Orton's Arm

> You also DO need to run and stop the run or, in other words, make the opponent one-dimensional so that > you dictate the percentages. Do you think announcers and other analysts repeat that mantra because they're > ignorant of the NY Times regression analysis? Yes. Just as I think Marv Levy was also ignorant of the conclusions of that statistical analysis when he said that winning games is 1/3 offense, 1/3 defense, and 1/3 special teams. The statistical analysis explained 80% of the observed variation in teams' winning percentages, while ignoring all special-teams related variables. At most variation in special teams play accounts for 20% of winning, and very probably less. Another football cliche disproved by the statistical analysis is the adage that offense puts people in the seats, but defense wins championships. The analysis did not find that defense was any more important to winning games than offense. > So no, the Times didn't inform me of anything that hasn't been obvious for a long time. So you're claiming that even if you hadn't seen the analysis, you would have been able to guess that the passing game is about four times as important as the running game? Do you have any evidence to support such a claim? > And again, it didn't educate anyone in the way of the personnel that play the game or the frameworks in which they play it. There are two scenarios under which the above could be true. 1) If front office personnel around the league were already aware of the fact that the passing game is four times as important as the running game. 2) If front office personnel around the league were so full of themselves that they believed that a regression analysis could not materially add to their existing knowledge of the game. As for 1), over the last 40 years the Bills have used 25% of their first picks of the draft on RBs. During that span, they have been about 10 times as likely to use their first pick of the draft on a RB as on a QB. If television announcers and other insiders talk about running the ball and stopping the run, and if at least some of them act as we've seen the Bills act, then where is the evidence that they have always been aware that the passing game is four times as important as the running game?

> While it was a great exercise in statistical analysis, the Times article didn't break any new ground. It didn't? Are you aware of prior statistical analysis which have covered the same subject? > And it certainly didn't teach anyone a thing about football or the athletes that play the game. If it didn't, then it should have. I have heard t.v. announcers say, on numerous occasions, that the key to winning football games is to be able to run the ball and stop the run. The Times analysis disproved that. If you want to make the case that the announcers' theory had already been disproved prior to the Times analysis, fine. Show me the prior disproof.

Opportunities to obtain franchise QBs are very rare. If you lack a franchise QB, and if you're reasonably confident a player will become the QB you're looking for, you take him. If the Bills are convinced a guy like Nassib or Barkley can be the long-term answer, they should take him at 8th overall. The Bills' OL played well last year, at least when healthy. I'll grant that Levitre is a significant loss. But that loss can be made good with a free agent signing, or by taking an OG later in the draft. If the Bills aren't comfortable with any of the QBs in this year's draft, then they should wait until next year. But the decision about when to take a QB should be based on getting the best QB possible. Better to get an Aaron Rodgers before the OL has been fixed than a Mark Sanchez after having waited to fix the OL. That said, I agree with those who feel that fixing a broken OL should always be an urgent priority--especially if the plan is to draft a young QB. As for using the 8th overall pick on a WR: I would have been perfectly happy to have used the 3rd overall pick on A.J. Green a few years back. That's because Green is a special player, and because a special WR can dramatically impact the passing game. A guy like Green can be productive even when being double covered. If one of your players can force them to use up two of theirs--at any position--then that changes the equation. That said, I agree that you shouldn't use a top-10 pick on a WR unless there's reason to believe you're getting a special talent like Green.

If you were building a house, you'd start with a blueprint. That blueprint exists because you (and presumably an architect) sat down and envisioned your house as you want it to be. A GM should do the same thing. Without a clear picture in his head of the team he intends to build, he will never get anywhere. Once he has that clear picture, he should spend his most valuable resources putting the most crucial pieces of the picture into place. If the Bills were to add Warmack to their war machine, the primary benefit would be in their running game. Yes, the passing game would benefit too, because of improved pass protection coming from the LG position. But even if Warmack completely dominated his man on every single pass play, the QB's time in the pocket would be limited by the other defenders Warmack wasn't blocking. Is it worth using the 8th overall pick on a guy whose primary benefit will be to help your team's run blocking? The New York Times did a regression analysis which demonstrated that the passing game is four times as important as the running game. (I can translate that into statistics speak if anyone's interested.) Bearing that regression analysis in mind, a GM should seek to have elite players for the passing game: WRs, a LT, pass rushers, CBs, and above all, an elite QB. Warmack has nothing to do with any of that stuff. (Unless you're concerned about the Bills' ability to block elite 3-4 NTs.) The Bills should use the 8th overall pick on a player who will make the Bills much better at passing or at stopping the pass. I don't think Warmack falls into either of those categories.

