP Losman: 6.6 Kelly Holcomb: 6.6 Trent Edwards: 6.5 That's a very narrow range. Also, a QB's YPA isn't affected by just his own play only--his supporting cast matters too. Kelly Holcomb had perhaps the worst supporting cast of the guys on that list, especially along the OL. There was one game in which the defense had shut down the Bills' running game, and the offensive line provided no pass protection whatsoever. Add to that the fact that the WRs had a lot of drops that day. The offense still put up 17 points, which to me indicates that the QB may have been the only offensive player who showed up that day. Additionally, Holcomb came very close to leading the Bills to victory over the Patriots, in Foxboro, back when New England still had a good defense. But, for that one game only, the Patriots just so happened to receive some help from the refs. What should have been a first and ten was turned into fourth and long, based on a ticky tack offensive pass interference call on Eric Moulds. Then on that fourth and long play, the Bills were out-coached. Rookie Roscoe Parrish was supposed to be the primary target, but the Patriots shifted to double coverage of Parrish just before the snap. Throwing it to Parrish would have been the wrong decision. Doing what Holcomb did--throwing it to Moulds well short of the first down marker--was also the wrong decision. Had Joe Montana been playing, he probably would have stood in the pocket, waited until Sam Gash came open, and would have thrown it to Gash. Obviously, Holcomb fell short of the Montana standard, both on that play and others. But he still may have been better than the other guys on the list, including Fitzpatrick. Holcomb was considerably more accurate than Fitzpatrick; and like Fitzpatrick he was good at getting rid of the ball quickly and making the OL look better than it actually was. On the other hand, Holcomb's arm was even weaker than Fitz's, and Fitz's decision-making may be slightly better than Holcomb's.

> Two QB systems do not work in real life period. This has been said at least a billion times throughout the life of football. I agree it's been said quite frequently. Said so often, in fact, that the kind of system the OP has described hasn't been attempted since Shula did it back in the '70s. (Obtaining good results, by the way.) Conventional wisdom in football is sometimes wrong. According to conventional wisdom, winning football games comes down to running the ball and stopping the run. A regression analysis performed by the New York Times proved that wrong. Passing offense is four times as important as rushing offense, and pass defense is four times as important as run defense. If conventional wisdom can be wrong about one thing (run and stop the run), it can be wrong about other things (such as the OP's idea). When a coach isn't fully confident of his own ability, he will tend to rely on conventional wisdom. For the OP's idea to come to fruition, you'd need four things to come together. 1) A team with a highly intelligent, creative, self-confident head coach. 2) A team with two QBs who are roughly equal to each other overall, but each of whom is strong in places where the other is weak. 3) The head coach must recognize that the two QBs are about equal overall, rather than trying to figure out which one is better. 4) The head coach would have to feel confident enough in his own job security to be willing to try unconventional things. It's been said that no one's ever been fired for buying from IBM. This, despite the fact there are times when a non-IBM solution would have been less expensive or better (or both). By the same token, NFL coaches may believe they can increase their job security by acting conventionally, even when an unconventional solution had the potential to work better. This is why there is less experimentation in the NFL than should be the case.

Good post. I'm reminded of the Bills-Titans playoff game. In the first half, Rob Johnson and the offense were useless. Worse than useless, in fact, because they produced no points themselves, while allowing the defense to score on them. A lot of that wasn't Johnson's fault. Both his OTs were playing hurt, and both allowed Javon Kearse to rush to the QB untouched. (The Titans lined Kearse up at different positions along the DL to maximize his impact.) But there were other times when a standard-issue QB would have gotten rid of the ball--times when Johnson took sacks. So you could say that the Bills' OL had an abysmal first half, and the effect of their poor play was magnified by Johnson's lack of pocket presence. After allowing the above-mentioned untouched pass rushes, the injured OTs were replaced by their healthy backups. Between that fact, and the fact that the Titans' pass rush slowed down a little in the second half, it became a whole new football game. Johnson did a great job in the second half, and caused the Bills to take the lead with just 11 seconds left. If you gave Johnson time in the pocket, he was very good at exploiting the intermediate to deep routes. More than anything, that game made me want the Bills to go to the two QB system you described. Flutie would play in the first half, when the pass rush was at its best. Flutie would use short passes and fast legs to largely nullify the effect of that pass rush; causing the offense to accomplish positive things. Had Flutie played in the Titans game, he would have had a much better first half than the one Johnson had. But unlike Johnson, Flutie wasn't very good at throwing intermediate to deep passes. Which is why Flutie wouldn't have played as well as Johnson in the second half of that game. The Bills should have let Flutie play for the first 30 minutes of every game, and Johnson the last 30 minutes. A situation like the above would have the added benefit that if the defense prepared for one quarterback only, the other QB would likely have a big day. Well, a big half day at any rate; but that's a whole lot better than 60 minutes of offensive futility. You are also correct to hint that there are other situations in which the above kind of thinking could work. The coaching staff would have to design two separate offenses. The Holcomb offense (for example) could have involved short to intermediate passes; whereas the Losman offense would be based on the long bomb to Lee Evans.