Good post! Even if drafting Warmack at 8th overall might seem like a good tactical decision, it would be a very poor strategic move.

The problem with a competition between a veteran and a rookie QB is that the former will almost always win. What the Bills should not do is to draft a rookie QB, throw him in as a starter immediately, give him a few games to look lousy, and then yank the rug out from underneath him by putting a veteran QB in his place. (For those who would draw comparisons with Losman--that's not what happened with him. Losman was not made a starter until his second year in the league; after having been given his rookie year to learn the offense.) To continue: I like the way the Bengals handled the early years of Carson Palmer's career. Palmer was told that he would be the third string QB his rookie year, regardless of how well or badly he played. Early in his rookie season, people who saw him in practice thought he looked like a 3rd string QB. But as the season went on, he quietly improved; to the point that by the end of the year he looked good. Really good. Going into his second year, the Bengals announced that Carson Palmer would be the starter; Jon Kitna the backup. No QB competition. Instead there was a concrete plan; the basis of which was their faith in Palmer's potential as a QB. That faith turned out to be fully justified, at least until injuries limited what Palmer could do. The Bills need a similarly disciplined plan. They should not bring in a young guy while simultaneously bringing in an aging veteran to undermine the young guy.

Next year's draft will supposedly be rich with good QB prospects. If that's true, the Bills should try to trade down from 8th overall, in exchange for a draft pick this year, plus a first round pick next year. If they go into next year's draft with two first round picks, then if need be they'll be well positioned to trade up for a QB they really want.

A case could be made that Bill has a very good point--depending on how you look at the situation. The higher a player is picked, the higher the expectations are, and the more disappointment potential he has. Over the last 20 years, the Bills have had several players chosen in the top-12: Mike Williams Donte Whitner Marshawn Lynch Leodis McKelvin Aaron Maybin CJ Spiller Dareus The last two names on the list don't belong in a discussion of most disappointing player, so let's discuss the others. Lynch was certainly a disappointing player: taken 12th overall, he was traded for a 4th + 6th rounder just a few years later. However, he is currently playing well for Seattle. The presence of guys like Aaron Maybin and Mike Williams remove Lynch from the spot of most disappointing player. After getting rid of Lynch, that list can be winnowed down to just four players: Mike Williams, Aaron Maybin, Leodis McKelvin . . . and Donte Whitner. Those who would argue Maybin's case could point out that he did literally nothing for the Bills. Nothing at all. I would argue that Maybin was significantly below water. By that I mean that he contributed a lot less to the team than a reasonably credible, bargain basement free agent signing would have. For the purposes of this discussion, it may not matter whether a player is just a little below water, or at the bottom of the ocean. Either way, the team got zero value out of drafting the guy; because they could have just signed a bargain basement free agent instead. With the possible exception of the 2004 season, Mike Williams was at or below water level. I'll grant that he had a much better career than Maybin. But that doesn't change the fact that the Bills got little or no value from the Mike Williams pick. Just as the value they received from the McKelvin pick was minimal at best; except for his value as a returner. The fact that McKelvin is valuable as a return man makes him less disappointing than Maybin or Mike Williams. Had the Bills not drafted Whitner, George Wilson would have provided roughly comparable play at the SS position. George Wilson was a relatively inexpensive free agent signing, so the argument could be made that Whitner was not very far above the water line. Because Whitner and Wilson were so similar, the Bills weren't much better off with having drafted Whitner than they would have been had they simply forfeited the 8th overall pick. From a practical standpoint, the picks used on Mike Williams, Aaron Maybin, and Donte Whitner were all wasted. Which of those three picks was the most valuable? On paper, Mike Williams would seem to be the obvious choice; because he was chosen 4th overall. However, 2002 was a very weak draft rich with busts. The 2006 draft was the opposite. Had the Bills stayed put at 8th overall, they could have taken Ngata, Cutler, or other players. Say what you will about Cutler, but he was traded for two first round picks. That's just a little bit more than we got for trading away Lynch! Alternatively, the Bills could have traded down from 8th overall; because there were other teams which really wanted our pick. I personally would much rather have the 8th overall pick in a draft like 2006, than the 4th overall pick in the 2002 draft.

Something about those stats seems off. When I get a chance, I'll have to dig deeper, to see what it is they're really measuring. > But but but - read this to the end! http://www.footballo...set-aldon-smith > Really great analysis, and they favorably compare Whitner with the Bills' safety play. That is not quite accurate. They favorably compared Whitner's discipline on gap assignments on running plays to that of the Bills' safeties. They did not address the question of whether the Bills or 49ers were receiving better play from their respective safeties.

Good posts. As you pointed out, my earlier impression was mistaken. Whitner is a more highly paid safety than I'd previously realized. But at least according to the link you just provided, in 2012 his performance justified only about 30% of the salary he actually received. The other 70% was him getting overpaid for what he was actually producing. As I'd pointed out earlier, PFF is not definitive; and opinions will vary about the extent to which Whitner had been overpaid back in 2012. Nevertheless, that article is worth quoting: ********** For all the impressive displays on the 49ers’ defense, one guy who didn’t stand out for the right reasons was the former Bill, Whitner. He gave up more touchdowns than any other safety in the league (eight) and missed more tackles than you’d like (12). An area for this team to improve. ********* Given that the 49ers had a better pass rush than almost any other team, the fact that Whitner still led safeties in TDs surrendered says a lot. You'd think that the safety who surrenders the most TDs would play for a team with a lousy pass rush. Also, Whitner has the reputation of being a good tackler, because of the highlight reel hits he occasionally delivers. But all those missed tackles suggest his reputation might be over-inflated.

Whenever someone posts a player ranking like the one above, it's useful to look at the methodology used. They described their methodology in the following words: *************** Our Process We balloted our team–guys that spend a vast proportion of their life watching football–and asked them, at each position in the AFC and the NFC, to rank the players in order of preference. We then weighted and tallied the 18 sets of votes and let our four main analysts arbitrate on any ties. ************** Unfortunately, they did not describe what methodology those football-watching guys used to evaluate players. Maybe it's subjective impressions, maybe there are a few football-watching guys who have developed some kind of quantitative way of evaluating players. We don't really know--at least not based on anything they wrote in the description of their methodology. There is the additional problem that if a person is watching a football game, it's hard to evaluate all 11 players at once. Under those circumstances, an individual player can sort of blend into the background on most plays; only standing out when he messes up majorly, or else when he does something impressive. One way of solving that is to have their football-watching guys watch each game multiple times; each time focusing on a specific player. But here again, we don't necessarily have enough information to know if that's what they're actually doing. It's also worth noting that PFF has a vested interest in exaggerating the amount of time their football-watching guys actually spend watching football. If their football watching guys are watching each game only once, Whitner would tend to stand out on plays when he makes a bit hit; while often blending into the background on other plays. During the regular season he didn't get beaten in pass coverage that often, because the 49ers' pass rush was just that good. Someone watching each 49ers game only once would probably give Whitner a high ranking. The PFF article you cited is certainly something to bear in mind when discussing Whitner's strengths and weaknesses. But the article is only an opinion, without much of a description about the methodology used to arrive at that opinion. Nothing in that article should be confused with an established fact; or used to assert that someone is "factually wrong." My own impression of Whitner's play is that he struggled in pass coverage in Buffalo; and continued to struggle in San Francisco whenever the 49ers lacked a ridiculously good pass rush. Others here--people who may well be equal to or better than the PFF guys at forming accurate subjective impressions of players' play--have reached similar conclusions. The fact that Whitner signed the kind of contract associated with a below-average starter or quality backup reinforces the notion that he struggled in pass coverage--at least while in Buffalo. Had he played at an above-average level while in Buffalo, and had even one NFL GM recognized that supposed above-average play, he would not now have the small contract he has. You and others seem to want to argue that he significantly elevated his level of play after joining the 49ers. It is very rare that a player signed as a free agent dramatically increases his quality of play with a new team. A much more likely explanation is that Whitner's weaknesses are currently being masked. As for the reasons the 49ers haven't cut Whitner--those reasons have already been hinted at in a thread entitled "building a sustainable defense." In a nutshell, the 49ers cannot afford to pay all their players like superstars. In order to keep as many of their star players as possible, they have to pay relatively low salaries at positions at which they lack star players. That's where Whitner comes in.