An excellent point. If it isn't worthwhile to pay Levitre $8 million a year, due in large part to the lack of importance of the LG position, it isn't worthwhile to use the 8th overall pick on Levitre's replacement.

Agreed. I'd rank them in the following order: 1. Fitz. (Below-average starter) 2. Trent (Currently a backup) 3. Losman (Out of the league) Everyone points to Losman's 2006 season. But statistically, Edwards' 2008 season was slightly better. One could point out that Edwards' success in 2008 was non-sustainable. He relied too much on one thing (the check-down), making that offense too easy to defend once defensive coordinators figured it out. But exactly the same things could be said about Losman's season in 2006. Except instead of the check-down, Losman's one trick was the long bomb to Lee Evans.

You've expressed yourself well, but I disagree with your conclusion that the Bills should add Warmack to their war machine. > Don't you have to draft a guy like that if he is available when you pick (regardless of needs)!?!? The problem is that the Bills have a number of needs at premium positions. (Pass rusher, CB, and above all, QB.) If the Bills use the 8th overall pick in the draft for a player at a non-premium position, then how should they go about filling their needs at premium positions? > My logic is this...a top flight, stout O-Line truly makes everyone on offense better I'll agree with that up to a point. However, the Ravens of 2000 had a very good offensive line, led by Hall of Fame LT Jon Ogden. Nevertheless, that offense went five straight games without scoring a touchdown, due mostly to problems at the QB position. (They had Tony Banks at QB for the first part of that stretch, then switched to Dilfer.) A lack of pass protection can take an otherwise effective quarterback and make him ineffective. But the presence of good pass protection will not make Trent Dilfer or Ryan Fitzpatrick into Joe Montana. > And not to mention...there is no point in drafting a franchise QB or even a developmental QB if he's just going to get killed. I disagree with this as well. If you were the GM of an expansion franchise, and if you could use the first overall pick on Peyton Manning, you take him. Period. That said, the Bills are a long way from being like that hypothetical expansion franchise. Glenn looks like he could be the answer at LT, Wood is a good center when healthy, Urbik is reasonably solid at RG, and Hairston and Pears hold the fort at RT. Assuming Levitre walks, our only real hole on the OL will be at LG. Using the 8th overall pick to fill a hole like that is an overreaction. There are perfectly good LGs to be had in the second or third rounds, or in free agency. Maybe not as good as Warmack, but good enough.

This.

Good article! After reading it, I could imagine Barkley being successful in a rhythm offense, like the one the 49ers employed during the '80s.

I strongly disagree. Like many other first round busts, Losman had great physical tools, but had never established himself as a pocket passer at the college level. Going into the draft, he was universally described as "raw," which translated meant that he hadn't shown great proficiency for reading college defenses, or touch and accuracy when throwing the ball. If he couldn't do those things in college, why would someone believe he could do them in the NFL? Steve Young started his career in a bad situation in Tampa. No offensive line, little offensive talent generally. His situation was worse than Losman's, because Young was asked to start as a rookie; whereas Losman was given his rookie year to sit and learn on the bench. Once Young was moved to a better situation, he led his team to a championship. Granted, Losman led his team to a championship too--but that was with the Las Vegas Locomotives. If Losman really had half the talent and potential that you and some others on these boards think he has, he'd be on an NFL roster. And someone would be grooming him to start. Losman is a textbook example of what not to do when drafting a first round QB. 99 times out of 100, it's a mistake to take the guy with the shiny physical tools, who's never shown good accuracy or a decent grasp of the mental side of the game. Teams should err on the side of taking the guy who's a little more physically limited, but who makes up for that with great accuracy and great mental abilities. Joe Montana lasted until the third round, largely because of his lack of arm strength.

The interview was rather disconcerting. Mostly because Skip Bayless was on the defensive, and that's not really when he's at his best. Skip Bayless's best is this! Now, you might point out that there's nothing in that "best" which contains rational football analysis. And you'd be right. But "analytic thought" isn't why one watches Skip Bayless, any more than it's why one acquires a pet dog. Both the dog and Skip are justified by their enthusiasm, not by their cerebral capacity.

Agreed. Accuracy was not one of Losman's strengths.

Two of the most important traits for a QB to have are accuracy and the ability to read defenses quickly. It's unfortunate that Polian had very little to say about how strong either QB was in those areas.

A guy like Kyle Williams can be dominant if he's at his best. But between age and injuries, I anticipate seeing a lot of "less than best" play from him this upcoming season, just as we saw this past season. As for Dareus: his second year was mediocre at best. He looked unmotivated and out of shape in the off-season and the early part of the regular season. There's a real chance he would continue to have looked that way, even had his brother not subsequently been killed.

Good post!