I was surprised it took this long for someone to mention him. Whitner represented the second-highest draft pick we've had in the last 25 years. The Bills' front office successfully turned that draft pick into a safety who can't cover. That, in a draft rich with very good players. Whitner is a below-average safety who, when he hit free agency, attracted little interest among GMs. That, at a time when he was entering what should have been the prime of his career. The fact that he went to the Pro Bowl is ludicrous, because he did not play at or near a Pro Bowl level. During the season, his weaknesses were masked by the quality of San Francisco's pass rush. Then, they experienced an injury to one of their best pass rushers; which meant Whitner actually had to cover people for what most teams would consider a normal length of time. This, he could not do, as we clearly saw in the Super Bowl. If guys like James Hardy (a second round pick), Erik Flowers (a late first round pick) and John McCargo (another late first round pick) belong in this discussion, then Whitner (8th overall pick) definitely belongs here too. The 8th overall pick is worth about double the value of the 23rd overall pick; which means the Whitner pick did about as much damage to the franchise as the McCargo and Flowers picks combined.

An excellent point. The two things I consider most important in a QB are accuracy and decision-making. Fitz had one of those things. His lack of arm strength further limited him. Yeah, the Bills need a QB who's less limited by arm strength than Fitz. More importantly, they need someone who's much more accurate at throwing the football.

Good post, and I agree with what you've written. Just for clarification: by ":Dean" you mean Astrobot, as opposed to the poster on here who goes by the name of "the Dean"?

I too feel intrigued by the idea of adding Warmack to the Bills' war machine, for the reason you mentioned. On the other hand, if a reasonably good NFL defense commits to stopping the run, then as a general rule it will be successful. It will be tougher for Warmack to push people around in the NFL than it was in college. Don't get me wrong--I still expect him to be a very good or exceptional OG--but even with that we shouldn't necessarily expect to be consistently successful at running the ball against defenses geared up to stop the run. Not if the defenses in question are good. On the other hand, an OL with guys like Warmack, plus a RB like Spiller, would force defenses to commit to stopping the run. That would open up opportunities in the passing game. At the moment, the Bills don't have the QB or the #2 WR they need to exploit those opportunities. One possibility would be for the Bills to trade down to around #15 overall for Warmack. Then they could use whatever picks they got from that, plus their second rounder, to trade back into the first for their QB.

You are absolutely correct to imply that the Bills should have taken A.J. Green instead of Dareus. Dareus is a solid player, and Green is something special. Even if Dareus seemed to fill a bigger need at the time, Green would have been much better in the long run. I'd list several factors teams should take into account when deciding which player to draft: Player grade Whether he's a game changer. Yes, I know this goes hand-in-hand with player grade. The importance of the position he plays; and the opportunities that position will give him to be a difference-maker Need An offensive guard like Warmack would earn a very high player grade. But he wouldn't earn as high a grade on the game changer dimension, because there aren't as many opportunities for an OG to be a game changer as would be the case for a QB, DE, LT, or WR. Also, even though the Bills currently have a large hole at LG, that hole shouldn't be considered as big a need as, say, QB. The reason I say this is because normally teams can sign or draft reasonably credible OGs, without parting with a lot of money or high draft picks. After taking all the above factors into account, I suspect the Bills might be best off drafting a QB, WR, DL, or even a CB* with the 8th overall pick; rather than using that pick on an OG. * Note that taking any DB in the first round is justifiable only if the Bills intend to keep him here his whole career, assuming he meets or exceeds expectations. Three times over the last decade, the Bills have let their DBs with the best combination of youth + proven accomplishment go first-contract-and-out. Using first round picks to fill the holes this created is inexcusable, and is one of the main reasons why the Bills have the longest active playoff drought.

I doubt Nassib will be available at 41. If the Bills have their hearts set on him, they'll probably need to either trade down from #8, or trade back into the first round. They may even need to take him 8th overall.

I agree the thread title is misleading, but you are overreacting. Astrobot does not claim to "know" what the Bills--or any other team--will do on draft day. He and others simulate possible scenarios. They make those scenarios as accurate as they can, taking into account teams' needs, players' grades, etc. (Though I agree with San Jose Bills Fan that they probably underestimate QBs' perceived value on draft day.)

The article to which Tipster linked was insightful and intelligently written. 16 year old or no, the article had more depth than most of the football-related articles I've seen from the Buffalo News. It's very, very rare for posters on these boards to create original content of that quality. As far as I'm concerned, Tipster did me a favor by bringing that article to my attention. I probably wouldn't have become aware of the article otherwise. When someone does something which makes these boards more interesting and informative--as Tipster has done here--we should be praising that person. Good post! I understand where you're coming from a lot more after having read it.

I'll grant that not everything written by 16 year olds should be taken as gospel truth. On the other hand, the kid who wrote the article didn't sound like he was 16. If you were to strip his name from the article, and replace it with the byline of some reasonably credible sports writer, people would be talking about the quality and insight of the article. I don't think anyone here is suggesting the Bills draft a guy based on just one article--regardless of the identity of the article's author. Especially not if the red flags Pantoja noted are real. For example: ******** His heavy feet make it nearly impossible for him to make throws to receivers who are at an angle <30 degrees relative to the line of scrimmage, so hitch routes and outs are nearly out of the question (when they are used, he consistently throws it behind the receiver). ******** That and some other things the author raised should give one pause. Even so, this quarterback is worth looking into.

For comparison, Trent Edwards owns a career average of 6.5 yards per attempt, and Losman's career average is 6.6 yards per attempt. When Fitzpatrick averaged 6.7 yards per attempt the last two seasons, he was producing at a slightly higher level than one would have expected of Losman or Edwards. Tom Brady's career average is 7.5 yards per attempt; and Peyton Manning's average is 7.6 yards per attempt. When Brees averaged 7.9 and 7.2 yards per attempt in the two seasons in question, he was producing in the Manning/Brady range. When the Dolphins rejected him, it was because they were concerned about whether he'd recover from his injury. It's possible for a general manager to make mistakes about signing free agents. Normally those mistakes involve a general manager overpaying for a free agent. In the Bills' case, guys like Langston Walker, Larry Triplette, and Derrick Dockery come to mind. It only takes one erroneous GM to cause a player to become grossly overpaid. But the only way a free agent can become grossly underpaid, relative to his past accomplishments and future potential, is if every GM in the league fails to assess him correctly. That's why it's extremely rare to see a veteran player attract little interest on the free agent market, only to go on to achieve great things.

When using statistical tools to evaluate a QB--as you seem to be doing here--it's always important to use the right statistical tools. Using the wrong ones will create deceptive appearances. Ryan Fitzpatrick played for a pass-happy coach; and did a pretty good job of avoiding injury. That gave him the chance to pile up a lot of passing yards. Not necessarily because he was doing anything special on a per play basis--he wasn't--but because he was out there for very many passing plays. Also, the Bills' lack of commitment to their running game meant that a typical Gailey game would often have more plays and more possessions than many other teams' games. After Lynch was traded, the Bills lacked a power RB. That lack--plus the fact that Gailey was pass-happy to begin with--made the Bills disproportionately likely to run the ball while in the red zone. It wasn't that the Bills were particularly good at converting red zone possessions, because they weren't. But whenever they did convert, they were much more likely to have done so with a passing play than a running play. Looking at yards per season or TDs per season rewards a QB for being out there for a lot of passing plays. That's why stats like those make Fitzpatrick look good. Another way of evaluating a QB is to look at what he did on a per play basis. In Dib's excellent post--the one he started off with a --he pointed out that Brees averaged 7.9 and 7.2 yards per pass in his last two years in San Diego. In his last two years in Buffalo, Fitz averaged 6.7 yards per pass. Those numbers are not remotely comparable. If running back A had a 1000 yard season while averaging 3 yards a carry, and running back B had a 1000 yard season while averaging 6 yards a carry, would you say the two RBs were statistically the same? Neither would most general managers. By the same token, when a QB like Fitz does a lot less--on a per-play basis--than a QB like Brees, that's going to affect how GMs see the two QBs. As it should.

You are comparing apples to oranges. It can be difficult for GMs to look at a player's college tape, and accurately predict how well he'll do in the NFL. That's why guys like JaMarcus Russell and Ryan Leaf were taken early in the first round, while players like Tom Brady and Kurt Warner were taken later in the draft, or (in Kurt's case) went undrafted. But once a guy has been in the league for a while--once there's a good amount of NFL game tape on him--it becomes easier for GMs to make an accurate assessment. > Donte was on a Superbowl contender this year. Just as Mike Gandy was the starting left tackle for a Super Bowl contender a few years ago. (The Arizona Cardinals.)

Whenever a Bills' player hits free agency, it's a chance for GMs around the league to collectively render a verdict on the quality of his play. Oftentimes, the verdict is in line with what the vast majority of fans here think. But there are times when a particular player produces polarizes these boards. When there are many here who vocally praise him, while many others criticize his play. Take Losman for example. There are still some here who think he could have been a good starting QB "if only __________ ." GMs around the league haven't bought that, which is why he's no longer in the NFL. Or take Donte Whitner. Long after it had become clear the 8th overall pick had been squandered, there were still many here who claimed that he was a top-10 safety. And went on claiming that after he attracted little interest in free agency, and signed the kind of contract a bottom-10 starter/quality backup would expect to sign. Ryan Fitzpatrick has just finished signing that same kind of contract with the Titans; which implies that GMs around the league are just as critical of him as they'd been of Whitner. (But not as critical as they'd been of Losman.) GMs around the league have rendered their verdict: no one was willing to give Losman the kind of contract a top-20 starting QB should expect. But I expect some to go right on praising him; just as Losman and Whitner have continued to receive praise long after the truth became clear.

During the 5-2 stretch when Fitz looked good, I noted that Gailey was experimenting with a new kind of offense. This offense put pressure on the QB to make good decisions quickly, and get the ball out in a hurry. These are things Fitz does well. The throws themselves were typically easy. That was also a good thing, because throwing the ball accurately wasn't one of Fitz's strengths. It wasn't a strength during the 5-2 stretch, before the stretch, or after. When you create a new kind of offense in an effort to emphasize your QB's strengths while minimizing his weaknesses, there's always the risk defenses will figure it out. I pointed out that danger during the 5-2 stretch. I also pointed out that Fitz wasn't playing as well as the Bills' winning percentage made it seem. In the Patriots game, for example, the Bills won by the skin of their teeth. This, despite the fact the Patriots' defense had been devastated by injuries, and despite the fact that Tom Brady uncharacteristically threw four interceptions. Normally, Brady won't throw anywhere near that many interceptions; and normally the Patriots' defense won't be the chopped liver we saw during that injury stretch. Ultimately, defenses figured out how to stop Gailey's new style of offense; starting with the Bengals game. That wasn't Fitz's fault, and had nothing to do with him becoming complacent after his big payday. I'll grant that the big payday may have affected him. If you think of yourself as the underdog with nothing to lose, you might take a few more risks. But for the most part, the apparent decline in Fitz's performance was the result of his weaknesses being exposed. Those weaknesses had been there all along.